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MORALIZING WOMEN:  
THE EXPRESSION OF BELIEF IN THE VICTORIAN NOVEL 
 
This dissertation examines the longstanding critical distaste for didactic literature and the 
marginalization of certain Victorian women novelists’ work for its overt moral, religious, and 
political commitments. Exploring women’s particular relationship to novelistic didacticism, I 
show that authors like Ellen Wood, George Eliot, Elizabeth Missing Sewell, and Sarah Grand 
consciously used didactic forms to address the risks of expressing belief in fiction and challenge 
stereotypes of the moralizing woman writer. Victorian women novelists faced difficulty avoiding 
charges of moralizing; while entering the public literary sphere brought charges of vulgar self-
display, any counter emphasis on didactic aims brought related charges of moral vanity. Either 
way, women supposedly failed to embody the figure of the spontaneously inspired, 
unselfconscious artist celebrated by ethical and aesthetic discourse of the period. These 
novelists’ experience of such constraints, however, prompted remarkable insights into the 
problematic ironies inherent in such notions of artistic unselfconsciousness as well as alternative 
strategies for managing the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in the novel.  
This project reveals that the modernist critique of Victorian moralizing had an antecedent 
in nineteenth-century religious tradition itself. Even more surprisingly, all the novelists I study, 
religious and secular alike, turn to religious forms—prayer in particular—to rethink authorial 
self-consciousness and the limited possibilities for expressing moral, religious, or political belief 
in literature. Conceptualizing prayer as an address to an audience between self and other, they 
 vii 
cultivate an authorial voice that is neither overly (vainly) self-conscious nor impossibly 
unselfconscious. Their didacticism thus involves more than the artistically simplistic, morally 
presumptuous aim of saving the reader; instead, the engagement of the reader and the author with 
the novel’s complex modes of moral self-consciousness allows them, willingly (after an 
extensive acknowledgment of the risks involved), to save each other.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Often dismissed as simplistic and narrow-minded, didactic fiction is one area of Victorian 
women’s literature that remains underexplored. Working from a feminist perspective, critics 
have recovered many women’s writings and demonstrated their subversion of gender norms, 
their small but significant rebellions against patriarchy. But we tend to avoid talking about the 
primary purpose of many of these works: their promotion of moral, religious, and/or political 
beliefs. Referring to what John Sutherland called the “‘lost continent’ of non-canonical Victorian 
fiction,” Susan M. Griffin notes, “Modernism’s lingering legacy has meant…that novels of 
religious controversy by women continue to comprise one of that continent’s darkest reaches” 
(279). This dissertation seeks to understand why this aspect of modernism’s legacy—an aversion 
for novels with religious (as well as political and moral) aims by women—continues. In 
considering the reasons for this distaste, I’ve found that concerns with moralizing in fiction were 
already present in the writings of the Victorians themselves and were even embedded in the 
religious thought that appeared in many women novelists’ work. A number of these novelists 
consciously addressed the risk of moralizing and ultimately envisioned alternative methods of 
managing the intersection of ethics and aesthetics in the novel. In the pages to come, I trace these 
methods, hoping to cultivate readers’ appreciation for the innovations possible within the 
nineteenth-century didactic novel. 
1. 
Current critical interpretations of George Eliot represent one significant exception to our 
dismissive attitude toward didactic fiction. A major figure in the canon, Eliot too engaged in 
didactic writing, as when in Daniel Deronda (1876) she promoted sympathy for Jewish struggle. 
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After the novel was published, she wrote to Harriet Beecher Stowe (famous for her own overtly 
political novel), “I…felt no temptation to accommodate my writing to any standard except that 
of trying to do my best in what seemed to me most needful to be done” (qtd. in Haight 487). 
Eliot’s biographer Gordon S. Haight comments that her “frank avowal of didacticism contradicts 
George Eliot’s basic tenet that fiction should represent real life” (487). Haight condemns the 
novel as “fiction with a purpose,” equating this quality with a “failure to achieve creative 
realization” (487). Haight’s comments recall the many charges of moralizing that plagued Eliot’s 
work at the end of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. Such charges have not hurt 
Eliot’s long-term canonical status, however. We can in part thank her superlative literary talents 
for this fate, but it is also the result of more recent critics’ work to save her from assessments like 
Haight’s. Such critics highlight Eliot’s complex moral skepticism, her consciousness of the 
problem of moralizing, and her constant self-critique on this topic.1  
Elizabeth Missing Sewell, Ellen Wood, and Sarah Grand—the other three novelists this 
dissertation examines—similarly engage in nuanced self-questioning as they find their way 
around moralization. This has gone unrecognized in their work. Such authors are primarily (and 
dismissively) known for the overtly religious or political valences of their novels. They are 
presumed to take unreflective stances on the expression of belief in fiction. Indeed, the “didactic” 
label tends to signal that such works could not display the self-reflectiveness and broad 
mindedness that we expect of good novels. But these authors’ representations of their moral, 
religious, and political commitments encouraged complex, transformative expressions of 
selfhood and subtle understandings of topics such as self-consciousness, interpersonal relations, 
feminine moral agency, narrative knowledge, novel form, and moral earnestness. Identifying 
                                                
1 See, for example, Neil Hertz, George Eliot’s Pulse (2003), and Marc Redfield, Phantom Formations: Aesthetic 
Ideology and the Bildungsroman (1996). 
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these aspects of their work, however, requires that we revise our critical assumptions about 
didactic fiction. 
 In addition to offending aesthetic tastes, the more religious works examined here can 
clash with progressive political views. Not long ago, a liberal or radical feminist perspective 
would have assumed religious and didactic Victorian women writers to be subject to the 
constraints of patriarchal tradition. The recent surge of studies on women’s religious practices in 
the nineteenth century, however, has painted a more complex picture. These studies often focus 
on women’s reshaping of religious tradition according to their own needs, apart from patriarchy.2 
But such studies, welcome though they have been, themselves risk being reductive; too often 
they reduce Victorian novels to one-dimensional political messages about women’s liberation. 
And, in doing so, they may inadvertently contribute to the continued distaste for women writers’ 
moral and religious commitments. As my readings of individual authors will show, the desire to 
prove that an author’s thoughts and actions answer to current feminist expectations of 
subversion, resistance, and liberation leads us to neglect the significant explorations of moral 
thought and experiments with literary form embedded within some of the more conservative 
aspects of these women’s work.  
A distant example might illustrate the importance of understanding women’s religious 
commitments in subtler terms than suppression or resistance. In her work on the women’s 
                                                
2 In The Reader’s Repentance (1992), Christine Krueger argues that women writers’ “evangelical hermeneutics 
briefly vitiated male domination of public speech, allowing women to use the authoritative language of scriptures 
among men as they traditionally had with each other” (5). The essays in Julie Melnyk’s collection Women’s 
Theology in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Transfiguring the Faith of Their Fathers (1998) “demonstrat[e] the ways 
that women revised, subverted, or rejected elements of masculine theology, in creating theologies of their own” 
(xii). F. Elizabeth Gray’s Christian and Lyric Tradition in Victorian Women’s Poetry (2010) “seeks to complicate 
the simplistic equation between traditional Christianity and the oppression of women” by “investigat[ing] how 
women could find supportive and liberatory models within their Christian faith” (4). Sue Morgan and Jacqueline 
deVries’s collection Women, Gender and Religious Cultures in Britain, 1800-1940 (2010) addresses the question, 
“In what ways did religious faith motivate women and give them the inner strength to question, criticize and defy 
worldly (male) authority?” (6).  
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mosque movement in Egypt, Saba Mahmood explains that the “liberatory” terms characterizing 
“the normative political subject of poststructuralist feminist theory” cause scholars to overlook 
“dimensions of human action whose ethical and political status does not map onto the logic of 
repression and resistance,” “modes of action indebted to other reasons and histories” (14). 
Mahmood provides the example of the women she studies:  
The task of realizing piety placed these women in conflict with several structures 
of authority. Some of these structures were grounded in instituted standards of 
Islamic orthodoxy, and others in norms of liberal discourse; some were grounded 
in the authority of parents and male kin, and others in state institutions. Yet the 
rationale behind these conflicts was not predicated upon, and therefore cannot be 
understood only by reference to, arguments for gender equality or resistance to 
male authority. Nor can these women’s practices be read as a reinscription of 
traditional roles, since the women’s mosque movement has significantly 
reconfigured the gendered practice of Islamic pedagogy and the social institution 
of mosques. (15)  
 
This last statement in particular might seem a preface for a feminist reading, an explanation of 
how these women’s actions nevertheless do subvert gender norms, but Mahmood argues that, 
while highly valuable in certain circumstances, such analyses’ reliance on “the binary terms of 
resistance and subordination” leads them to ignore “projects, discourses, and desires that are not 
captured by these terms” (15). Although primarily anthropological and political, Mahmood’s 
perspective is valuable for our study of religion and literary aesthetics. Her desire to “think of 
ethics as always local and particular, pertaining to a specific set of procedures, techniques, and 
discourses through which highly specific ethical-moral subjects come to be formed” is welcome 
in literary studies as well (28).3 Mahmood’s work highlights the possibility of locating these 
characteristics in works we might otherwise dismiss as oppressive and morally simplistic. 
                                                
3 For philosophical and literary studies that advocate literature’s ability to represent moral complexity through such 
particularity, see Cora Diamond, “Losing Your Concepts” (1988); Colin McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fiction (1997); 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (1990); and Robert B. Pippin, Henry 
James and Modern Moral Life (2000). 
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In a strangely self-contradictory way, our desire for women authors who use their writing 
to resist oppressive social structures and our desire for literature that does more than just espouse 
one overarching moral, religious, or political message have kept us from recognizing the ethical 
and aesthetic value of certain Victorian women writers’ work. Putting these desires to one side 
(even if only temporarily) will allow us to identify the ethical and aesthetic insights these writers 
offer. As will become clear, this sort of study does not ignore the challenges Victorian women 
faced because of their gender; nor does it preclude the possibility that their innovations could be 
empowering. But recognizing that gender liberation was not always women’s primary goal, we 
can also recognize the nuances that gave their work aesthetic value, ethical weight, and rhetorical 
power. 
2. 
With the exception of Sarah Grand, the novelists studied here did not intend to fight 
gender injustice. They did not desire gender equality in the public literary sphere, either; a more 
basic need to find a place for themselves as writers led them to study the possibilities for moral 
expression in the novel. Women’s writing at the time was suspect and in need of justification. In 
middle-class Victorian England, women were properly domiciled within the home, apart from 
the male public sphere; as various critics and historians, have shown, any appearance in print 
made them vulnerable to charges of unladylike and vulgar self-display.4 Needing to justify their 
writing, then, women writers were forced to make its moral purposes explicit. But that very 
justification brought its own dangers: the overt demonstration of moral ambition invited charges 
                                                
4 On the association of the nineteenth-century woman writer with the prostitute, see Mary Poovey, The Proper Lady 
and the Woman Writer (1984); Catherine Gallagher, “George Eliot and Daniel Deronda: The Prostitute and the 
Jewish Question” (1986); Deborah Epstein Nord, Walking the Victorian Streets (1995); and Linda K. Hughes and 
Michael Lund, Victorian Publishing and Mrs. Gaskell’s Work (1999). On Ellen Wood’s specific consciousness of 
this threat, see Andrew Maunder’s “Ellen Wood was a Writer: Resdiscovering Collins’s Rival” (2012). 
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of moral vanity. Claiming to have some knowledge worth imparting to the multitude was just 
another form of self-display.  
Either way, an excessive self-consciousness was assumed to impede women writers’ 
creative aims. Mainstream ethical and aesthetic discourse advocated unselfconsciousness of 
audience as essential to sincere inspiration. Women served as a kind of limit case for this 
unselfconsciousness: they were praised for an angelic “blankness of mind” (Yeazell 51) but then 
automatically associated with a vain consciousness of such moral and aesthetic superiority. This 
dynamic appeared in novel criticism as well. As we will see, women novelists were distinctly 
aware of the problems associated with either an embrace of unselfconscious inspiration or a 
more active, didactic approach to the novel, and they responded to this interpretive bind in a 
variety of ways. Before I preview these responses, however, let me more carefully spell out the 
complex nest of constraints from which they emerged.  
The charges of self-promotion and vanity that Victorian women writers faced could be 
extreme. Exposing oneself “to public view…was fraught with danger for bourgeois women 
writers, since it threatened to equate the professional woman with the demimonde or with the 
prostitute, who also marketed her person in public” (Hughes and Lund 126). Failure to make the 
moral aims of one’s work explicit brought intense scrutiny from Victorian readers, as Charlotte 
Brontë found with Jane Eyre (1847). In the Quarterly Review, Elizabeth Rigby criticized 
Brontë’s characterization of Jane as “the personification of an unregenerate and undisciplined 
spirit” that lacks “Christian grace.” Jane “has inherited in fullest measure the worst sin of our 
fallen nature—the sin of pride” (Rigby 173). Denouncing the novel’s “moral, religious, and 
literary deficiencies,” Rigby called Jane “a decidedly vulgar-minded woman” and Brontë’s work 
“an anti-Christian composition” (174). The Spectator described the interactions between Jane 
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and Rochester as “hardly ‘proper’” (1074). Guessing that a woman wrote the novel, the Christian 
Remembrancer criticized its “masculine hardness, coarseness, and freedom of expression” 
evinced by the prominent use of “slang,” “humour…produced by a use of Scripture,” and “love-
scenes [that] glow with a fire as fierce as that of Sappho, and somewhat more fuliginous” (396).  
A number of women authors, some in direct response to Brontë’s experience, felt 
compelled to be explicit about their moral purpose. Margaret Oliphant’s derogatory comparison 
of the moral ambiguity of North and South (1854-55) to that of Jane Eyre motivated Elizabeth 
Gaskell to depict Brontë in The Life of Charlotte Brontë (1857) as “never violat[ing] propriety or 
domestic affections” (Hughes and Lund 128).5 Gaskell’s biography inspired Elizabeth Missing 
Sewell to praise Brontë’s literary talents and moral character for similar reasons: in defending 
Brontë’s character, Sewell defended her own. She wrote in her journal in June 1857 (later 
published as part of her autobiography), “Years ago, when Jane Eyre came out I read it. People 
said it was coarse, and I felt it was, but I felt also that the person who wrote it was not 
necessarily coarse-minded, that the moral of the story was intended to be good; but failed in 
detail” (Autobiography 159-60). Describing Gaskell’s biography as “intensely, painfully 
interesting,” Sewell then comments on Brontë’s moral character: “A purer, more high-minded 
person it seems there could scarcely be, wonderfully gifted, and with a man’s energy and power 
of will and passionate impulse; and yet gentle and womanly in all her ways, so as to be infinitely 
touching” (Autobiography 160). Sewell’s comments about Brontë echo her description of her 
character Aunt Sarah in The Experience of Life (1852) (examined below in Chapter 1), who 
serves as an idealized stand-in for the author. Like Brontë, Aunt Sarah adds “the charm of a 
                                                
5 See Oliphant’s “Modern Novelists—Great and Small,” which appeared in the May 1855 issue of Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine. 
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woman’s feeling” to “a character which [i]s masculine in its strength of will and vigour of 
action” (17). 
As these responses to Brontë’s writing suggest, women authors felt an urgent need to 
defend themselves (and each other) against accusations of immoral motives. Greater directness 
concerning the moral purpose of their fiction, however, brought accusations of superficiality, 
insincerity, and moral vanity. Critiquing Roman Catholicism in her novel Margaret Percival 
(1847), Sewell was accused of spouting forth “a didactic code” more like “the platform oratory 
of a baptismally-regenerated assembly” than something indicative of a “high-minded and 
spiritual authoress” (“Puseyite Novels” 516, 514). Ellen Wood faced repeated charges of using 
moral and religious language in East Lynne (1860-61) to compensate for a more lascivious 
fascination with the adultery of her heroine.6 Even Eliot suffered from this tendency to conflate 
the expression of belief with self-serving moral vanity. In his critique of Middlemarch, reviewer 
Richard Holt Hutton described Eliot’s “attempt…to represent the book as an elaborate 
contribution to the ‘Woman’s’ question” as “a mistake, meting out unjust measure to the entirely 
untrammeled imaginative power which the book displays” (1555). Hutton implied that Eliot was 
more concerned with “represent[ing]” her work and herself in a certain way to her audience than 
accessing the “untrammeled imaginative power” essential to good literature. Later critics would 
see Eliot as a major source of a more widespread blight. In his 1895 review of Sarah Grand’s The 
Heavenly Twins, D. F. Hannigan complained that “a novelist’s first duty is…not to preach or 
moralize or indulge in hysterical tirade.” It was Eliot’s “tendency for pedantry” that originated 
this “fashion” in women’s fiction (Hannigan 304). 
                                                
6 The Literary Gazette reviewer, for example, argued, “The theology of the work is…open to grave 
exception…sacred and pregnant language ought not to be used in this unmeaning way” (371). Fellow novelist 
Charlotte Riddell called Wood “simply a brute” for “throw[ing] in bits of religion to slip her fodder down the public 
throat” (qtd. in Elwin 241). 
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Such self-conscious display ran counter to some of the period’s central aesthetic and 
ethical tenets. Broadly speaking, nineteenth-century aesthetic discourse believed that sincere 
inspiration was grounded in authorial unselfconsciousness. This idea appeared everywhere from 
William Wordsworth’s famous claim that “all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of 
powerful feelings” (242) and John Stuart Mill’s assertion that “eloquence is heard, poetry is 
overheard” (1143) to John Ruskin’s notion that “the most perfect human artists” work “without 
boasting,” possessing “an inner and involuntary power which approximates literally to the 
instinct of an animal” (163). (We hear echoes of this view still today; take, for example, Pico 
Iyer’s recent comment in the New York Times Book Review: “At its core, writing is about cutting 
beneath every social expectation to get to the voice you have when no one is listening” [27].) 
Such unselfconsciousness requires an obliviousness of audience that is not ignorance or 
blindness. This aesthetic carries strong ethical undertones; it stems from a post-Kantian 
movement away from dogmatic moral law toward a more individually, aesthetically shaped 
ethics based in what John Kucich has described as “a realm of experience that must never be 
completely known” (26). A version of this ideal took hold in the intuitionist strain of Victorian 
moral philosophy that believed that “individual freedom involves turning oneself into an 
intuitively guided moral sophisticate rather than observing moral rules” (Kucich 26). Intuitionist 
W. E. H. Lecky most directly articulated the unselfconsciousness at the heart of this view, 
claiming, “the pleasure of virtue is one which can only be obtained on the express condition of 
its not being the object sought” (36).  
We might assume that women writers would have tried to embody such 
unselfconsciousness to overcome charges of physical and moral vanity. But this interpretive bind 
actually stemmed from the vexed association of women with the unselfconscious ideal in 
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aesthetic and moral discourse. Women’s unselfconscious modesty was a subject of praise and 
admiration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for many of the same reasons men like 
Wordsworth and Ruskin sought it in their art: it suggested innocence, beauty, goodness, and 
access to transcendent inspiration. And yet, as Ruth Bernard Yeazell has shown, admiring 
women for these traits threatened to undermine feminine modesty, ironically associating 
women’s unselfconsciousness with the self-knowledge of moral vanity and even sexual boldness. 
Eighteenth-century conduct books labeled the resulting feminine types the “prude” and the 
“coquette.” Proudly displaying the moral superiority of her modest demeanor, “The prude affects 
an appearance of more modesty than she really has.” This state of mind aligns her more closely 
with the “coquette” than she would like to admit (The Polite Lady 217). The anonymous author 
of The Polite Lady, however, ultimately prefers the prude. Although the two types are “equally 
ridiculous,” they “are not equally dangerous,” since the prude “preserves her reputation” and “at 
least the appearance of modesty” (219). Within this context, we can see why many women 
would choose to make the moral aims of their fiction explicit: the moral vanity of didacticism 
was the lesser of two evils.  
Similarly, Amanda Anderson has argued that the moral ideal of feminine 
unselfconsciousness—or feminine “purity,” as she terms it—was often associated with the 
extreme, uncontrolled self-consciousness of fallenness in Victorian moral discourse. As 
Anderson explains, “the relation between the categories of purity and fallenness took highly 
complex forms, with purity sometimes figuring and shoring up coherent, normative forms of 
identity, sometimes figuring alternate or ideal conceptions of identity, and sometimes 
displaying—as selflessness or sympathy—the attribute of attenuated agency that typically 
defines fallenness” (Tainted Souls 15). In works as divergent as John Stuart Mill’s writings on 
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moral philosophy and W. R. Greg’s review of four accounts of prostitution, the selfless feminine 
ideal “can actually promote rather than prevent fallenness…. Women are likely to fall, and when 
they do, it won’t be out of any power of choice, since choice is dependent on self-control” 
(Anderson, Tainted Souls 37). As we’ve seen, women writers were already careful to avoid 
associations with the figure that epitomized fallenness for the Victorians, the prostitute. But it 
was difficult to escape such associations, no matter what tactic they took. 
Indeed, when women writers embraced their roles as unselfconscious moral exemplars, 
they faced criticisms of false modesty and uncontrolled self-consciousness. Famous for 
promoting women’s selflessness as a cure-all for Victorian society, the author Sarah Stickney 
Ellis was criticized for extolling women’s moral character a little too strongly. In an 1844 
review, A. W. Kinglake criticizes Ellis’s comparison of women’s angelic nature to a model of 
male virtue characterized by “a sublimity so nearly approaching what we believe to be the nature 
and capacity of angels, that as no feeling can exceed, so no language can describe” (qtd. in 
Kinglake 112). While Ellis promotes a model of virtue similar in its unintelligibility to the 
ethico-aesthetic ideal of the unselfconscious artist, Kinglake views her description as morally 
vain. He comments on the irony that in Ellis’s writing “[s]ometimes, for whole pages together, 
we find so much virtue inculcated, that we almost give ourselves credit for having perused some 
sermons and long, by way of relief, to find our authoress stooping to practical views” (112). 
Similar criticisms proliferated in novel reviews. In “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists” 
(1856), Eliot herself denounced women writers’ tendencies toward the “oracular species” of 
novel “intended to expound the writer’s religious, philosophical, or moral theories,” as the “most 
pitiable of all silly novels by lady novelists” (Evans 449). She complains, “To judge from their 
writings, there are certain ladies who think that an amazing ignorance…is the best possible 
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qualification for forming an opinion on the knottiest moral and speculative questions” (Evans 
454). What little knowledge these works express “remains acquisition, instead of passing into 
culture”; the woman writer, “instead of being subdued into modesty and simplicity by a larger 
acquaintance with thought and fact…has a feverish consciousness of her attainments; she keeps a 
sort of mental pocket-mirror, and is continually looking in it at her own ‘intellectuality’” (Evans 
454-55). Similarly, in “False Morality of Lady Novelists” (1859), W. R. Greg claims that women 
novelists’ “experience of life is seldom wide and never deep,” their philosophy “inevitably 
superficial,” and their judgment immature. According to Greg, they promote a “false morality” 
(149) characterized, in part, by “egotistical notions of self-sacrifice” (150). 
The tendency to view women’s attempts at unselfconscious inspiration as morally vain 
survived well past the nineteenth century. In the mid-twentieth century, F. R. Leavis’s reading of 
Eliot made clear that access to the inspired unselfconsciousness seen with Wordsworth, Mill, and 
Ruskin was still limited by gender. Eliot’s vexed relationship with this mindset had prompted 
modernist complaint, forming a reputation for moralizing that began, according to Leavis, with 
Henry James’s 1876 review of Daniel Deronda. The review claimed that Eliot displayed “a want 
of tact” in the “importunity of the [novel’s] moral reflections” (288). Leavis defends Eliot from 
this charge that she had lost, in James’s words, the “spontaneous” ability “to observe life and to 
feel it” (qtd. in Leavis 46). To the contrary, Leavis argues, her moral interests come from a place 
of unselfconscious inspiration. But then—revealing the vertiginous difficulties for women in this 
region of moral psychology—he suggests that Eliot often becomes too self-conscious about her 
unselfconsciousness. “The direct (and sometimes embarrassing) presence of the author’s own 
personal need” for audience approval impedes Eliot’s literary achievements (Leavis 43). Daniel 
Deronda in particular contains “something to provoke the judgment that so intelligent a writer 
 13 
couldn’t, at that level, have been so self-convinced of inspiration without some inner connivance 
or complicity: there is an element of the tacitly voulu” (Leavis 96). In other words, Eliot’s moral 
endeavors are inspired, but her love for this fact undermines that spontaneity and inspiration. 
This “immaturity,” as Leavis called it, was implicitly feminine: such consciousness of audience 
resulted from the close “relation between the Victorian intellectual and the very feminine woman 
in [Eliot]” (96). 
To place all of this in a larger context, Victorian women writers confronted an early 
version of the “showing vs. telling” dynamic that would arise with Henry James late in the 
nineteenth century and become central to novel theory in the twentieth. Perhaps this early 
version is best explained by the absorption/theatricality dynamic that Michael Fried has 
demonstrated as central to understandings of eighteenth-century French painting and realism 
more broadly. But these women’s responses to the problem differed significantly from their 
predecessors’. Fried argues that the idea of a beholder or audience threatened the authenticity of 
an image. Artists thus worked to erase the sense of a painting’s consciousness of its beholder. 
This dynamic formed “the ontological basis of modern art” that took shape into the nineteenth 
century (Fried 61, 70). Nineteenth-century realism also cultivated a sense of objectivity through 
authorial unselfconsciousness. Victorian novels often expressed the idea that “[o]ne can only 
achieve truth through objectivity; one can only be objective by virtue of the moral strength of 
self-restraint” (Levine 149). The women I study were attuned to this problem, but their 
experience with the connection of angelic unselfconsciousness to moral vanity led them to reject 
what up until then had been an acceptable “fiction,” as Fried terms it, in art and literature. They 
refused to feign authorial unselfconsciousness and were thus compelled to find a more difficult 
solution. They worked to find an acceptable form of self-consciousness that neither denied its 
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audience nor exhibited too strong a reliance on that audience’s affirmation—a difficult balance, 
to be sure. But such difficulty produced a variety of creative strategies, as will become apparent 
in the chapters to come.  
3. 
The novelists studied here expose the restrictive view of authorial self-consciousness and 
address the challenges it posed to moral expression in the novel. Such efforts require 
considerable self-reflection, of the sort usually denied to didactic writers. Even so alert a critic as 
Yeazell, for example, is liable to underestimate the capacity of didactic writers to register the 
ironies of their position. She points out that in Coelebs in Search of a Wife (1808)—a work that 
is part novel, part conduct book—Hannah More uses the character of Coelebs to promote a 
“strict division between the sexes” on the topic of modesty. That “the writer who spoke through 
him was herself a woman” who undermined her own modesty by speaking about this issue “was 
not an irony that More and others like her were prepared to register” (Yeazell 8). As the chapters 
to come will reveal, however, several authors who followed in More’s footsteps were quite 
prepared to address the problems this irony created for women writers. More remarkably, they 
found in novel form a means of reshaping simplistic understandings of feminine self-
consciousness and reconceptualizing the ethical and aesthetic trope of the unselfconscious artist. 
This topic is something that Sewell, for instance, addresses at length. Raised under the 
influence of the Oxford Movement, her adherence to the Tractarian doctrine of reserve, which 
advocated unselfconsciousness in one’s devotion to God, required her to think through the 
challenges women face in their attempts to embody such a state. Sally, the narrator of The 
Experience of Life, worries that her mother’s “reserve of manner” creates “an appearance of want 
of sympathy” and “unconscious superiority” toward others (7). It is true that male Tractarians 
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were also accused of moral vanity in their attempts at a worldly withdrawal.7 Isaac Williams, the 
author of the tracts that defined the doctrine of reserve, resigned himself to the possibility that 
practicing reserve “will doubtless lower [a person] in his own eyes, and in the eyes of the 
world…. [One] must be content to be not understood, to be misrepresented” (V: 8). But in her 
more limited situation as a woman, Sewell was unwilling to suffer such misrepresentation; she 
was prompted to resolve the problem Williams identified by revising the terms of sacred 
unselfconsciousness. Displaying a defining trait shared among the texts I study, Sewell’s 
reimagining of reserve does not just demonstrate the worthiness of her novel’s religious 
expression; it above all allows for a self-improvement that would have been impossible had she 
ignored the problem as Williams does. Like the other novelists examined here, the challenges 
Sewell faced as a woman writer compelled her to address the contradictions of authorial 
unselfconsciousness and expand the possibilities for moral expression in the novel. 
The balanced self-consciousness these novelists imagine for their heroines and 
themselves in response to these restraints in some ways calls to mind Anne-Lise François’s 
conceptualization of the “open secret” in Romantic literary traditions, but it serves more actively 
moral ends. The open secret, which includes the impulse “to do good only in secrecy, in ways 
unknown even to oneself,” rejects any imperative toward publicity or concealment, characterized 
as it is by “self-quieting, recessive speech acts and hardly emitted announcements or reports on 
self” (François 26, xvi). These authors cultivate a similar self-consciousness characterized by a 
delicate balance between expression and reticence, but it operates in conversation with more 
                                                
7 As James Eli Adams writes, “Responses to Tractarian reserve energized a social paradox, whereby reticence turned 
into a canny mode of self-assertion, which laid claim to special privileges. And contemporary hostility to the 
Tractarians seized on this political dimension. Arnold, for instance, quickly grasped in Tractarianism a reactionary 
social formation, ‘that sort of religious aristocratical chivalry so catching to young men’—a ‘chivalry’ that Arnold 
regarded as ‘Antichrist’ because it subordinated duty and character to the purely social attribute of ‘Honor’” (Adams 
96-97). 
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explicit self-reflection. Indeed, the open secret holds power to legitimate women’s very public, 
very conscious articulation of their moral and political beliefs and render them more disposed to 
consequential moral action. 
The narrative voice that results from this particular self-consciousness hovers between 
communicative and noncommunicative intent. Analyzing sentences of narration at the linguistic 
level to demonstrate their noncommunicative nature, Ann Banfield argues against 
understandings of narrative based on a “communication model” that attributes sentences of 
narration to a self-conscious narrator. “Narration,” according to Banfield, does not “entail 
addressing an audience. Rather, it is of its nature to be totally ignorant of an audience, and this 
fact is reflected in its very language.” Banfield demonstrates that sentences of narration could 
never be “speakable”; their linguistic construction makes it impossible that they would ever be 
uttered by someone speaking in everyday conversation with another person. Narrative thus 
captures the unselfconsciousness so praised in nineteenth-century aesthetic discourse. “[T]he” 
language of narrative,” Banfield argues, “realizes most fully in its form and not only in its intent 
the essence of the literary which has for so long been taken to be the achievement of poetry”—
something encapsulated, as we’ve seen, in “Mill’s famous contrast between poetry and 
eloquence” (179). Nevertheless, just as the authors I study rejected the idea of such pure 
unselfconsciousness, their sense of narrative voice similarly nuances Banfield’s notion of 
noncommunication. Narrative voice for these authors rides a fine line between communication 
and noncommunication. Their novels are not spoken directly to an audience, but they do not 
avoid communicating either. The sentences of narrative may not be speakable in everyday 
communication, but by their very nature as language, they still convey meaning. Narrative 
theorists may argue about whether narrators are a disembodied, unselfconscious means of 
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presenting an objective reality or self-conscious communicators of their own knowledge, but the 
authors I study embrace narrative for its ability to exude both senses simultaneously.  
To understand narrative in such a way is to imagine an author who neither self-
consciously depends on an audience nor attempts unselfconscious ignorance of that audience. All 
four authors studied here cultivate this voice of balanced self-consciousness both in their 
heroines’ moral expressions and in their narrative to varying degrees. In East Lynne, Wood hints 
at the novel’s ability to capture such a voice, imagining a similarly balanced self-consciousness 
in her heroine Isabel and briefly gesturing toward its implications for herself as a didactic 
novelist. Sewell, Eliot and Grand engage in a more sustained examination of their own 
cultivation of this state of mind at the level of the narrative. Eliot and Grand go to the greatest 
formal lengths to cultivate such an understanding of the implied author. Eliot even has her 
heroine Gwendolen attempt to speak sentences that employ the same linguistic construction as 
sentences of narration. Writing in the later part of the century, Eliot and Grand seem to respond 
with greater urgency to a debate that was becoming more central to discussions of the novel in 
general but that still held the most severe implications for women writers. 
4. 
Remarkably, in their search for an alternative mode of moral expression and their desire 
to move beyond the dualistic view of authorial self-consciousness, all of the novelists in this 
study, religious and secular alike, look to traditional religious forms. They thus remind us of the 
importance religion played in the development of the novel as a genre, even as late as the 
nineteenth century. This turn to older forms to solve such a modern problem may not seem quite 
so surprising, however, given the problem’s largely religious origins. The sincerity of religious 
expression lay at the heart of the evangelicalism that itself was central to Victorian religious 
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culture. As Lori Branch has demonstrated, the secular aesthetics represented by Wordsworth’s 
“spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” originated in the spontaneous sentiment of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century free prayer.8 From the Reformation through the nineteenth 
century, Britain understood “spontaneity—an unpremeditated emotional freshness coveted in 
phenomena as disparate as poetic effusion, enthusiastic worship, romantic attraction, and 
consumer desire”— to be essential to “meaningful human experience” (Branch 2).  
The religious underpinnings of this aesthetic were still apparent in the Victorian period. 
For example, novelist Ellen Wood’s son Charles, in his memoir of his mother, praises her 
religious emphasis on “the state of the heart” over “petty rules and ceremonials” (263) and the 
“utter self-unconsciousness” of her literary endeavors (235). Charles seems anxious to prove that 
his mother “never moralized” in her work: “If a philosopher, she was so unconsciously, for she 
never obtruded her personality upon the reader” (C. W. Wood 222). Sewell’s Tractarianism was 
similarly concerned with the sincerity of religious and artistic expression, although the 
movement rejected evangelical outpourings of belief as too solicitous of an audience. As Isaac 
Williams put it, “A want of reserve, an artificial religious tone in conversation or prayer 
is…proof that the person is wishing to be, or wishing to persuade himself that he is, rather than 
that he really is religious” (V: 8). Significantly, through the self-denial and withdrawal advocated 
by the doctrine of reserve, Tractarianism promoted its own version of unselfconsciousness as key 
to sincere expression.  
                                                
8 Branch argues for the similarities between Wordsworth’s earlier work in Lyrical Ballads (1798) and his later 
Ecclesiastical Sketches (1822), which, although more popular with Victorians, has been “dismissed by not a few 
modern critics as a recanting of his youthful idealism and as an ossification into conservatism” (13). In the latter, 
“ritual and liturgy…recuperate a carefully measured—circumscribed, yet radically free—sense of personal agency. 
By ritual Wordsworth points simultaneously to the public, communal liturgy of the church but also to intentional 
rituals of spontaneity: to what he calls in The Prelude the ‘high service within,’ the consciously cultivated habits of 
mind by which one looks at the world” (Branch 13). 
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These religious concerns lead authors like Wood and Sewell to search for more adequate 
ways to express their beliefs. Their novels revise traditional religious forms in response to the 
restrictions on ethical and aesthetic sincerity imposed on women writers. Even the more secular 
novelists in this study, Eliot and Grand, look to religious forms to answer to the problem of 
moralizing. Reconsidering her earlier critique of the vanity driving women writers’ “oracular 
species” of novels, Eliot envisions the narrative of Daniel Deronda as a form of prayer—an 
individual yet “self-oblivious” articulation that “seeks for nothing special” (310). Prayer 
becomes crucial to these novelists’ search for an adequate method of expressing moral belief in 
the novel. With its unique sense of audience, prayer offers a more concrete way to convey their 
complex understandings of authorial self-consciousness. Although God can always become just 
another version of the other or the self, in these women’s careful envisioning of prayer, He 
serves as a mediating presence that guards against the intense self-consciousness that can form 
from expressions of moral belief directed solely toward the other or solely toward the self. The 
more secular Eliot and Grand may not put their faith in God, but by using the term prayer, they 
just as meaningfully signal a reaching outward that isn’t necessarily directed toward the human 
other but that improves one’s moral relations all the same. 
In recognizing religion’s shaping of the novel’s formal strategies throughout the 
nineteenth century, this study contributes to recent reconsiderations of the “secular” in and 
beyond Victorian studies. As the sociologist of religion Danièle Hervieu-Léger has 
demonstrated, “the process of secularization” does not signify the demise of religiousness but is 
rather “a process of reconstructing belief” (3): “Modernity has deconstructed the traditional 
systems of believing, but has not forsaken belief. Believing finds expression in an individualized, 
subjective and diffuse form, and resolves into a multiplicity of combinations and orderings of 
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meaning which are elaborated independently of control by institutions of believing” (Hervieu-
Léger 74-75). Reminding us of the relationship between modern and religious perspectives, the 
authors in this study call upon traditional religious forms to foster a modern mode of belief in the 
sincerity of their creative expression.  
In this, they help reveal the inaccuracy of understanding nineteenth-century intellectual 
history as defined by a progressive movement away from religious belief and toward secular 
doubt.9 Until very recently, historians have tended to view Victorian intellectual life and 
religious belief as two separate entities. The dominant understanding has been, as Timothy 
Larsen puts it, that “[t]here might have been hordes of earnest Christians running around trying 
to keep people from enjoying themselves, but thinking Victorians, at any rate, generally 
abandoned orthodox faith” (2). Revising Alfred Tennyson’s phrase “honest doubt” from In 
Memoriam (1850), Larsen demonstrates that a number of members of the Victorian Secularist 
movement ultimately turned to an “honest faith”: figures “who had fully imbibed, and indeed 
widely disseminated, all the latest ideas from German biblical criticism to Darwinism 
…ultimately came to the conviction that faith was more intellectually compelling than doubt” 
(vii). Tracing this “crisis of doubt,” Larsen argues, “Future studies of nineteenth-century 
intellectual history should consider building into their framework a realization that faith was 
compelling to many Victorian thinkers” (253). The women writers of this study, forced to think 
in new ways about the cultivation of faith between author and reader, demonstrate the way older 
religious forms address complexities inherent to modern ethics and aesthetics.  
                                                
9 For studies that argue for a reconsideration of the “secularization” thesis in Victorian studies, see Suzy Anger, 
Victorian Interpretation (2005); Mark Knight and Emma Mason, Nineteenth-Century Religion and Literature: An 
Introduction (2006); Timothy Larsen, Crisis of Doubt: Honest Faith in Nineteenth-Century England (2006); 
William R. McKelvy, The English Cult of Literature (2007); and Kirstie Blair, Form and Faith in Victorian Poetry 
and Religion (2012). 
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These writers also anticipate the recognition by poststructuralist writers of the role of the 
religious in our relationship to knowledge. As philosopher John D. Caputo, explains, “the 
structure of the religious breaks into our lives just at that point where we experience the limits of 
our powers, potencies, and possibilities and find ourselves up against the impossible, which is 
beyond our powers. Those who refuse the religious want to retain their own self-possession, their 
own power, their own will” (On Religion 29). Caputo distinguishes “religion,” which he defines 
as “the being-religious of human beings…on a par with being political or being artistic,” from 
“the religious,” which he views as “a basic structure of human experience” (On Religion 9). A 
large part of this experience is recognizing and celebrating the fact that truth, language, and the 
self are at their core uncertain, and that “we can only and indeed must believe, and indeed…we 
must believe something” (On Religion 23). Caputo reads deconstruction and Jacques Derrida’s 
work in particular as an instance of the religious, as encouraging an ongoing renewal of ethical 
responsibility in the face of meaning’s instability rather than a nihilistic rejection of meaning 
altogether. Derrida himself recognized deconstruction’s affinities with negative theology and 
sought to understand this relationship in his later works.10 A similar “theological turn” can be 
seen in the work of French phenomenologists such as Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Louis Chrétien, 
who have argued for the methodological utility of phenomenology in understanding religious 
experience, and in turn, the utility of religious experience in illuminating phenomenology as a 
philosophical method. Drawing on these developments in philosophy and religious studies, the 
following chapters demonstrate that patterns of nineteenth-century religious thought led women 
writers to consider similar problems of truth, sincerity, and selfhood in linguistic expression and 
                                                
10 See, in particular, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials” (1989) and “Sauf le Nom” (1995). (“Sauf le Nom” was 
kept as the title of the English translation in order to preserve the complexity of meaning captured by the French.) 
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recognize the ability of Judeo-Christian religious tradition to manage and remain alert to these 
concerns. 
5. 
 The following chapters trace the religious origins of the modern ethical and aesthetic 
challenges women novelists faced, and they study the way such restraints led to innovative 
understandings of authorial self-consciousness, moral expression, and the novel form. 
Recognizing the impossibility of expressing complete unselfconsciousness, the novelists I study 
engage with the complexities of authorial self-consciousness instead. They explore these 
complexities through the uneven distribution of self-consciousness and narrative knowledge 
among characters, narrators, and the implied author. As such experimentation constitutes a key 
part of these novelists’ didactic aims, it becomes clear that didacticism can involve more than the 
artistically simplistic and morally presumptuous goal of saving the reader. In the case of the 
works studied here, it is the engagement of the reader and the author with complex models of 
moral self-consciousness that allows them, willingly (only after an extensive acknowledgment of 
the risks involved), to save each other.  
The first chapter, “Revising Tractarian Reserve: Novel Form and Elizabeth Missing 
Sewell’s Expression of Belief,” uncovers the religious underpinnings of the concern with moral 
vanity in the novel and demonstrates women’s particular association with such vanity. Sewell, 
like other Tractarians, embraced the doctrine of reserve, which endorsed withdrawal and 
unselfconsciousness. But in The Experience of Life, she also tries to resolve one of the doctrine’s 
inherent ironies, that attempts at unselfconscious immersion in God invite accusations of the very 
moral vanity that reserve was designed to avoid. Although her Tractarian forefathers saw 
poetry’s measured control of emotion as the ideal form for cultivating reserve, Sewell suggests 
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that the novel was better equipped to address her concern with the problem of self-consciousness 
in the expression of belief. Using unorthodox modes of plotting and narration and comparing the 
resulting novelistic voice to a kind of prayer, Sewell embodies a reserved self-consciousness that 
preserves her religious commitments as well as the reader’s faith in her artistic and moral 
motives.  
Chapter Two, “A Cross to Bear: Novelistic Didacticism and Evangelical Experimentation 
in East Lynne,” turns to evangelicalism and continues to examine the religious origins of 
Victorians’ concern with moral vanity in the novel. For Evangelicals, unselfconscious 
spontaneity in prayer ensured that one’s religious expression was sincere rather than merely 
dutiful. But it could also appear solicitous of others who could affirm that sincerity. Ellen 
Wood’s East Lynne (1860-61) reveals how evangelical patterns of thought both produced and 
offered ways around the interpretive bind women authors faced. With a distinctly evangelical 
emphasis on the atonement, Wood repeatedly describes the adulterous heroine Isabel’s return to 
her family disguised as her children’s governess as “bearing her cross.” These moments have 
been dismissed by Victorian and more recent critics alike as moralizing, but Isabel’s strange 
return allows her a liminal place between a moralizing self-assertion and a feminine 
unselfconsciousness often read as morally vain in its own right. Doing what she can to help her 
children while ensuring that she does not act solely for recognition, Isabel’s model of moral 
agency emblematizes Wood’s own moral expression in the novel.  
I’d like to note briefly here that Wood’s use of religious tradition to inform her 
understanding of a similarly balanced self-consciousness differs slightly from the other authors. 
She sees prayer as a mode of expression directed more exclusively to God rather than 
simultaneously to God, others, and oneself. Wood’s evangelical background leads her instead to 
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look to the atonement and the notion of bearing one’s cross as providing the distinct method of 
self-reflective moral expression that the other authors seek through prayer. Nevertheless, this 
method still has ties to prayer. Wood depicts Isabel’s bearing of her cross as a more public 
version of sincere prayer, a mode that takes her prayers more actively into the world. And, 
especially important for our interests in the validity of moral expression in the novel, Wood still 
draws on biblical tradition’s complex understanding of the difficulties of linguistic sincerity to 
validate Isabel’s moral expressions and actions. Isabel’s repeated use of the simple phrase “yes, 
yes” at the end of the novel, when she has succeeded in bearing her cross, alludes to similar 
usages in the New Testament. As we will see, the yes, yes has a long tradition of serving as a 
quiet, unaffected way of affirming one’s sincerity while still recognizing the precariousness of 
that sincerity. The voice that speaks the yes, yes is thereby able to capture a similar kind of quiet, 
balanced self-consciousness as the other authors do with prayer.  
Chapter Three, “‘Something quite new in the form of womanhood’: Reimagining ‘Lady 
Novelists’ and the Realist Novel in Daniel Deronda,” uncovers Eliot’s treatment of the ethical 
and aesthetic limitations placed on women’s writing. Facing accusations of moralizing and 
yearning to speak out against Jewish injustice in her final novel Daniel Deronda, Eliot rethinks 
her earlier critique of women writers’ moral vanity in “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists.” She 
exposes society’s expectations of angelic unselfconsciousness that ironically incited this kind of 
self-consciousness in women and provoked charges of vanity. Suggesting that expectations of 
authorial selflessness amplify the problem for the realist novelist, Eliot looks to religious form 
for a more plausible place for the implied author in realism. Her narrative derives rhetorical 
power by approximating prayer as individual expression that is also “self-oblivious,” “seek[ing] 
for nothing special.” Tracing this authorial voice, I revise the critical view of Eliot as hesitant to 
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use realism as a vehicle for moral belief. Such a viewpoint may debunk modernist depictions of 
Eliot as moralizing, but it suggests a moral skepticism that “fall[s] into the apologetic philosophy 
which explains the world into containing nothing better than one’s own conduct” (Daniel 
Deronda 177), a mindset that the novel posits as a type of moral vanity itself. 
Chapter Four, “Feminist ‘Cant’ and Narrative Selflessness in Sarah Grand’s New Woman 
Trilogy,” examines the ethical and rhetorical significance narrative knowledge holds for feminist 
expressions of belief in Grand’s novels Ideala (1888), The Heavenly Twins (1893), and The Beth 
Book (1897). Like many New Woman authors, Grand has been accused of moralizing. But in this 
critics are only repeating the sort of criticism that her novels themselves make. Grand’s narrators 
trace a less self-conscious state of mind behind her heroines’ expressions of belief, ensuring that 
their ethical self-awareness does not become self-regard. Narrative form can make this kind of 
self-consciousness apparent, but, as Grand realizes, it can also transform it into just another 
instance of moralizing self-promotion on the part of the author. Grand responds to this problem 
through formal innovation, shifting among various narrative perspectives and generic modes. 
These shifts are not isolated experiments, but an integrated project designed to allow for 
authorial self-expression free of self-absorption. Like the other novelists I study, Grand compares 
her authorial voice to prayer, in which the purpose of expression lies somewhere between self-
reflection and rhetorical efficacy. Training her readers to interpret a version of such complex 
self-consciousness in others, Grand envisions a community of feminists bound together by their 
willingness to pick up where the novel must leave off, serving as each other’s narrators in the 
real, “narratorless” world. 
Collectively, these chapters demonstrate the various ways women writers re-envisioned 
the possibilities for expression of belief in the novel and the various social contexts—
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Tractarianism, Evangelicalism, international politics, and the women’s movement—they sought 
to invigorate with their innovations. In our own critical context, these works offer to rethink staid 
categories such as moral earnestness, evangelism, and cant as they revise our understanding of 
novelistic didacticism. Seeking to manage the difficult balance of ethics and aesthetics, the 
women writers studied here developed strategies that can still teach us about the formal 
possibilities of the novel. In this way, the validity of their didactic goals extends much further 
than they could have possibly foreseen. Lest we feel coerced by these aims, we might keep in 
mind that we are, in a way, learning alongside these authors themselves. Driven by more than a 
simplistic desire to convert readers to their viewpoints, these authors’ didactic expressions are 
often just the beginning, rather than the end, of attempts to cultivate their own faith in their 
novels’ ethical and aesthetic aims. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Revising Tractarian Reserve:  
Novel Form and Elizabeth Missing Sewell’s Expression of Belief 
 
The work of Tractarian novelist Elizabeth Missing Sewell has remained at the margins of 
critical conversations over the years, most likely because of her conservative views on women 
and her use of the novel for moral and religious purposes.1 Sewell did make a brief appearance in 
early feminist recovery work: Elaine Showalter gave a nod to her novels in A Literature of Their 
Own (1977), and Catherine Sandbach-Dahlström, Patrick Scott, and Shirley Foster made 
extended arguments for continued study of Sewell.2 Other scholars, however, were put off by her 
apparent antifeminism.3 If we judge Sewell from a contemporary feminist perspective, her 
performance is ambiguous. She rejects certain gender restrictions, questioning fellow Anglican 
novelist Cecilia Frances Tilley’s refusal to describe a clergyman’s inner life or “intrude ‘into that 
sacred edifice which formerly a woman’s foot was forbidden to profane,’” declaring, “I should 
never consider it an intrusion to go wherever men go” (Autobiography 132). But then Sewell has 
one of her most beloved characters, the otherwise independently minded Aunt Sarah, tell her 
niece, “Don’t try to be a man when you are only a woman” (The Experience of Life 435). 
Recognizing the limits inherent to Sewell’s historical and social milieu—and that the expression 
of feminist views was not a primary aim of literature at the time—Maria LaMonaca has recently 
                                                
1 J. S. Bratton speculates that what “has kept [Sewell’s novels] from much serious critical consideration is” that their 
“‘reflection and advice’ are both explicitly Christian (though in no way offensively so, as the author’s horror of cant 
ensures) and explicitly concerned with women” (168). 
2 See Sandbach-Dahlström’s “Perceiving the Single Woman: Elizabeth Sewell’s The Experience of Life” (1984), 
Scott’s “Genre and Perspective in the Study of Victorian Women Writers: The Case of Elizabeth Missing Sewell” 
(1984), and Foster’s Victorian Women’s Fiction: Marriage, Freedom and the Individual (1985). 
3 See Sarah C. Frerichs’s “Elizabeth Missing Sewell: Concealment and Revelation in a Victorian Everywoman” 
(1979) and Valerie Sanders’s “‘Absolutely an Act of Duty’: Choice of Profession in Autobiographies by Victorian 
Women” (1986) and The Private Lives of Victorian Women: Autobiography in Nineteenth-Century England (1989). 
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reframed the conversation about Sewell’s views on women. Highlighting Sewell’s censure of the 
supposed sanctity of the Victorian domestic sphere, LaMonaca argues that Sewell “would never 
have considered herself an advocate of women’s rights” (110), but “in an era in which women 
defined their agency in moral, spiritual, and ethical terms, not even the most entrenched social 
institutions or expectations could quench the desire of” women like Sewell “to live, act, and even 
write as their consciences demanded” (125). Reading Sewell within terms less strictly defined by 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century expectations, LaMonaca encourages renewed appreciation 
for Sewell’s representations of the complexities of women’s moral and religious agency. 
Nonetheless, Sewell remains rarely studied,4 and this neglect seems not solely the result 
of her ambiguous gender politics. It also derives from the other aspect of her work that has drawn 
criticism: its didacticism. Critics recognize Sewell’s novelistic talents—her character 
development in particular—but they also criticize her unsophisticated moral and religious focus.5 
One of the earliest twentieth-century critics of Sewell, Joseph Ellis Baker, wrote that her work 
was “[a]t once adult in taste and language, juvenile in morality and experience” (116). Years 
later, Showalter would argue that Sewell “was an extremely conscientious and deliberate novelist 
with a sophisticated understanding of plot, character, and narrative technique; but she used her 
books to dramatize her own views on theological and educational questions” (146). Similarly, of 
Sewell’s novel Ursula (1858), John Sutherland writes, “the subtle chronicle of the growth of 
female consciousness is vitiated by a penchant…above all for pietistic conclusions” (567).  
                                                
4 Since the turn of this century, only four studies have devoted any attention to Sewell’s work: June Sturrock’s 
“Catholic Anti-heroines: Craik, Sewell and Yonge” (2004), Philip Davis’s Why Victorian Literature Still Matters 
(2008), LaMonaca’s Masked Atheism (2008), and Meoghan Cronin’s “Bless Me, Father; Religion and the Good Girl 
in Elizabeth Sewell’s Margaret Percival and Mary August Ward’s Helbeck of Bannisdale” (2011).  
5 Some scholars have contributed more criticism than praise. Andrew L. Drummond calls Sewell “an assiduous 
propagandist in fiction,” her novels “didactic, wooden and frightfully ‘churchy’” (72). Vineta Colby names Sewell 
as one of a handful of Victorian women novelists who “stop their narratives cold for their moralizing and have their 
simple homely characters speak the formal rhetoric of the pulpit” (192). 
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As long as we view Sewell’s didacticism as impeding her literary success, we miss a 
large part of what makes her worth studying. Sewell’s talents for self-examination, 
characterization, and narrative technique propel her engagement with the challenges of moral 
and religious expression (that is, the aspect of her work that has been dismissed as narrow-
minded didacticism). Recognizing this interconnection, we can better appreciate the complexity 
of her moral commitments and her experiments with novel form. Compelling evidence of such 
complexity can be found in Sewell’s autobiographical novel The Experience of Life (1852), 
popular in its day and more recently dubbed “an unheralded little masterpiece” by Robert Lee 
Wolff (143). The novel follows the life of its narrator, Sarah Mortimer, or Sally, from childhood 
to old age. Sally grows up in a large family that struggles financially when her father dies and 
her uncle keeps the family inheritance. Sally never marries and devotes herself instead to 
teaching. No “striking event[s]” define Sally’s life (1); rather the narrative traces her daily 
psychological, moral, and religious struggles and her development, aided by her great aunt, also 
named Sarah Mortimer. The novel is based on Sewell’s “own experience, or personal knowledge 
and observation”; as she claimed, the younger “Sarah’s troubled mind was a record of my own 
personal feelings, but I had no aunt Sarah to comfort me” (Autobiography 114-15).  
Throughout the novel, Sally’s “troubled mind” works to understand the challenges 
women face when expressing moral and religious belief. Sewell looks to the Tractarian doctrine 
of reserve to address these challenges, but she also exposes the doctrine’s pitfalls. Responding to 
what the Oxford Movement viewed as the moral vanity of Evangelicalism, reserve advocated for 
withdrawal and unselfconsciousness in any display of belief. Sewell understands herself to hold 
to the practice of reserve. But she demonstrates that Victorian women and women authors are 
particularly vulnerable to accusations of moralizing, whether they attempt to embody reserve’s 
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pure unselfconsciousness or more overtly express their beliefs. In doing so, Sewell pinpoints one 
of reserve’s inherent ironies: attempts at unselfconscious immersion in God invite accusations of 
the very moral vanity that reserve is designed to avoid.  
Sewell reconceptualizes reserve to resolve these issues. She turns from her Tractarian 
forefathers’ emphasis on poetry, suggesting that the novel’s formal strategies are better equipped 
to address her concerns. Sewell explicitly eschews the marriage plot for its association of authors 
with a wifely unselfconsciousness that verges on vanity, and she experiments with particular 
narrative techniques to trace a readable sincerity in her characters, her narrator, and herself. 
Using Sally’s careful narration of the nuances of her younger self’s self-consciousness as a 
model, the novel offers readers the opportunity in later scenes to “narrate” its narrator and author 
in such a way that both figures embody a similarly complex self-consciousness. That is, without 
asking for this interpretation but inviting it all the same, narrator and author neither affectedly 
pretend to complete unselfconsciousness nor fall prey to self-conscious moralizing. Sewell 
compares her resulting novelistic voice to a kind of prayer, the audience for which lies 
somewhere between self, others, and God. Such ambiguity of audience allows Sewell to preserve 
her moral and religious commitments while revealing the complexity of thought informing this 
didacticism. 
I should briefly note here that I will speak throughout the chapter of Sewell’s struggles to 
express moral and religious belief in fiction. Although her focus on the doctrine of reserve was 
primarily religious, she also saw it as a guide for moral expression more generally. Thus, at times 
I will refer to Sewell’s aims and expressions of belief as “moral” rather than “religious.” The 
term “moral” should not preclude the possibility that these aspects are also religious in nature; 
rather it serves to indicate Sewell’s concern with the way expressions of religious belief affect 
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one’s relation to other people. As we will see, Sewell’s moral interactions with her readers and 
her religious identity are never mutually exclusive. 
1. 
Tractarian interest in reserve arose with the movement in the early 1830s. It appeared in 
John Keble’s Lectures on Poetry (delivered between 1832 and 1841, when Keble was Oxford 
Professor of Poetry) and in John Henry Newman’s first book, The Arians of the Fourth Century 
(1833). But it was Isaac Williams’s Tracts 80 and 87, both titled “On Reserve in Communicating 
Religious Knowledge” (1838, 1840), that made reserve a formal doctrine. In their writing about 
reserve, the Tractarians developed ideas that dated back to the Bible and to the writings of early 
Church fathers. Williams speaks repeatedly of “our Father ‘who seeth in secret,’” a reference to 
the book of Matthew: “when thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand 
doeth: / That thine alms may be in secret: and thy Father which seeth in secret himself shall 
reward thee openly” (Matt. 6:3-4).6 These verses capture two key components of reserve: first, 
that God “is in secret”; his truth is hidden from view and revealed only gradually to the worthy. 
Secondly, God’s faithful should themselves be “in secret,” expressing their devotion 
paradoxically through withdrawal and self-denial.  
The idea that worshippers should look only to God, striving for an unconsciousness of 
other people was central to Williams’s tracts—and a point of contention for Sewell. Williams 
describes “good men” as taking after Christ in their charitable actions, “marked by an inclination, 
as far as it is possible, of retiring, and shrinking from public view” (II: 7). This emphasis 
becomes especially clear in Tract 87, which criticizes the Evangelical tendency towards 
sanctimonious display. Williams’s focus on unselfconsciousness in the expression of religious 
                                                
6 See also Matthew 6:5-6: “when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are: for they love to…be seen of 
men…. But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and…pray to thy Father which is in secret.” 
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belief reveals, as G. B. Tennyson notes, that reserve is not just a mode for approaching God but 
also “a principle of the moral life in general” (47). As we will see, Sewell also views reserve as a 
guide for moral behavior, but for this very reason she identifies the limits of such extreme 
unselfconsciousness and explores the importance of other people in one’s cultivation of reserve. 
In 1840, through her brother, William Sewell, an Oxford-educated clergyman and author, 
Sewell met “the most marked men of the Oxford leaders,” including Keble, Newman, and 
Williams (Autobiography 61). The Tracts for the Times “excited [Sewell’s] curiosity, and led to 
inquiry,” while her brother also “succeeded in indoctrinating” her with Tractarian views. Sewell 
singles out the importance of the doctrine of reserve, both in her life and her literary endeavors: 
“Especially it was a relief to me to find great earnestness and devotion in a system which 
allowed of reserve in expression, and did not make the style of conversation, which I had met 
with in the only definitely religious tales I had read, a necessary part of Christianity” 
(Autobiography 57).7 
Within The Experience of Life, Sewell depicts the problems associated with a lack of 
reserve in her characterization of Sally’s maternal aunt Mrs. Colston, who “preache[s] a sermon 
upon every word” (166). Aunt Colston’s preaching stems more from her pleasure in displaying 
her moral fortitude than from any desire to help others. It doesn’t matter when she preaches to 
her niece on the importance of waking early that, as Sally’s brother protests, Sally already “gets 
up earlier than any one” (150). When she lectures her niece on “[v]anity, sycophancy, discontent 
with [her] station in life, exclusiveness,” Sally describes the experience as being “written and 
talked at” (235). Sewell was alert to the danger of such sanctimony in her own writing. In her 
                                                
7 Sewell refers specifically to evangelical children’s author Mary Martha Sherwood. She admired fellow Tractarian 
novelists Charlotte Yonge and Harriet Mozley for answering to readers “who turned from the texts, and prayers, and 
hymns, which Mrs. Sherwood had introduced into her stories, and yet needed something higher in tone than Miss 
Edgeworth’s morality” (Autobiography 62). 
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autobiography, she recalled that her earliest attempts at authorship were “little sermons for my 
younger sisters, which doubtless would have been much better applied to myself” (16).  
Nevertheless, if Aunt Colston reveals a lack of reserve, her sister, Fanny Mortimer 
(Sally’s mother), reveals the danger of too much reserve—something Sewell saw as equally 
problematic. Fanny is “very gentle, yielding, and unselfish,” but she does have her “faults, or at 
least, failings”: “bred up in an atmosphere of pride and ultra refinement,” she is “not a popular 
person.” Sally blames her mother’s excessive reserve: “Reserve of manner gave her often an 
appearance of want of sympathy; and…there was an unconscious superiority shown in her 
intercourse with the Carsdale society, which threw many persons at a distance” (7). Even if 
based in gentleness and unselfishness, too much reserve, Sewell suggests, can be interpreted as 
and actually become a sign of affectation. Again, Sewell recognized this problem in herself. As a 
girl, she preferred to read alone while her sisters played nearby: “I enjoyed hearing their voices, 
but I did not wish to join them. But the self-consciousness which naturally goes with such a 
disposition was very easily seen; and I was told that I was affected, and this again acted upon my 
irritable temper, and I grew more really reserved” (Autobiography 16). Sewell reveals that this 
“self-consciousness”—a simultaneous withdrawal from others and concern with their opinions—
continued into adulthood. “I am alluding…to what I was as I grew beyond actual childhood” 
(Autobiography 16-17).  
Sally’s mother’s “reserve of manner” extends to her expression of belief as well, more 
directly evoking questions about whether or not reserve might impede Sewell’s didactic goals. 
Fanny’s reserve obstructs her children’s moral and religious upbringing. Sally does not know 
“what first made [her] think seriously about religion”; Fanny “[i]s so reserved that” she has 
“difficulty…bring[ing] herself to speak upon the subject even to her children” (30). Later Sally 
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reveals that her mother’s “reserve…counteracted much of the good which I might have derived 
from being with her” (220). Reserve not only risks its own moral vanity but can also exclude 
others from one’s ideas; more drastically, it can prevent moral expression entirely. 
In highlighting reserve’s limits, Sewell questions the Tractarians’ promotion of “natural” 
feminine self-effacement as an archetype of reserve.8 As Emma Mason claims, reserve “was 
understood as a gentle route to God opposed to the manly directness of Evangelical writing” 
(198): “Already aligned with passivity and sensibility, women were recognized as almost 
essentially reserved” (205). Williams compares Anglican religious practices to reserved 
femininity when he criticizes both Evangelicalism and Roman Catholicism for affected public 
expressions of belief. “The eye of man is on both,” he explains, “unhallowing the holy things of 
GOD, and engendering pride” (V: 8). Anglican practices are “directed to the eye of GOD, and 
not to man; as the Bride who ever looks to the Bridegroom, and to none else” (Williams VI: 1).9 
Women were said to possess a natural unselfconsciousness that men must cultivate.  
While the doctrine of reserve allowed Christina Rossetti as well as other High Church 
women writers such as Felicia Skene, Charlotte Yonge, and Cecil Frances Alexander a particular 
authority to represent religious issues in their work,10 Sewell saw this authority as much more 
                                                
8 The leaders of the Oxford Movement were even criticized as “unmanly” for promoting the virtues of reserve over 
“straightforward, frank, unhesitating action and utterance” (Adams 99). Charles Kingsley, for example, wrote in 
1851 that within Roman Catholicism and High Church Anglicanism, “there is an element of foppery—even in dress 
and manner; a fastidious, maundering, die-away effeminacy, which is mistaken for purity and refinement” (Kingsley 
201). For more on this topic, see David Hilliard, “UnEnglish and UnManly: Anglo-Catholicism and Homosexuality” 
(1982) and James Eli Adams, Dandies and Desert Saints (1995). 
9 Similarly, Gill Gregory notes that in Williams’s poem The Cathedral (1838), the speaker admires the cathedral’s 
statue of the Virgin “as an exemplary model of a womanly reserve”: the Virgin “ha[s] a song but ‘no voice’ (‘Her 
voice is with her God, her silence speaks’).” But while Williams celebrates the Virgin’s reserve, he inadvertently 
reveals the dangers of associating women with such a pure, natural unselfconsciousness, for the Virgin is in “a state 
of petrifaction” in which her “song is no longer her own” (Gregory 364).  
10 Mason argues that their works “employ a certain reserve derived from Tractarianism, subtly alerting the reader to 
their religious knowledge and so implicit support for women’s education” (205). For more on Rossetti’s 
employment of reserve, see Andrew D. Armond’s “Limited Knowledge and the Tractarian Doctrine of Reserve in 
Christina Rossetti’s The Face of the Deep” (2010) and Mary Arseneau’s Recovering Christina Rossetti: Female 
Community and Incarnational Poetics (2004). 
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vexed. Examining Rossetti’s poetry, Mason explains that by “requir[ing] the believer to adopt a 
restrained, submissive and therefore ‘feminine’ relation to religious investigation,” Tractarian 
reserve “allowed a writer like Rossetti…the role of theological commentator…while exempting 
her from accusations of vainly flaunting religious learning unsuitable for a middle-class woman” 
(198). Mason identifies the link between whiteness in Rossetti’s poetry and the way reserve 
allows one to “becom[e] pure, erasing and effacing the self into a state of extreme reticence” 
(210). But such a wholehearted embrace of reserve and of women’s access to it overlooks the 
ease with which such self-effacement can appear as “vain flaunting” itself.  
The interpretive dilemma reserve posed for women becomes clear when we look at 
Keble’s comparison of the “modest reserve” of poetry to “the modest blush of a country maiden” 
in his Lectures on Poetry (V: 84-85). Keble’s understanding of self-consciousness within reserve 
is more tempered than Williams’s, since the poet and the maiden “neither conceal their secrets 
from worthy readers nor cast their pearls before the unworthy” (V: 84-85). As Keble’s address of 
his audience as “gentlemen” makes clear (V: 84), he was primarily concerned with men’s 
relationship to reserve. Nevertheless, if his reference to “the modest blush of a country maiden” 
suggests something about women’s capacity for reserve, his choice of image troubles what might 
seem a more balanced view of feminine self-consciousness. The history of the blushing maiden 
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century aesthetic and moral discourse reveals the problems Sewell 
associates with reserved unselfconsciousness. As Ruth Bernard Yeazell demonstrates, the blush 
signified both innocent unselfconsciousness and sexual knowledge and vanity. On the one hand, 
the blush was an emblem of the modest “blankness of mind” admired in marriageable women 
(Yeazell 51): “unlike the other bodily signs of modesty—the downcast eyes, the head turned 
aside—[a woman’s] blushes were not subject to her will and could not, therefore, be affected” 
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(Yeazell 73). On the other hand, the bodily nature of the blush could also conjure a conflicting 
sense of sexual knowledge. If young women did not “remain modestly unaware” of their desire 
for those courting them until the marriage proposal (and even afterward, as Yeazell shows), their 
blushes risked suggesting a false, manipulative modesty (51). Thus the Reverend John Bennett’s 
comments in Letters to a Young Lady (1789): “a girl should hear, she should see, nothing, that 
can call forth a blush, or even stain the purity of her mind” (Yeazell 65). 
Tracing these conflicting interpretations of women’s supposed unselfconsciousness, we 
can see how Fanny Mortimer’s reserve could appear affected and why Sewell might hesitate to 
adopt the traditional forms of Tractarian reserve. Although Keble suggests that women’s mental 
states are more complex, the image of the blushing maiden ready for marriage tends to get 
reduced to signifying either helpless innocence or affected vanity. Williams, a student of 
Keble’s, ignored the nuances of feminine self-consciousness and associated women with pure 
unselfconsciousness. Sewell counters such reductive treatments of women’s mental states. She 
refuses to set up Sally’s mother’s extreme reserve as a model of virtuous expression, and, as we 
will see, she explores the difficulty of getting around the aesthetic and moral expectations that 
women authors be unselfconscious.  
Sewell herself was affected by such conflicted understandings of feminine 
unselfconsciousness. Just two years before the publication of The Experience of Life, she was 
accused of a pretension like that of Sally’s mother. An Athenaeum review of Sewell’s novel The 
Earl’s Daughter (1850) reported that her avoidance of overt didactic expression leaves the reader 
“tantalized rather than taught by too finely spun speculations on those most secret thoughts in 
every human breast which are not to be either weighed or condemned by man for man” (655). 
Tractarian reserve necessitated a similar tension between alluding to God’s truth and struggling 
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to keep it hidden. The Tractarians drew on a “genealogy of hiding God,” as Mason explains: 
“Even when the truth is adapted to human comprehension, the disclosure is necessarily guarded, 
scripture cloaking its meanings behind enigmas, parables and proverbs and the Fathers too often 
coding their commentaries to bar readers from knowledge for which they were unprepared” 
(198). This tendency often drew criticisms of pretension. Sewell’s similar refusal to do more than 
allude to such “secret thoughts”—her reliance on the reader’s “clairvoyance”—creates, 
according to the reviewer, a sense of “beauty and high pretension” that “is more fatiguing than 
the harshness and inequality of less perfect creations” (Athenaeum 655). This problem 
reverberates throughout Sewell’s characterization of Fanny, whose “image, in its grace and 
beauty,” Sally hesitates to describe: it “comes before me as a lovely picture, which I would fain 
keep in all its original perfection” (7). An attempt to maintain that “lovely picture” of 
“perfection” through reserve, however, can be easily misinterpreted: when, for example, Fanny 
tells Miss Cleveland that she would like her daughters to know Lady Emily Rivers, not for her 
social rank, but because she is “good and unpretending” (49), Miss Cleveland assumes that 
Fanny’s wish stems from the fact that she is “pretending.” She reads Fanny’s reserve as the rest 
of the town always has, as a sign of her “exclusiveness” and her “pride” in her aristocratic 
background. Again explicitly using the word “reserve,” Sally describes her own difficulty 
understanding her mother here as resulting from the fact that “[s]he was so reserved” (50).  
Sewell’s reserve similarly led to a misinterpretation of the motives behind her moral 
expression. Her avoidance of moralizing backfired, at least for the Athenaeum reviewer:  
The flimsiest or wildest romance is, to our thinking, reading less unwholesome 
than this quintessential distilment of the mysteries of the heart, made by any 
mortal teacher, with the view of recommending his own peculiar system of cure 
as the one which should…quicken every palsied function of conscience…and, in 
short, utterly cast out mistrust, evil, and imperfection, by the ministry of a few 
absolute and unquestionable angels on earth. (655) 
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Just as Sally’s mother’s resemblance to an “angel of goodness and beauty” can make her seem 
affected (9), Sewell’s attempt at reserve was read as more a performance of her own angelic 
perfection than a desire to express her religious and moral beliefs effectively. Not only does 
Sewell’s reserve exude pretention for this reviewer; it also begins to resemble a version of 
didacticism urging an entire belief system on the reader. 
After seeing how easily reserve can appear moralizing, we may not be surprised to find 
that around the same time that Sewell was accused of being too reserved, she was also accused, 
like Aunt Colston, of “preach[ing] a sermon upon every word.” In October 1850, the Prospective 
Review compared Sewell’s critique of Roman Catholicism in Margaret Percival (1847) to “the 
platform oratory of a baptismally-regenerated assembly.” The review examined Sewell’s first 
five novels,11 praising them for the most part, but warning, “Religion…should be exhibited as a 
spring of conduct, a moving force influencing external circumstance, not as a theological system, 
or a didactic code” (514). Suggesting, as the previous reviewer did, that Sewell too self-
consciously imposes her beliefs on the reader, the Prospective Review critic expresses the 
common preference for the organic portrayal of religious and moral issues. Such organicism 
would be difficult, according to this critic, for an author whose religious arguments resemble 
those demonstrated by “an English Clergyman…to his niece” (517). Sewell has thus stepped into 
the realm of preaching inappropriate for a woman author. Again, while Sewell faced accusations 
of being too self-conscious in her attempts at unselfconsciousness, her attempts at the 
straightforward expression of her religious views also marked her as affected. 
 Confronted by this dilemma, Sewell imagines a new model of feminine self-
consciousness and moral didacticism and embodies it in the figure of Aunt Sarah, Sally’s 
                                                
11 Sewell’s first five novels were Amy Herbert (1844), Gertrude (1845), Laneton Parsonage (1846-48), Margaret 
Percival (1847), and The Earl’s Daughter (1850). 
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namesake, godmother, and mentor. Aunt Sarah’s moral expression contrasts with both Sally’s 
mother’s reserve and Aunt Colston’s moralizing. When Sally attends classes for confirmation, 
her mother says “in her quiet way that she should be glad for [her] to go; but aunt Sarah warmly 
approve[s],” requesting to hear all about it and offering advice (32). Sally’s mother may be “very 
gentle, yielding, and unselfish” (7), but, Sally says, Aunt Sarah is “self-denying, to an extent 
which I have only lately begun to understand and appreciate” (24). Aunt Sarah’s self-denial 
involves some self-assertion, requiring a prior acknowledgment of self and its inevitable limits. 
When Sally’s father’s death leaves the family penniless, Sally assumes it her duty to support her 
mother with the little money she earns teaching, but Aunt Sarah encourages her to ask her more 
financially stable siblings for help. She points out the vanity and inefficacy that arise from trying 
to be too selfless: “they will all…call you an angel; and by-and-by, you will find that you can’t 
support her” (312-13). Aunt Sarah discourages Sally from “half kill[ing] [he]rself with anxiety” 
to the point that she “turn[s] round upon” her siblings, telling them, “See…how I have sacrificed 
myself for you.” This advice may run “contrary to the dreams of self-sacrifice in which [Sally] 
ha[s] for years indulged” (315), but as Aunt Sarah says,  
good people,--and I call you good, not because you are so, but because you wish 
to be so,--good people sin in their virtues, as well as bad people in their vices. 
Generosity is a valuable quality, but justice is so too; and, may be, one is better 
than the other, because the world thinks less of it. And if you ever wish to be 
generous, you must begin by being just,--just to yourself as well as to your 
neighbours. (315-16)  
 
The world’s attention to self-sacrificing generosity automatically associates it with vanity. In this 
case, doing for oneself is less vain than doing for others and, in fact, allows one to do more for 
others in the long run. 
Aunt Sarah’s moral expression may be self-assertive, but it is quite distinct from Aunt 
Colston’s sanctimonious preaching. At first glance, though, the two women appear similarly 
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rigid in their didacticism. For example, Sally’s sister Caroline, “who always laugh[s] at what she 
call[s] over-strictness, used to declare that aunt Sarah had trained even her canary bird to keep 
quiet on its perch when the Bible was brought out” (31). But Sally contrasts the two women 
when Aunt Colston tells Sally that “there is nothing so needful as humility for a young person 
aiming at proficiency as an instructress of childhood” (152-53). Detecting her pretention, Sally 
reflects, “Oh dear! How much rather I would have heard Aunt Sarah say, ‘Sally don’t be a 
goose!’” (153). Sally admires the unaffected tenor of Aunt Sarah’s moral counsel. When she 
advises that Sally always be ready to help her mother, Sally exclaims, “I can help her, I must—I 
will,” to which Aunt Sarah adds, “With red eyes whenever she wants a pair of stockings 
mended.” Sally describes Aunt Sarah’s tone as “malicious…yet so kind…that in spite of being 
heartily provoked with myself, I could not help laughing”—which is exactly the response Aunt 
Sarah aims to evoke. “Ah! laugh if you will,” she says; “laughing helps us through the world.” 
Aunt Sarah’s affectionate teasing tempers her moral seriousness, in a way that adds a “depth of 
earnestness,” as Sally puts it, to her tone (84). Aunt Sarah neither shies away from the overt 
expression of belief nor succumbs to the vanity that can undergird self-assertion. 
 The intricacies of Aunt Sarah’s tone preview Sewell’s use of narrative techniques to 
cultivate a similar tone as author. This connection between Aunt Sarah’s didacticism and 
Sewell’s becomes more obvious when Aunt Sarah uses her writing to convince Sally’s siblings 
to support their mother financially after their father’s death. Referring to her own failed attempt 
to do the same, Sally notes, “It was the most difficult letter I ever wrote in my life. I began 
sentences, and stopped, and tried to twist them differently, and tore up the paper, and never 
seemed to advance a step further.” Sally’s letter is ineffective, leading Aunt Sarah to write one 
herself. “Aunt Sarah’s influence in the family…was the result of many years of respect,” Sally 
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says, “and the same things which, said by me, would probably have been disregarded, or have 
caused annoyance, were received from her with attention; and, at length, produced a practical 
effect” (330). The effectiveness of Aunt Sarah’s letter depends on readers’ understanding, 
developed over time, of her tempered self-consciousness. Sewell, as we will see, looks to the 
novel’s form to shape this understanding for herself. 
2. 
Sewell worked to influence readers’ ongoing interpretations of her moral character as 
author. Since marital status largely influenced interpretations of Victorian women’s moral 
character (we need only look to Williams’s reserved bride and the blushing maiden trope as 
evidence), Sewell’s and her first-person narrator’s explicit lack of desire ever to marry would 
have hindered such interpretations. Women’s moral characters were defined by their potential to 
embody the ideals of reserve as selfless, unselfconscious wives. Although highly vexed, these 
ideals still favored, on the surface, women who married or presumably would marry in the 
future. As Sally’s sister Caroline declares when attempting to convince Sally to marry, Aunt 
Sarah “would have held a much higher position in general estimation if she had been married.” 
Her other sister Joanna adds, “think for a moment how every one laughs at old maids, and how 
silly they make themselves, and how cross they are” (197). Joanna suggests that a young 
woman’s unselfconsciousness is eventually sullied if she fails to marry. Society’s definition of 
middle-class women based on marital status may prevent readers from perceiving the nuances of 
self-consciousness we see in Aunt Sarah or cause readers to view Sewell’s attempt to 
demonstrate them as a further sign of vanity. 
Sewell suggests that her narrator’s and her own unmarried status may threaten her 
trustworthiness as a novelist. The Victorian novel certainly relied on its association with 
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marriage to legitimate its moral aims, affiliating itself, as Rachel Ablow has shown, with 
idealizations of the angelic wife who purified her husband’s moral character. The novel served as 
a kind of wife to readers, “retrain[ing] their ways of seeing, understanding, and feeling” so that 
they aligned with the selflessness and spirituality promoted by domestic ideology (Ablow 5). 
According to Ablow, Dickens epitomizes this idea in David Copperfield (1850), his “aesthetic 
seek[ing] to make [readers] love both him and his characters…and so to ‘influence’ them in 
much the same way that a wife might influence her husband” (19). Sewell, however, rejects the 
Victorian marriage plot in her novel and undermines any automatic association of her moral 
character with a reserved wifely selflessness. Although a wifely status may seem the easier route 
to proving her sincerity, it risks association with vanity.12  
And, indeed, marriage is often linked with vanity and greed in the novel. About her sister 
Caroline’s wedding to the successful businessman Mr. Blair, Sally comments, “I tried to think 
the event might be for her good, and, if goodness and happiness were to be found in wealth, I 
knew she had a fair prospect before her. But there was something in my heart which told me that 
marriage cannot be passive in its effect upon the mind,--that if it does not raise, it must lower, the 
character.” Reversing the idea that it is the angelic wife who should raise the character of the 
husband, Sally says that Caroline’s husband “was not a person to give her higher views of life 
and its duties. He would, so I feared, sink her first to his own level, and then they must both 
mutually drag each other lower and lower” (211). Sally reveals the social posturing underlying 
the notion of the wife as moral exemplar: Caroline “had accomplished the objects for which her 
husband had been urged to marry her; she had raised him in society, she had made his parties 
                                                
12 This was more a risk for Sewell than for Dickens, since, as a woman, she was more vulnerable to the negative 
implications of wifely selflessness. Ablow demonstrates that other women authors such as Emily Brontë and George 
Eliot challenged the novel-as-wife model for the way it glorified not just women’s selflessness but also their self-
annihilation.  
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agreeable, set herself against awkward acquaintances, toned down his manners, and gained him 
respect by a prudent liberality of charitable subscriptions” (229). From this perspective, the 
wife’s purification of her husband’s character has less to do with genuine moral behavior than 
with social appearance. 
Lest Sewell imply that the blame rests with women themselves, she is careful to 
demonstrate that society—and more specifically the marriage plot—push women into marrying 
for vain motives. Sally laments that women she knows and women characters she has read are 
forced to think of themselves and the trajectory of their lives only in terms of marital status:  
Aunt Colston discoursed upon the desirableness of having daughters well settled; 
even uncle Ralph, when he ventured upon a joke, used to tell Joanna not to say 
‘no’ too often. And in novels—if the few I had read were to be taken as any true 
description of life—there was nothing else worth a moment’s thought. If women 
were not married, they were either soured by the disappointment, and lived to be 
the torment of their friends; or after concentrating into a few years the sorrows of 
a long life, they invariably died of consumption. (221-22)  
 
Caroline’s vain preoccupation with her wifely status inevitably results from an inundation of the 
idea that marriage is the only worthy aspect of a woman’s life.13 
Caroline represents more than just a woman desiring to be married; she also takes on the 
traits of a woman writer using the idea of marriage for her own gain. Caroline displays certain 
traits fitting for a novelist: “Hers was a mind which seemed to watch and understand all that was 
going on, and know exactly what every one meant, or was wishing for. She could calculate to a 
nicety the effect of her own words, and could always prophesy the line of conduct which her 
companions would pursue.” Having received a dinner invitation and insisted that the entire 
                                                
13 Sewell would express a similar idea in her Principles of Education (1865). She does admit, “A happy marriage is 
the most happy of all happy events.” However, problems arise when marriage is presented as “the purpose and 
object of life, the final cause of woman’s creation. It seems almost absurd to suggest the possibility of such an idea, 
and yet so-called rational human beings talk and act as if it was; and fiction, being only the counterpart of the 
world’s facts, recognizes it as such, and thus presents it to the imagination. Girls are so wrongly taught from 
childhood that they are led to stake their all upon this one cast” (Sewell, Principles 308). 
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family attend for the sake of Joanna’s and her own marriage prospects, Caroline “seat[s] herself 
at the writing-table,--look[s] at [her] mother and father, as if her arguments were unanswerable,--
wr[ites] the acceptance, and that point [i]s settled” (127). Caroline’s writing here is directed 
toward her “one object in life—a wealthy marriage” (127-28). Shaping her own authorial identity 
in contrast to Caroline, Sewell suggests that plotting for ends other than marriage may be a 
desirable moral choice and a way around the limitations marriage places on women’s and women 
authors’ moral characters. Sally tells us at the very beginning that she will not “write a tale that 
contain[s] one prominent object, in which all interest is concentrated” because “this is not a real 
representation of human existence” (1). Instead, Sally recounts Aunt Sarah’s “experience of 
life,” and her own, neither of which are centered on the “one prominent object” of marriage.14 
Sewell thus distances herself from the imagined purity of the marriage plot, the angelically 
reserved wife, and novelists who might use these naturalized structures as moral justification for 
their writing.  
The Experience of Life works to establish the sort of trust between author and reader 
ideally found between people in marriage—but without relying on the structure of the marriage 
plot. Speaking of Caroline’s desire to be married, Sally tells us, “I knew her object; she did not 
conceal it.” Sally knows Joanna’s “object” too: “admiration now; marriage by-and-by.” She 
admits, “Sometimes I asked myself, what was my own” (128). Sewell may not have an “object” 
in the sense of a teleological end toward which the rest of the narrative points, but she does aim 
to cultivate trust throughout the novel between readers and herself—an aim that, although 
common among novelists, was more difficult for Sewell caught in the dilemma we have been 
studying. Working within a didactic tradition, Sewell viewed her fiction as a way to help her 
                                                
14 LaMonaca argues that, in its rejection of marriage as an option for Sally, “Sewell’s novel challenges not only the 
rhetoric of Victorian domesticity, but also existing standards of novelistic realism and the narrow confines of the 
marriage plot” (110). 
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readers understand her moral and religious beliefs and strengthen those beliefs for herself. In 
other words, she sought to bring her readers and herself closer to God, perhaps cultivating a 
relationship like that between Sally’s younger sister Hester and her husband, the rector Mr. 
Malcolm, in which “‘the blessings of all spiritual benediction and grace’…fall upon them both; 
for they were amongst those whose one prayer is, ‘so to live together in this world, that in the 
world to come they may have life everlasting’” (438). The novel thus does not rule out 
marriage’s potential to encourage the kind of trust that brings both parties closer to God, but it 
suggests that Sally may be more successful in cultivating others’ trust through a feminine reserve 
that operates apart from the institution of marriage and, for Sewell, apart from the limitations of 
the marriage plot. 
Sally and Aunt Sarah’s faith in each other’s capacity for goodness suggests the possibility 
for this trust outside of marriage. Lady Emily Rivers engenders similar trust in both Sally and 
Aunt Sarah (and, as we’ve seen, Sally’s mother Fanny). Describing Lady Emily’s “soft tones of 
welcome,” Sally asks, “Who could shrink from…those words of kindness, of which it was 
impossible to doubt the sincerity” (103-04). But Sally wonders what it is that makes Lady 
Emily’s “purity” and “unworldliness” legible (73): “I can see them now, when I recall her image, 
written upon her countenance in indelible, unmistakeable characters; but I could not read them 
then, I could only feel them” (74). Comparing her understanding of Lady Emily’s 
trustworthiness to a kind of reading, Sally suggests that readers of this novel might learn to 
detect a similar trustworthiness in their narrator and author. But Sally doubts the widespread 
possibility of reading and trusting sincerity in another person, asking, “Can it be merely the 
dream of years, magnifying, to increase its regrets for the past, which bids me look around the 
world now, and sigh that there are none like her?” (104). Putting this thought in the form of a 
 46 
question, Sewell seems to ask readers whether or not they will help her make Sally’s thought 
untrue, whether they will help make it possible that Sally and Sewell too are like Lady Emily in 
their readable sincerity. 
3. 
With this attention to sincerity’s readability and to the problem of the marriage plot, 
Sewell intimates her belief that the novel holds within its form the potential to free her from 
associations with moral vanity. Thus far, her most straightforward formal attempt to get around 
this interpretive bind has involved unorthodox plotting, but she retains misgivings about whether 
rejecting the marriage plot will be enough, since perceptions of women’s moral character are so 
wrapped up in marital status. Because these perceptions are based in a sense of women’s self-
consciousness or lack thereof, Sewell looks to the novel to represent the complexities of 
women’s self-consciousness. Alongside her experimentation with plotting, Sewell uses the 
interplay among levels of self-consciousness in characters, narrator, and author to approximate a 
sincerity similar to Lady Emily’s. Rather than just declaring the existence of that sincerity—as 
she does with Lady Emily and to some extent with Aunt Sarah—Sewell makes hers legible for 
her readers to detect for themselves.  
With Aunt Sarah, Sewell has demonstrated the nuances of self-consciousness possible in 
a woman’s moral character and expression, but she will undermine her own aims if she attempts 
to convince readers of these nuances in herself. Reflecting this authorial and narratorial 
conundrum at the level of character, Sewell places Sally in a situation where her attempts at 
reserve are read as affectedly self-conscious, and she is left with no way to defend herself from 
accusations of vanity. Planning a party, Caroline and Joanna decide they need new dresses, but 
Sally sees no need for one herself. Nevertheless, Horatia—Aunt Colston’s niece through 
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marriage and adopted daughter figure who views Sally as a “rival” for their aunt’s affections and 
inheritance (152)—forces her into a position in which she appears vainly self-serving whether 
she refuses or accepts a new dress. The scene suggests that reserve doesn’t automatically 
generate vanity; such risks arise in the way reserve is read. Although Sally’s affected self-denial 
begins as a simple lack of interest, Sally allows the accusations to bother her, quickly becoming 
as vainly self-conscious as her accusers believe her to be. Sewell thus pinpoints the unique threat 
posed by the charge of self-consciousness: you become exactly what you are charged with. Sally 
vacillates between rejecting a dress to appear unselfish in Aunt Colston’s eyes and expressing 
her desire for a dress to keep from seeming like she only rejects the dress to appear good. The 
younger Sally may find herself caught in an impossible situation, but, as we will see, the older 
Sally—the narrator of this scene—as well as Sewell, have devised a way out. 
Horatia has dresses sent out for Sally and leads Aunt Colston to believe that Sally herself 
has ordered them, making it appear that the vanity that drives Sally’s supposed desire for a new 
dress also drives her desire to appear self-denying. Horatia reads Sally’s lack of interest as 
affected self-denial, accusing her of wanting to “wear sackcloth to be thought a saint.” Sally’s 
attempt to deflect the accusation only makes it worse. When she asks Horatia to stop, Horatia 
responds that “saints should never be out of temper” and declares, “She won’t be Saint Sarah if 
she talks so” (183). Horatia suggests that Sally refuses the “temptation” of the dresses solely “for 
the sake of pleasing” Aunt Colston. Sally notes the role of language in creating this confusion, 
explaining, “I really could not allow this absurd scene to go on; and feeling that my words were 
likely to be taken up and diverted to a contrary meaning, I contented myself with quietly closing 
the parcel.” Aunt Colston reads this action as Sally further resisting selfish temptation, 
commenting “Self-command, I see.” Suggesting that the “absurd scene” has not ended but only 
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grown more absurd as Sally attempts in vain to convince others that she does not act for reasons 
of vanity, narrator Sally admits to the reader that Aunt Colston’s comment “was praise very ill 
deserved” (185). 
“[U]rged by an impatient longing to do something which might, as it were, clear [her]self 
from suspicion” (187), Sally tries the opposite tactic, openly expressing a desire for a new dress 
and allowing her mother to help her choose one. But this does not help matters. Sally notes Aunt 
Colston’s disapproval and, “resolving to be bold,” tells her, “You are vexed with me about that 
silk dress…but it really was not my fault.” When her aunt asks whose fault it was, however, 
Sally realizes again that she cannot say anything that will clear her from appearing selfish: “I 
could not say, ‘My mother’s,’ and felt perplexed how to reply” (205). Sally’s tactic of boldness 
as opposed to reserve only further convinces Aunt Colston of her vanity and increases her own 
concern with appearance in her aunt’s eyes. 
Sewell alludes here to the similar dilemma women writers faced with their moral 
expression. She also acknowledges the way this interpretive bind can snowball into absurdity—
an absurdity that Sally herself has some part in creating as she allows these interpretations to 
affect her. If Sewell criticizes past reviewers for putting her in this position as an author, she also 
reveals how easy it is to be drawn into perpetuating these interpretations herself. She asks in a 
refreshingly honest way how one might work one’s way out of this interpretive dilemma.  
The older, narrating Sally understands the problematic insidiousness of this sort of self-
consciousness, but her younger self struggles to avoid it, which only makes it worse. The older 
Sally recognizes Aunt Colston’s approval of her “self-command” as “praise very ill deserved,” 
and when Horatia disingenuously calls the younger Sally “wise” for not accepting a new dress, 
she tells the reader, “I was not very wise. I was excessively weak; but I was not eighteen, little 
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used to the ways of the world, shrinking with the most acute feeling from the least suspicion of a 
double motive” (187). The younger Sally, just as exasperated with her own impotent confusion 
as with Horatia’s scheming, surrenders to the seeming impossibility of the problem, but the older 
Sally implies that she has found a way around it; she has learned not to “shrink…from the least 
suspicion of a double motive.” 
Narrator Sally’s acknowledgment of her own susceptibility is not self-berating but 
instead grants her a kind of knowing command over the scene—the very “self-command” that 
younger Sally lacks—and undermines any sense that her moral expression is a blind attempt at 
others’ approval. She cannot explicitly narrate this dynamic in herself without falling into the 
same trap of defensiveness, but she guides us to understand it by narrating a similar dynamic in 
her younger self early on. Recounting her confirmation, Sally recalls the pleasure of being 
admired, a dress again serving as a symbol of vanity: “I felt a consciousness of being noticed as 
about to take part in a ceremony in which every one I met was interested; my white 
dress…marking me out as one of the children to be confirmed.” Sally tries to “collect…[her] 
thoughts,” hoping her self-regard will subside at church, but “the same confusion of ideas 
followed me, and the service was, what the preparation had been, a struggle in which I believed 
myself utterly to have failed.” But then, with phrasing that suggests a further level of self-
consciousness gained only now that she narrates herself, Sally adds, “Yet, no,--I will not say that 
entirely. Even then, though grievously vexed with myself, something in my own heart told me 
that I had not failed” (35). Sally realizes that her younger self’s semi-conscious willingness to 
engage in this struggle—her refusal to “shrink…from the least suspicion of a double motive”—
signals something other than vanity and failure: “I was in earnest, heartily in earnest. I had 
entered upon the battle of life, and I was resolved, through God’s assistance, that, cost what it 
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might, I would bear myself bravely to the end” (35-36). Sally’s earnestness here comes from 
occupying a state between vain self-consciousness and helpless unselfconsciousness and from 
acknowledging that she will always risk a lack of earnestness at the very moments she wishes to 
be most earnest—but “bravely” trying anyway.  
Sally embodies a similar earnestness in her narration of the dress scene, but she leaves it 
to readers to detect this state of mind themselves. Unlike her younger self in this scene, Sally the 
narrator does not fall into the trap of exaggerated self-consciousness. She can laughingly recall 
the moral conundrum of her exchange with Aunt Colston and Horatia and thus capture the 
distance she now has on it. The different levels of self-consciousness in her former and current 
self can only become apparent through their juxtaposition in first-person narrative. Further 
revealing her balanced self-consciousness, Sally presents this scene and her retrospective 
relationship to it as parallel to the confirmation scene. The difference this time is that she does 
not purport to make any claims to her own earnestness. She thus acknowledges the importance of 
her audience without showing excessive concern with our opinions of her. 
Instead, Sally uses the confirmation scene to provide us with an interpretive framework 
that we can use to “narrate” her in the dress scene. I use the term “narrate” here to signal a 
distinct kind of reading, in which we are invited in the dress scene to follow the narrator’s lead 
laid out in the confirmation scene but also granted the freedom of a narrator to interpret as we 
deem fit. This time no one tells us to think of Sally as earnest, and she in fact presents her 
younger self as the opposite of earnest. Rather than “shrinking…from…suspicion of a double 
motive” in the dress scene, narrator Sally openly examines the importance and challenges of 
shaping one’s behavior in response to others’ opinions, revealing an earnestness that can only 
come from “bravely” facing these moments that make up “the battle of life.” By offering us the 
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opportunity to “narrate” this meaning, but never asking us to, Sewell imagines a reserve that 
acknowledges the impossibility of extreme unselfconsciousness and finds its way around 
accusations of affectation in the expression of moral belief. 
As we will see, Sewell uses the novel to capture this reserve not only in Sally, but also in 
herself as implied author. Sewell’s investment in the novel thus differs from the Tractarians’ 
promotion of poetry as the ideal literary form for cultivating reserve. For the Oxford leaders, 
poetic form tempered the threat of excessive emotion to the sincerity of religious expression and 
practice. Drawing on Richard Hurrell Froude’s journal and the personal letters of Keble and 
Edward Bouverie Pusey, Kirstie Blair writes: “The Tractarian vision of an individual 
Christian…is not of someone…secure in their faith and in full control, but rather of a 
consciously sinful, tormented individual, frequently vacillating between enthusiasm and despair, 
who needs forms in order to stabilize his or her defences and achieve the proper state of 
calmness and order” (29-30). Keble saw poetry as a means to a balanced self similar to that 
imagined by Sewell in the novel. But where Sewell seeks a balance of self-consciousness, Keble 
seeks a balance of emotion. As Blair argues, “Poets,” for Keble, “are men who are on the verge 
of breakdown due to repressed emotion: ‘What must they do? They are ashamed and reluctant to 
speak out, yet, if silent, they can scarcely keep their mental balance…,’ and so the primary 
purpose of poetry is curative.” Traditional metrical forms brought divinely sanctioned measure to 
a poet’s words, thus “offer[ing] an ‘outlet’ for properly reserved expression” (Blair 38). Just as 
Keble worried about repressed emotion, Sewell worries about repressed self-consciousness and 
grants an analogous “curative” function to the form of the novel. Thanks to the interplay among 
levels of self-consciousness in character, narrator, and author, the novelist can access a reserve 
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that overcomes the self-conscious affectation associated, ironically, with the kind of pure 
unselfconsciousness that Williams promoted in his tracts.  
The legibility of such complex self-consciousness is essential to maintaining reserve and 
engendering trust between author and reader. In cultivating readers’ trust, Sewell looks more 
aggressively than her Tractarian forefathers into the irony that reserve both requires and is 
hindered by a consciousness of other people. Whereas Williams ignores the impossibility of ever 
fully withdrawing from the other, Sewell is compelled to address this issue head-on, having been 
perceived, like other women authors, as trying to be selflessly unselfconscious only to impress 
others. While Williams condemns the desire to look to anyone but God as antithetical to reserve, 
Sewell sees an awareness of others as necessary, ironically, to overcoming moral and religious 
vanity. Sewell makes legible in herself a distinct form of self-consciousness in which the 
reader’s presence is central to her ability to achieve true reserve and bring herself and readers 
closer to God. She captures this sense of self-consciousness by imagining her authorial voice as a 
kind of prayer that speaks to readers, herself, and God simultaneously. The balanced self-
consciousness that results from this unique sense of audience resembles that which we detected 
in Sally’s narrative voice earlier. The novel’s similar dispersal of differing levels of self-
consciousness among characters, narrator, and author in prayer allows Sewell to grasp at this 
mindset without explicitly claiming she embodies it (and thereby negating it). The novel may not 
be the only medium by which one can achieve this sense of audience, but it does seem unique in 
its ability to represent it. And considering how easily this mindset can be destroyed in the very 
attempt to represent it, such a capacity seems key to making it possible or at least engendering 
faith in its possibility. 
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For Williams, a reserved self-consciousness that brings one closer to God can only occur 
through a complete withdrawal from the gaze of other human beings. Williams directly opposes 
“looking to man,” which leads to “ostentatious singularity and display,” to “looking to God,” 
which he claims “will lead us to the reserve of a sacred simplicity” (VI: 5). Sewell, however, 
would argue that these two things are impossible to separate and that reserved self-consciousness 
requires acknowledgment of this impossibility. Williams does admit that just saying we must 
look to God rather than man “surely…will not produce what we want; but rather the very 
opposite; for to put on the appearance of reverence for example’s sake, or for the edification of 
others, were but the very thing which we condemn” (VI: 5). But he has no practical solution to 
this problem except to propose again (in even vaguer terms) the importance of acting for actual 
good rather than for the appearance of goodness in the eyes of others: “All that can be said is, not 
to seek to remedy by external effects, that which can only be from within; to think less of 
appearance, more of the reality” (VI: 5).  
For Sewell, an avoidance of “external effects” does not mean an automatic embrace of 
God. Aunt Sarah asks Sally, “Did you ever watch your own mind when you had buried the 
memory of a good deed in the bottom of your heart, and tried to forget it?” Sally admits the 
impossibility of pure unselfconsciousness, responding, “I am afraid one always carries about the 
consciousness of it.” Aunt Sarah agrees: “Yes; and a much larger consciousness than it has any 
right to; but take it out and look at it…and ten to one but it shrinks to nothing…. By not seeing 
things clearly we exaggerate them” (374). Similarly, Sally’s attempt to look solely to God (as 
opposed to “looking to man”) only brings the crushing weight of extreme self-consciousness. 
Endeavoring to align her will with God’s, Sally finds that the more actively she tries to direct her 
thoughts heavenward, the more morbidly self-conscious she becomes: “I had no power to control 
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my mind. I felt myself so wicked, so intensely wicked, so unlike every one in the world. I longed 
that others should know me to be what I knew myself; I fancied I could better bear my doubts if 
they were not secret” (86-87). An attempt to look solely to God only brings a self-absorbed 
desire to look to other people. Sally goes to Aunt Sarah, planning to “confess what I was, beg her 
to hate me, to send me from her, to give me any suffering, but only to listen to me and know me” 
(87).  
But looking solely to other people is not the answer either. When Sally reaches Aunt 
Sarah, she finds her engrossed in prayer, gazing at a picture of her beloved deceased brother and 
“repeating to herself: ‘The Lord is my light and my salvation, whom then shall I fear? The Lord 
is the strength of my life, of whom then shall I be afraid?’” Sally quietly retreats to her room as 
she thinks, “Who was I that I should venture to intrude my doubts into the presence of a perfect 
faith? I closed the door and knelt, but I could not pray; the wretchedness of my mind grew more 
intense.” Looking solely to Aunt Sarah is not the solution, but avoiding Aunt Sarah in an attempt 
to look solely to God just intensifies Sally’s self-consciousness. Suddenly, however, she finds a 
way to look to God and Aunt Sarah simultaneously. Aunt Sarah’s “words…follow” Sally: “I 
found myself repeating them without thinking of their meaning; and then they framed 
themselves, as it were, into a prayer, and I said, ‘Lord, be Thou my light and my salvation, then 
shall I not fear: be Thou the strength of my life, then shall I not be afraid.’” This prayer slowly 
alleviates Sally’s self-consciousness without abolishing it altogether: “Another moment, and the 
rush of doubt was upon me again; but I was not helpless as before” (87). Sally’s prayer, which 
begins as “little more than mechanical” (87), distracts her from her self-absorption but at the 
same time grants her a more tempered self-consciousness: “I was exhausted, saddened, 
trembling, as one who has escaped a deadly peril and knows that the danger may return at any 
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moment; but it was over—the fullness of faith was for the time restored to me” (87-88). Looking 
solely to God only intensifies Sally’s looking to herself; looking solely to others has the same 
effect. The key to a more tempered self-consciousness is to look to God, others, and oneself 
simultaneously, something achieved through prayer. 
Sally attains this level of self-consciousness through prayer’s distinct sense of audience. 
Prayer reaches outward toward the other, both human and divine, but also speaks to the self 
praying. As Jean-Louis Chrétien explains, prayer is “a self-manifestation before the invisible 
other, a manifestation that becomes a manifestation of self to self through the other” (154). In 
praying, one speaks to God and to oneself, but also to other people. Chrétien describes “vocal 
prayer, whether it be individual or collective” as “public” in nature: “One prays to God, but one 
prays in the world” (168-69). More specifically, in Christian prayer, “the individual prayer is 
distinct from the collective prayer, but only as variants of the same ecclesial prayer, which the 
Our Father marks in its very form” (Chrétien 171): that is, even an individual praying “say[s] 
‘Our Father,’ and not ‘My Father’” (Chrétien 155). Sally’s intended audience in prayer thus lies 
somewhere between self and other, allowing her a self-consciousness not solely consumed with 
her appearance in others’ or God’s eyes.  
Such a distinctive sense of audience strengthens one’s faith and inspires faith in others. 
Although Sally refers to her aunt’s praying as the sign of a “perfect faith,” we can surmise from 
Aunt Sarah’s repetition of her prayer while gazing at the image of her brother that she 
experiences difficulty with her faith just as Sally does. She also finds strength through prayer that 
allows her to look simultaneously to God, other people, and herself, cultivating and expressing a 
similar self-consciousness that induces Sally and her to trust the sincerity of her words. We again 
see prayer’s ambiguity of audience as Aunt Sarah offers up the words of her prayer not solely for 
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herself (she speaks aloud, looks at the image of her brother, and in fact helps Sally), but not 
solely for God (God knows everything and does not need to hear the words aloud), and neither 
solely for others (her brother is not actually present, and she supposedly does not know that Sally 
is there). Further revealing that what Sally originally assumes is a completely unselfconscious 
“looking to God” is in fact somewhat self-conscious, Aunt Sarah displays awareness that her 
praying has helped Sally. Bidding her niece goodbye the next day and revealing her own 
understanding of prayer as an alternative to the at times overbearing self-consciousness of 
thought, she tells her, “God bless you, my child: don’t think, but pray:--now go” (88). Aunt 
Sarah’s sense of audience while praying echoes Sally’s and demonstrates how the voice that 
results from such complex self-consciousness might inspire oneself and others simultaneously. 
Sewell’s ability to capture this voice in her novel appears key to inspiring trust in readers. 
Sewell thus cultivates a voice that is similar to Sally’s and Aunt Sarah’s in prayer, her 
words aimed somewhere between self and other. When Sally shares one of her frequent prayers 
to help readers with similar struggles, she unconsciously suggests that this very sharing is a key 
part of the prayer’s beneficial effect on her personal understanding. Describing how the rising 
popularity of Dissent causes her to doubt the Church and the beliefs with which she was raised, 
Sally explains that it often threatens “to bring back my former agony of doubt”; however, she 
continues, “I was learning how to deal with my own mind.” Echoing Williams’s earlier 
comments about Anglican practices as “directed to the eye of GOD,” Sally admits,  
The history of such a conflict is for the Eye and Mercy of God; it would not even 
have been referred to here, but that, perchance, it may strengthen some sinking 
under the same trial, to know that it may be met, even in early youth, without 
argument, without sympathy, without external aid, but simply with the force of 
prayer, and the strong will to crush the very shadow of a rising doubt, and that the 
end is peace, and the conviction not only of faith but of reason. (136) 
 
 57 
Although Sally dismisses “external aid” as unnecessary, her notion of “prayer” requires it: 
ending the passage and the chapter exclaiming, “And now farewell to that great anguish for 
ever!” (136), Sally inadvertently reveals that the words leading up to this exclamation form part 
of the very prayer of which she speaks, a prayer that requires the “Eye of God” and the reader. 
Sally, like Williams denouncing “external effects,” may still feel that such growth does not 
require “external aid,” but Sewell conveys a more complicated view, suggesting that the words 
of Sally’s prayer are directed toward readers as well as God. She also suggests that the words of 
her novel are directed toward herself: just as Sally learns from narrating herself, Sewell learns 
from “authoring” Sally as narrator. While Sally might still be unaware at this moment of the role 
her readers play in her developing understanding of herself through the novel, Sewell realizes the 
necessity of the reader to the efficacy of her prayers and resulting self-growth.  
Sewell again uses the character Sally to provide us with a model by which we can better 
understand the intricate levels of self-consciousness cultivated by the narrator and the author in 
prayer. Perhaps “provide” is not the right verb, since it implies that Sewell fully intends that we 
receive this understanding. Really, the novel’s moral expression is aimed just as much at 
Sewell’s own growth as our understanding, but this growth requires our presence and is offered 
up for our interpretation. Directed toward God, herself, and readers, Sewell’s prayer accesses a 
reserved level of self-consciousness by never privileging one audience over the others. Of course, 
the end goal is always salvation, but such unity with God can only be achieved through 
simultaneous trust in—itself a kind of unity between—herself and other people. 
Characterizing herself as a writer and teacher with aims similar to Sewell’s, Aunt Sarah 
emphasizes this sort of unity with God and resulting salvation as the aim of her interactions with 
her readers. Showing Sally letters from people she describes as “my children,” she tells her, 
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“They are from young things, who…took a fancy to be with me, and to listen to me. I could not 
cast them aside when God had put them in my way; and so I gathered them, as it were, about me, 
and gave them what help I could to forward them in their journey” (431). Like Sewell, Aunt 
Sarah suggests that this connection is formed through a simultaneous awareness of her own 
ability to learn from expressing her moral views to others. She admits the possibility that “they 
did more good to me, poor children, than I did to them,” revealing, “I was saved from being as 
narrow in my views as I should have been if left to myself” (432). And this relationship “saves” 
her in more ways than one; when Aunt Sarah “look[s] forward to the world to which [she is] 
hastening,” she automatically thinks of her “children,” admitting, “the thought that they will be 
there to meet me is amongst my brightest hopes” (431). 
4. 
In the end, Sewell struggles to maintain faith in her ability to represent this communion 
between herself, other people, and God: representing such unity is just as difficult as achieving it. 
In his own attempt to describe it, Chrétien looks to Seneca, who himself relies on the divided 
form of a chiasmus: “Love among men as if God beheld you, speak with God as if men were 
listening” (169). As close as this sentence comes to capturing the idea of union between self, 
other people, and God, it falls back on two separate clauses that still suggest that one’s love for 
men might only be for appearance in God’s eyes, and vice versa. Similar representational 
difficulty leaves Sally, Aunt Sarah, and Sewell vacillating at the end of the novel between the 
importance of other people and the importance of God to salvation.  
 Aware of her impending death, Aunt Sarah shifts focus away from her “children” to 
God: “all she cared to know of” “was that she was going to be with Him.” Her thinking has 
changed; when Sally asks her about “those whom she had loved, and to whom she might now 
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soon be restored,” Aunt Sarah responds that reuniting “was a thought of infinite joy, but it was 
not the ground of her happiness: she did not think it ought ever to be” (441). As Sally observes 
this, however, she notes the importance other people continue to play in Aunt Sarah’s mind: 
although she feels a sense of “rest,--perfect rest,” which “[s]he could not hope…to make others 
understand…her earthly affections seem…to call out more fully than ever” (443). 
Sally similarly vacillates between the importance of people and of God as her life draws 
to a close. Just like Aunt Sarah’s children, Sally has her sister Hester’s children, who “gather 
round me and tell me that their daily life is gladdened by me” (467). Sally, who lives nearby and 
visits daily, appreciates the tranquility of Hester’s home, which results from “the influence of the 
living”: Hester’s “own tranquil mind, the fervent piety and devoted tenderness of her husband, 
the warm endearing affection of her children, above all, the love which springs upward to her 
God” (469). Sally participates in this love that brings the household closer to God; “But,” she 
insists, “my real home is the Church.” The Church might signal a simultaneous relationship with 
God and other worshippers, but for a moment Sally’s thinking turns toward God alone. She 
speaks of “how little the life of a member of Christ’s Church can ever be called lonely. ‘One 
Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, one God and Father of all,’—were I without earthly friends, 
without human relations—could they not all in that life be mine?” But then Sally immediately 
tells us, “Not each for himself, and by himself, we travel towards Eternity; but together,--one, 
though many;--united, though separate” (470).  
And then, in the most surprising shift thus far, this more balanced sense of the importance 
of human relationships to one’s salvation gives way to a narrower focus on other people. And not 
just other people, but other people’s admiration—something our author and narrator have been 
wary of throughout the novel as they cultivate the proper reserve. The final scene shows Sally 
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walking through the churchyard, reading the names on the gravestones, and looking forward to 
her own afterlife. She carries her imagining of the importance of other people past the point of 
death, where, according to her religious beliefs, one’s primary relationship is with God.15 
Imagining her own resting place in the churchyard, she admits her desire “to be within reach of 
the prayers and praises I have loved”: 
most dear is the hope that those over whom I have watched from infancy, the 
children of my darling Hester, and it may be their children after them, may recall, 
as they pass my grave, the lessons I have labored to teach them, and speak of me 
with the love, though it can never be with the reverence, which must ever place 
amongst the dearest of my earthly memories, the name of—aunt Sarah. (471) 
 
Considering Sally’s allegiances to the Church and the basic aims of reserve (even if she differs in 
how that reserve is cultivated), it is surprising that her life story culminates in the thought of 
other people exclusively, rather than God. The novel’s final sentence is excessively long, almost 
greedily gathering clauses as it enumerates the people who admire Sally or who might admire 
her in the future. The sentence does end with Sally directing her own admiration to someone else, 
but that someone is Aunt Sarah. And in this case, a reference to Aunt Sarah comes very close to 
another reference to herself; after all, Sally is Aunt Sarah to Hester’s children.16 
Sally suddenly seems consumed with her image in the eyes of people over God. Perhaps, 
however, this is the ultimate test of the reader’s trust that Sewell has worked throughout the 
                                                
15 Sewell believed that human passions, including loneliness and vanity, pass away in heaven, where all have been 
saved and become one with God. Quoting the Gospel, Sally expresses this idea with regard to marriage in particular: 
“And ‘in heaven there shall be neither marrying nor giving in marriage’” (222). (See Matthew 22:30 and Mark 12:25 
for original verses.) Sewell would more explicitly express this belief with regard to human relationships in general a 
few years later in her novel Ivors (1856). The mother of main character Susan offers divine consolation when it 
becomes clear she will not marry, telling her daughter of “another love, before which all human affection fades into 
nothingness” (Ivors 410-411). Susan’s mother refers to God’s love, “which is more fond than the love of a husband, 
more watchful than the care of a parent, and sympathised with us before we understood the affection of sisters or of 
brothers” and endures as long “as the blessedness of eternity” (Ivors 412). 
16 Maria LaMonaca reads this moment as Sally’s “identification of herself as a second Aunt Sarah” (121). Recalling 
Sewell’s admission in her autobiography that the novel was drawn from her own experience of life, Wolff claims, 
“We infer that both Aunt Sarah and the younger Sarah are versions of Elizabeth Sewell’s idea of herself and of her 
own life” (144). Sewell, like Sally in the novel’s closing pages, had recently stepped into her own “Aunt Sarah” 
role: she and her sister Ellen had begun taking in pupils to teach alongside their nieces, whom they had already taken 
in as their “children” after their sister-in-law passed away (Autobiography 117). 
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novel to foster. Sewell can only come so close to capturing the sense of audience she attempts to 
portray through her representations of self-consciousness in her character, her narrator, and 
herself. Achieving this self-consciousness depends to some degree on the reader’s faith in its 
possibility. Sewell believes that looking to other people always implies looking to God, just as 
looking to God always means looking to other people; it depends on one’s willingness to 
acknowledge and have faith in this simultaneity that determines whether it will be an opportunity 
for growth or limitation. If readers have heard Sewell’s reserved expressions of belief and 
established faith in her aims as author, they will see that it is up to them to unify these two sides 
in their mind and trust that she has as well, despite the seeming impossibility of representing this 
unity on the page. From this perspective, Sally’s final focus on the admiration of others serves as 
a reminder of the fragility of this unity and an acknowledgment of the difficulty of the trust 
Sewell asks of her readers. 
Sewell works to develop such trust throughout the novel, searching for an adequate way 
to express her commitment to readers’ and her own salvation. Facing accusations of moralizing 
whether she embraced a passive reserve or more explicitly expressed her beliefs, Sewell used the 
novel’s form to guide readers toward a richer understanding of women’s moral self-
consciousness. Finding traditional understandings of reserve put forth by male Tractarian leaders 
inadequate to her experience, Sewell brought to light the problematic ironies within reserve and, 
in doing so, sought a way around the limitations they posed to her faith and her authorship. 
While Sewell remained committed to Tractarian ideals as well as traditional women’s roles, she 
also sought a more rigorous understanding of reserve’s cultivation that would allow women 
greater moral and religious agency.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A Cross to Bear:  
Novelistic Didacticism and Evangelical Experimentation in East Lynne 
 
Since the publication of East Lynne (1860-61), critics have denounced author Ellen 
Wood’s moralizing depictions of her adulterous heroine Lady Isabel. Victorians complained that 
Wood preached a superficial theology, citing in particular her repeated urging that Isabel must 
bear her cross. This language was not simply sanctimonious in critics’ minds; it was also 
scandalous. After all, bearing her cross leads Isabel back to the home she left, disguised as a 
governess for her own children. The Literary Gazette reviewer argued, “The theology of the 
work is…open to grave exception…sacred and pregnant language ought not to be used in this 
unmeaning way” (371). Fellow novelist Charlotte Riddell called Wood “simply a brute” for 
“throw[ing] in bits of religion to slip her fodder down the public throat” (qtd. in Elwin 241). 
More recent critics usually note Wood’s moralizing language before moving on to examine a 
counteractive ambivalence in the novel toward such Victorian taboos as uncontrolled emotion, 
maternal indulgence, and female sexual desire. When this ambivalence is deemed unconscious, it 
is understood to subvert her official moral and religious stance.1 When it is deemed conscious, 
Wood’s moralizing language works to mitigate her subversiveness.2 From either perspective, 
however, the novel’s moral and religious overtones appear narrowly superficial. 
                                                
1 See, for example, Ann Cvetkovich, Laurie Langbauer, and Lyn Pykett. 
2 See, for example, Winifred Hughes and Andrew Maunder, “Ellen Wood was a Writer.” 
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This chapter demonstrates that Wood’s ambivalence is embedded within and consciously 
required by her religious perspective.3 Like Sewell, Wood was keenly aware of the interpretive 
bind posed by the stereotype of the moralizing woman in moral and aesthetic discourse. Sewell’s 
central dilemma lay between the affectation of reserve and the affectation of a more overtly 
moralizing stance. For Wood, the stakes are more extreme. In a dynamic closely resembling that 
which we’ve seen between the “prude” and the “coquette,” women in the novel are forced into a 
sanctimonious moral stance in order to avoid automatic association with physical vanity and 
even sexual promiscuity. While the moral passivity of Sewell’s reserve can hold self-serving 
motives, for Wood such vanity holds the more intense implications of fallenness.  
Like Sewell, Wood draws on her theological inheritance to elude this interpretive bind. 
Wood’s religious language, then, gestures toward a much larger ethical and aesthetic project. Her 
alertness to the resources within such language derives from her evangelical background. Wood 
looks to the atonement to formulate an independent method of moral expression and reflection 
for Isabel, readers, and herself. Isabel’s fall results from intellectual, religious, and moral apathy, 
her adultery only a symptom of this larger ailment of “indifference.” In order to atone for that sin, 
Isabel must bear her cross, which requires her to recognize that she has a “will,” distinguish that 
will from God’s, and then work to unite the two. As she begins this process, however, she finds 
herself struggling with a bind similar to that of her author. No longer indifferent, she cannot 
retreat from moral action, but her desire to right past wrongs at times seems driven by selfish 
motives: to be loved by her family, to be recognized as moral. Isabel’s disguised return, 
however, allows her a method of moral expression and action that overcomes association with 
                                                
3 Only very recently have critics begun to consider Wood’s religious belief as a serious influence on her work. Beth 
Palmer examines how Wood’s evangelicalism informed her work at the Argosy Magazine, which she owned and 
edited from 1867 to 1887. Anne-Marie Beller demonstrates the influence of Wood’s religious beliefs on the 
significance of her heroines’ deaths in East Lynne and other novels. 
 64 
vanity and moralization. Isabel’s return to East Lynne has always stood out to critics as quite odd 
in its otherworldliness and implausibility. But Isabel’s liminality, as I will refer to it, allows 
Wood to imagine the possibility of moral action and expression separate from the self-conscious 
desire to appear moral to an audience.  
My interpretation of Isabel’s return as ethically empowering joins other recent critics 
working to overturn readings of the novel’s second half as solely a masochistic enactment of 
Isabel’s punishment for her sins and her inevitable suffering as a woman.4 Wood does not 
attempt to solve the problem of female oppression, but her religious beliefs do guide her to 
imagine some autonomy for women. Isabel is led by her social circumstances to leave her 
husband and children for another man, but once she takes this step, it becomes her own sin—in 
her eyes and the eyes of those around her, if not in ours. Although we may not endorse Isabel’s 
helplessness, we can respect her subsequent attempts to understand her role in what has occurred 
and to find a position in her new life that allows her some of the moral autonomy she lacked as a 
wife. Her attempts, through trial and error, to find this autonomy often involve humiliation and 
pain, but they also bring increased strength and incomparable reward.  
Much of Wood’s exploration into women’s moral autonomy remains at the level of plot 
and character. She does, however, briefly examine the importance of a narrator (and thus the 
novel) in attesting to women’s unselfconsciousness. She ends up implying that assurance of 
one’s sincerity is more difficult for real women who cannot rely on a narrator. In the end, Isabel 
must seek out her own method of ensuring the sincerity of her moral expression and action. We 
might ask then if this method might have some import for women authors struggling with a 
similar interpretive dilemma. Unlike Sewell and the other authors, however, Wood does not 
                                                
4 See Anne-Marie Beller and Ellen Bayuk Rosenman for other positive interpretations of Isabel’s return. 
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employ Isabel’s method at the level of the narrative as a way to shape interpretations of the 
implied author. 
Wood may not go to the same lengths to consider the relation between feminine self-
consciousness and narrative voice, but she does suggest more boldly than anyone else studied 
here that women have special insight into the problem of moral expression because of the 
interpretive dilemma they faced. While the women in the novel confront accusations of moral 
and sexual vanity, the men—particularly Isabel’s husband Archibald Carlyle, but also the alleged 
murderer Richard Hare and even the deceitful Sir Francis Levison—never face such suspicion. 
Hare wins over doubters simply with his “solemn” words and “earnest” tone (55). Levison, after 
eloping with Lady Isabel, returns to make a plausible bid for parliament—against her former 
husband, no less. And because the community always views Carlyle as noble and sincere, he is 
never forced to grapple with the problems of moral earnestness the way women in the novel are. 
Isabel’s moral earnestness in the end requires awareness of the insincerity—the very lack of 
earnestness—that threatens any attempt to speak about moral issues. While Carlyle at the end of 
the novel is left unquestioningly and rather emptily espousing to his wife the importance of 
“earnestly…doing right, unselfishly, under God” (624), Isabel displays a method of virtuous 
expression that exemplifies her more reflective mindset. Such a method holds promise for 
women novelists searching for an adequate way to express moral belief. 
1. 
Central to Victorian Evangelicalism and the religious traditions from which it sprang was 
a contradictory concern with self-consciousness, which was thought both necessary for and 
undermining of moral sincerity. Evangelicalism arose in Britain in the 1730s, emphasizing 
“personal experience and promulgation of the Christian ‘evangel’ (gospel)” (Knight and Mason 
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122). Celebrating spontaneous conversion and denouncing the hollow rigidity of liturgy and 
ritual, Evangelicalism was influenced by late seventeenth-century Puritanism and early 
eighteenth-century Dissent, traditions that emerged from the Reformation’s critique of ritual and 
subsequent rationalization of Christian practices.5 Lori Branch explains that spontaneous prayer 
was promoted over liturgy in response to a concern about spiritual “hypocrisy” that was “not a 
matter of saying one thing and doing another, but of saying one thing and feeling another: of a 
disjunction between the logocentric intellect and the heart” (44). Spontaneity in prayer, which 
ensured the sincerity of religious expression, prevented this hypocrisy but, paradoxically, risked 
encouraging it as well: quoting Henry Dawbeny, a central voice in the seventeenth-century free-
prayer debate, Branch claims, “Words uttered spontaneously out of sincere emotional desires not 
only insure that God will accept an individual’s prayer but also ‘interpret the desires of our souls 
unto others’” (49). This consciousness of others who could affirm one’s sincerity threatened to 
undermine that sincerity, creating “an uncomfortable…awareness of its performativity” (Branch 
51). Looking in particular at William Wordsworth’s Ecclesiastical Sketches (1822), Branch 
demonstrates that these ironies continued into the nineteenth century. 
Charles W. Wood’s memoir of his mother, published in 1894, seven years after her death, 
reveals a similar preoccupation. Wood, born in 1814 in Worcester, grew up “under the very 
shadow of” Worcester Cathedral; religious “devotion was her first duty” (C. W. Wood 17). Her 
Anglicanism took a distinctly evangelical bent: “the state of the heart” rather than “petty rules 
and ceremonials” defined her “creed” (C. W. Wood 263). Full of direct passages of praise from 
Wood’s reviewers, Charles’s memoir goes to extreme lengths to portray Wood as an artistic 
                                                
5 Branch writes, “Reformation controversies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries accompanied what has been 
called a crisis of representation, in which the term ceremony, for instance, first began to acquire negative 
connotations of hollowness and superstition, and in which interrogations of the power of signs, ‘in particular the 
communal, repetitive, formal, performative sign,’ led Reformers to develop an ‘anti-magical semiotics’ defined 
against a ‘mystified, sacral, essentialist’ understanding of signs” (Thomas M. Greene qtd. in Branch 37). 
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genius and a saint, implicitly concerned that her authorship might undermine her angelic nature. 
In her novels, Wood “never moralized or criticized…. If a philosopher, she was so 
unconsciously, for she never obtruded her personality upon the reader” (C. W. Wood 222). “One 
of her remarkable traits,” Charles claims, “was an utter self-unconsciousness. It never occurred 
to her to be a shining light to others, only to be true to herself” (235). Charles’s own religious 
leanings lead him to praise Wood’s religiousness but also, anxiously, to underscore her lack of 
affectation.6 
Exploring the novel’s ability to answer to this preoccupation, Wood herself briefly 
considers in East Lynne the possibility of unselfconscious moral expression, placing Isabel 
singing in a room adjoining the one where, unbeknownst to her, her father and Carlyle listen 
admiringly. Overhearing Isabel singing hymns from The Book of Common Prayer, the Earl 
remarks that “Isabel little thinks she is entertaining us, as well as herself” (67). The Earl may 
attest to Isabel’s unselfconsciousness, but the narrator must confirm it, echoing, “Indeed she did 
not” (68). Wood thus considers the value of the novel in representing unselfconsciousness. There 
may in life be someone to eavesdrop on one’s unselfconscious devotions, but in a novel there is 
always someone eavesdropping, and an anonymous third-person narrator’s relation to a novel’s 
characters does not usually carry with it the problematic implications of eavesdropping. Both 
Isabel’s father and the narrator attest to her ethical and aesthetic sincerity for readers, allowing 
her to remain “self-unconscious.” Lord Mount Severn observes that the “singular charm” of 
Isabel’s singing “lies in her subdued, quiet style” rather than “squalling display” (67). That 
sincerity has a distinct power: “The conversation of the Earl and Mr. Carlyle had been of the 
eager bustling world,” and Isabel’s “sacred chant broke in upon them with strange contrast, 
                                                
6 Malcolm Elwin argues that Wood “would have been doubtless the first to deprecate her son’s unctuous references 
to her genius in the extravagantly reverential and sentimental memoir published, in the customary Victorian family 
fashion, a few years after her death” (233). 
 68 
soothing to the ear, but reproving to the heart.” As we might expect of a Victorian depiction of 
feminine virtue, Isabel’s unselfconsciousness guarantees the purity of her motives and the beauty 
of her voice in prayer. Much more surprisingly, however, Wood’s novel will emphasize that such 
unselfconsciousness is ineffective and impossible to guarantee in the real, narratorless world. As 
Wood herself knew too well, women had to find another way to ensure the sincerity of their 
moral expression. 
Without a narrator figure to identify her unselfconsciousness, Isabel’s moral actions are 
interpreted as vain. Society in the novel associates femininity first with beauty and then with 
vanity. Townspeople in West Lynne believe that if they enjoy admiring women, then women 
must also enjoy admiring themselves. As Mr. Dill tells Cornelia, “pretty young girls know they 
are pretty, and you can’t take their vanity away from them” (381). Isabel’s father tellingly feels 
the need to defend her from such a charge. He tells Carlyle that her beauty “caused quite a 
sensation at the Drawing-room last week,” but immediately adds, “and she is as good as she is 
beautiful” (12). Carlyle is indeed struck by her beauty—“not so much” by “the perfect contour of 
the exquisite features,” which might give the impression of careless vanity, but by “the sweet 
expression of the soft dark eyes,” which suggest “sorrow and suffering” (11). Isabel’s beauty, 
perceived as an extension of her moral goodness at home, is nevertheless interpreted as a sign of 
vanity in public. When she discovers she can help the impoverished musician Mr. Kane by 
attending his concert and convincing others to attend also, she dresses up in all her finery to 
“show those West Lynne people that I think the poor man’s concert worth going to, and worth 
dressing for.” Before Isabel goes out, her father protests, “You will have the whole room gaping 
at you…. You have dressed yourself to please your vanity” (76). And, sure enough, the 
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representative town busybodies Mrs. Ducie and her daughters disapprove of Isabel’s calling such 
attention to herself, never considering that she might have higher motives. 
 A more vocal stance on Isabel’s part would only provoke accusations of moral vanity. 
Indeed, feminine vanity in the novel exists on a spectrum: women characters who avoid physical 
vanity risk moral vanity that prides itself on its supposed modesty and prudence. The town 
coquette Afy Hallijohn and Carlyle’s sister Cornelia mark opposite ends of this spectrum. As a 
“very pretty woman, tall and slender,” who “mince[s] as she walk[s], and coquet[s] with her 
head” (327), Afy is more concerned with drawing men’s admiration and women’s envy than 
considering the morality of her behavior. Her vain flirtatiousness leads the town to suspect her of 
lascivious behavior; after her father’s murder she is wrongly assumed to have run off with the 
prime suspect, Richard Hare. On the other end of the spectrum, Cornelia is “good at heart…. 
Only her manners are against her, and she will think herself better than other people” (158). 
Cornelia expresses her sense of superiority through moralizing proverbs: criticizing her brother 
for buying a carriage, she tells him, “Wilful waste makes woful want…. To be thrifty is a virtue; 
to squander is a sin” (145). After Cornelia forbids Carlyle and Isabel to use their carriage on a 
Sunday, the three characters are arranged in a revealing tableau-vivant: Isabel stands “at the 
window with her husband” while Cornelia is “seated at a distant table, with the Bible before her” 
(151), divided from the couple by her religion.  
Always ready to accuse other women of immodesty, Cornelia seems to use her plain 
dress and moralizing demeanor to distance herself from feminine vanity. She criticizes Afy’s 
“impudence” as she passes wearing a “coquettish little bonnet,” “conceited and foolish and good-
looking as ever” (381), and she even describes the Carlyles’ family friend Barbara Hare (who 
works valiantly to exonerate her brother Richard from a murder charge) as a “little vain idiot” 
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(64). But Cornelia comes across as equally self-absorbed. Experiencing a similar double bind, 
Isabel illustrates it more explicitly: she explains to Mrs. Vane (the wife of her father’s heir) that 
she is not wearing her diamonds for a social event because she “did not like to be too fine…. 
They glittered so! I feared it might be thought I had put them on to look fine.” With a “sneer,” 
Mrs. Vane associates Isabel with “that class of people who pretend to despise ornaments,” 
behavior she terms “the refinement of affectation” (16). Given the limited options, appearing 
affected in her attempts at modesty is the lesser of two evils for Cornelia. As we’ve seen with the 
“prude” and the “coquette,” “while their characters are ‘equally ridiculous,’ they ‘are not equally 
dangerous,’ since the prude manages to preserve her reputation and ‘at least the appearance of 
modesty’” (Yeazell 7). Cornelia may preserve her reputation, but her moral and religious beliefs 
are rarely taken seriously.  
 In depicting characters’ struggles with this conundrum, Wood may have drawn on 
personal experience. Her first novel, Danesbury House (1860), written for a Scottish 
Temperance League contest at the urging of a church rector friend, was reviewed in March 1860, 
just as the third installment of East Lynne appeared.7 Although reviews of Danesbury House 
were fairly positive, reviewers still intimated that Wood could have fallen prey to moralizing like 
Cornelia’s. As the Athenaeum notes,  
A free temperance song might by possibility be as dashing and inspiring as a 
drinking song, if the genius, and not the conscience, of the writer inspired it; but a 
Prize Temperance Tale, or a Prize Temperance Song, will, we fear, inevitably 
smack of the model Sunday-school boy under the eye of his master on his best 
behaviour—the genuine human nature all stowed away out of sight. (407) 
 
The reviewer admits that the novel “gets over the natural difficulties of the task extremely well” 
but then argues that in depicting the misery caused by alcohol, “the author endeavours to prove 
                                                
7 Published in twenty-one installments in the New Monthly Magazine from 1860 to 1861, East Lynne was “still 
incomplete” that spring of 1860 when the reviews appeared (Maunder, “Introduction” 18). 
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too much” (407). For the Glasgow Herald reviewer, Wood focuses too much on the dark realities 
of intemperance and not enough on possibilities for reform. The reviewer is disturbed by Wood’s 
depiction of deaths from delirium tremens: “It is a revolting picture, and of dangerous tendency. 
For what is the inference which would be drawn by the intemperate reader?…. That, as he is 
without hope, he had better have a short life, and a merry one, and ‘die with harness on his 
back.’” The reviewer allows that Wood showed some integrity in the sudden conversion of the 
rake Lord Temple, but “by what mysterious process, good reader? By a process very natural and 
desirable to a lady authoress—by entering into the blessed estate of matrimony.” Wood’s 
difficulty anticipated those of the women characters in her next novel: like Cornelia, if she didn’t 
risk accusations of moralizing, she would be accused of the lascivious fascination with sin that 
townspeople in East Lynne associate with Afy. Andrew Maunder puts the latter problem in more 
extreme terms, arguing that the middle-class Wood was concerned about being associated, like 
other “authoress[es]” of the period, “with the actress, or worse, the prostitute, who also marketed 
her person in public” (“Ellen Wood was a Writer”). With Danesbury House, the reviewers 
commend Wood for successfully avoiding these twinned fates but in so doing they make the 
reader conscious of their possibility.  
In East Lynne, the narrator defends herself against accusations of moralizing on the one 
hand and of siding too closely with the fallen Isabel on the other. This defense is aimed not only 
at the general “reader” but also specifically at the “critic” (590). In a move typical of didactic 
novels, the narrator openly aligns the reader with Isabel, proclaiming, “Oh, reader, believe me! 
Lady—wife—mother! Should you ever be tempted to abandon your home, so will you awake. 
Whatever trials may be the lot of your married life…resolve to bear them” (283). This confident 
position of moral teacher changes, shortly before the novel’s end, as the narrator begins to 
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question herself from the reader’s perspective. She even imagines a separate persona she terms 
“the moralist” in order to free herself from the taint of moralizing. Describing Isabel’s realization 
of her love for Carlyle, the narrator adds, “It had been smouldering almost ever since she quitted 
him. ‘Reprehensible!’ groans a moralist. Very. Everybody knows that, as Afy would say. But her 
heart, you see, had not done with human passions” (590). Through the narrator’s shifting 
perspectives, Wood simultaneously imagines herself in and distances herself from the moralizing 
position, assigning the role of the “moralist” to the position of an abstract reader or kind of 
alternative narrator—even aligning it with Afy, who among her immoral tendencies has been 
known to express “moral” perspectives for their social currency. Wood intimates that the 
“moralist’s” view is immoral, since it suggests an unreflective, simplistic understanding of 
Isabel’s fallenness expressed more to prove something about one’s own moral character than out 
of concern for Isabel’s. But she also reveals awareness that she may be criticized for not being 
“moral” enough in her defense of Isabel: “I shall get blame for it, I fear, if I attempt to defend 
her” (590). Taking on the traits of both a conventional didacticism and a satire of such 
didacticism, Wood’s narrative powerfully contradicts itself in order to reveal the rhetorical and 
ethical limits women writers faced. 
Previous critics have noted the proliferation of moral maxims and Biblical allusions in 
the novel, however, and assumed that Wood fully embraced the role of the moralist. As the 
Literary Gazette reviewer observed, “Mrs Wood is, of course, so far conversant with the 
etiquette of lady literature that she does not fail to parade her moral” (370). Similarly, more 
recent readings have claimed that Wood’s moral interests were motivated by a desire for 
respectability.8 But Wood did not take on this moralizing persona blindly. Rather, she uses the 
                                                
8 Winifred Hughes reads the narrator’s exhortation of the reader to avoid the urge “to abandon [her] home” and 
thereby “forfeit [her] fair name and [her] good conscience” as evidence that Wood was more concerned with 
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novel to comment on moralizing as a phenomenon in women’s writing and to reject the charge 
that her own moral expressions are narrow-minded or self-serving. 
Cultivating an ongoing attentiveness to the motives behind moral expression is central to 
Wood’s project; she designs her plot so that Isabel’s downfall indirectly results from Cornelia’s 
inflexible moral stance. Imposing her views on Isabel, Cornelia makes her distrust her own 
judgment. Before her marriage, despite others’ view of Isabel as angelically unselfconscious and 
ignorant of the ways of the world, Isabel reveals a distinct moral autonomy. For example, when 
she is kept from her father to protect her from the knowledge that he is dying, she reasons with 
Carlyle: “Tell me the truth, then, why I am kept away. If you can show me a sufficient cause, I 
will be reasonable and obey.” Isabel then asks if he is dying: “Mr. Carlyle hesitated. Ought he to 
dissemble with her as the doctors had done?... ‘I trust to you not to deceive me,’ she simply 
said.” Convinced, it seems, by Isabel’s reasonableness and moral confidence, Carlyle 
immediately responds, “I fear he is. I believe he is” (87). Wood deliberately displays Isabel’s 
rationality before her marriage to Carlyle: acknowledging “the custom in romance to represent 
young ladies, especially if they be handsome and interesting, as being entirely oblivious of 
matter-of-fact cares and necessities,” the narrator insists that such “apathy never exists in real 
life” (97). Nevertheless, Isabel’s ethically self-reflective and self-assured sense of reality quickly 
fades in the Carlyle home. Cornelia’s moral vanity relies on a sense of her own financial 
prudence and a belief in Isabel’s imprudence. Cornelia regularly “impress[es] upon” Isabel that 
her marriage has struck an “unfortunate blow to [Carlyle’s] interests,” making her “painfully” 
aware of “the incubus she must be” (168). Isabel’s feelings of indebtedness prevent her from 
                                                                                                                                                       
appearing moral than actually being moral: “it is no accident that ‘fair name’ precedes good conscience’…. Mrs. 
Wood never really addresses the question of morality, or does so only on the most superficial level…. In East Lynne, 
the moral sense is bound up in social status” (114). Similarly, Lyn Pykett argues that “the much-noted moralizing of 
the narrator, and even the straining for gentility…are…part of a discourse—the discourse of respectable or proper 
femininity—which constructs morality along class and gender lines” (The ‘Improper’ Feminine 119). 
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saying anything to Carlyle about his sister or even considering that Cornelia might be wrong. 
The narrator laments that if only Isabel “had the courage to speak out openly to her husband, he 
would assure her “that all these miserable complaints were but the phantoms of his narrow-
minded sister” (169).  
Isabel’s self-doubt allows Levison, while staying at East Lynne, to convince her (falsely) 
of Carlyle’s love for Barbara. After repeatedly urging Isabel to suspect her husband, Levison 
tells her about a private meeting between Carlyle and Barbara. They actually meet to discuss 
Richard Hare, who has secretly returned despite being wanted for murder, but narrating the scene 
for Isabel, Levison gives the characters very different motives: “As I came by Hare’s house just 
now, I saw two people, a gentleman and a young lady, coupled lovingly together, enjoying a tête-
à-tête by moonlight. They were your husband and Miss Hare.” Levison then takes Isabel past the 
Hares’, where she sees Carlyle and Barbara engaged in intimate conversation and interprets the 
scene as proof of Levison’s story. Levison takes her into his arms, “whisper[ing] that his love 
was left to her, if another’s was withdrawn” (271), another lie that Isabel believes. Discovering 
that Isabel has run away, the servant Joyce, a source of sound moral judgment throughout the 
novel, immediately assigns fault to Cornelia.9 Joyce complains to Cornelia and Carlyle that Lady 
Isabel “has not been allowed to indulge a will of her own, poor thing, since she came to East 
Lynne” because Cornelia has “curbed her…and snapped at her…all these years” (279). When 
Lord Mount Severn, Isabel’s father’s heir, finds Isabel in France he reveals that everyone back 
home still suspects Cornelia had something to do with her departure, even if the severity of 
                                                
9 As Brian W. McCuskey argues, servants in the novel “serve as an antidote to the corruption of excessive secrecy 
and silence,” brought on, in several critics’ views, by Carlyle’s “fiercely private habits” (372). Joyce in particular 
holds “responsibility for speaking what must be spoken…if the community is to function healthily because openly 
and honestly” (McCuskey 373). 
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Isabel’s actions seems to outweigh a motive solely based in feelings of inadequacy brought on by 
her sister-in-law (304).  
Implying a parallel between Cornelia’s suppression of Isabel’s rationality and her own 
potential suppression of the reader’s, Wood reveals an awareness of didacticism’s pitfalls. As we 
will see, rather than force readers to listen passively to her as author, Wood provides them with 
the tools to arrive at their own moral conclusions. Although she begs readers not to do what 
Isabel has done, Wood does not end the novel there, but draws the story out into a strange, 
liminal place in which Isabel must constantly reassess herself and her actions. Through Isabel’s 
transformation in the latter part of the novel, Wood develops a method of moral reflection and 
self-interpretation that will help readers avoid Isabel’s fate. Discovering a mode of moral 
expression that helps others while eluding any vain desire that others see her in a certain way, 
Isabel also answers to the concerns Wood faced as an author. 
2. 
After her departure from East Lynne, living in exile in France and finally realizing the 
futility of her hope that Levison will marry her and save their baby from illegitimacy, Isabel 
experiences a religious conversion and vows to “take up h[er] cross” (298). In the novel, cross 
bearing requires continuous assessment of one’s motives, a distinct contrast to Cornelia’s 
unreflective religious moralizing that constrains Isabel’s self-understanding before her departure. 
The novel’s epigraph, taken from Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s The Courtship of Miles 
Standish (1858),10 stresses the importance of this image to Wood’s theology in East Lynne: 
“Truly the heart is deceitful, and out of its depths of corruption / Rise, like an exhalation, the 
                                                
10 Charles W. Wood interestingly describes the epigraph as “almost telling the burden of the book”: “The text was so 
applicable to the story that Longfellow might have written it for that purpose. They are also some of his best and 
truest lines…. After that nearly all Mrs. Wood’s mottoes were taken from Longfellow; every motto wonderfully 
fitting to its story” (208). 
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misty phantoms of passion; / Angels of light they seem, but are only delusions of Satan…. This 
is the cross I must bear; the sin and the swift retribution” (1). The passage suggests that 
misunderstanding obscure motives can cause sin; and that such sins require repentance. It also 
suggests, however, that this lack of clarity itself is the cross Isabel must bear; she must 
continually reassess her motives. But, Wood might add, given all we’ve seen thus far, Isabel 
must perform this reassessment in a way that does not perpetuate vanity itself. As we will see, 
Isabel’s disguised return to East Lynne allows her to embody a liminal state that keeps her self-
aware without becoming self-obsessed. 
The notion of a cross to bear represents one facet of the doctrine of atonement and 
salvation through Christ that was so central to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Evangelicalism. Describing the rise of Evangelicalism, W. E. Gladstone focuses distinctly on the 
cross: Evangelicalism “aimed at bringing back, on a large scale, and by an aggressive movement, 
the Cross, and all that the Cross essentially implies” (qtd. in Jay 51). Significantly, Elisabeth Jay 
notes that with this statement, Gladstone, “normally a precise and careful writer…was forced to 
generalize in…vague phrases” (51). Such vagueness may result from the difficulty of 
pinpointing what exactly the cross “implies.” In an 1856 tract, the Anglican bishop John Charles 
Ryle described atonement as “knowing” Christ, not just through “a kind of head knowledge,” but 
through an experiential knowledge of “the power of Christ’s Cross.” Such knowledge is difficult 
to attain, Ryle insists: “unless you know and feel within that the blood shed on that cross has 
washed away your own particular sins,--unless you are willing to confess that your salvation 
depends entirely on the work that Christ did upon the Cross,--unless this be the case, Christ will 
profit you nothing… You must know His Cross, and His Blood, or else you will die in your sins” 
(qtd. in Landow 17). Despite the difficulty of “know[ing] His Cross,” Ryle insists on its 
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necessity for salvation. Ryle’s definition of “knowing” is multi-faceted, involving feeling and 
experiencing, but key for our concerns is that, despite the difficulty of achieving such knowledge, 
it must be obtained. One must be certain. 
For Wood “the Cross essentially implies” a great deal, but its sacredness lies in its very 
ability to open up possibilities for interpretation. Wood’s religious reflectiveness thus draws on 
evangelical tradition, but foregrounds self-questioning rather than sure knowledge. This 
unorthodox take may be better illuminated by contemporary religious philosopher John D. 
Caputo’s reading of Christ and the atonement. “The Christian,” according to Caputo,  
is someone who confesses that the power of God is with Jesus, that Jesus is 
Emmanuel, which means ‘God with us,’ and at the same time, in the same breath, 
is continually disturbed by the question that Jesus asks, ‘who do men say that I 
am?’ (Matt. 16:15). Contrary to the condensed wisdom of the bumper stickers, 
Jesus is not The Answer but the place of the question, of an abyss that is opened 
up by the life and death of a man who, by putting forgiveness before retribution, 
threw all human accounting into confusion. (On Religion 35)  
 
Bearing one’s cross involves entering a state of questioning about the very nature of the cross 
itself. For Isabel this leads her to reflect on what exactly this act of atonement is and what 
successfully fulfilling it looks like. She must sort out the events that have caused her suffering, 
distinguishing God’s will from her own will and from the will of the men who have controlled 
her life. It also requires that she recognize when bearing her cross itself becomes a response to 
her own will rather than God’s—a risk she faces when the desire to bear her cross leads her back 
to East Lynne and the potential recognition of her family.  
By bearing her cross, Isabel remedies the main sin that has brought her suffering: her 
“indifference.” Pent up in a house Levison has procured for her in Grenoble, she is oppressed by 
knowledge of her sin, “not only of the one act of it, patent to scandalmongers, but of the long 
sinful life” in which she has “been carelessly indifferent.” Isabel suddenly reaches “her wasted 
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hand” toward the Bible, which she used to read “more as a forced duty than with any other 
feeling.” Reading the verse from Luke, “If any man will come after me, let him take up his cross 
daily, and follow me” (298), Isabel vows to fight her indifference.11 She leaves Grenoble, 
abandoning her hope for Levison to return and marry her, but is severely injured in a railway 
accident, her baby killed. Believing she will also die, Isabel tells a Sister of Charity about the 
harm she has caused at East Lynne. The sister advises Isabel to “make in this last moment an act 
of faith and obedience, by uniting your own will with His who sends this suffering” (321). Isabel 
understands bearing her cross to involve such a union of wills: she responds, “I will, I have taken 
up my cross” (322). Doing so requires not only that Isabel have a will, but that she be able to 
recognize it and then align it with God’s will. 
Thus returning to East Lynne involves Isabel’s discovery of her will, revealing, perhaps 
surprisingly, Wood’s critique of feminine passivity. Looking over the events leading up to her 
departure, we can see more fully what Isabel means by indifference: she has not born her cross or 
aligned her will with God’s because she has not seen herself as having a will. Isabel 
demonstrates “the dangers” of becoming “the passive, dependent…woman of the domestic 
ideal”; she is “paradoxically both a victim and a villainess” (Pykett, The 19th-Century Sensation 
Novel 101). Where Lyn Pykett and others have deemed such ambivalence on Wood’s part 
unconscious and Isabel’s return to East Lynne as the novel’s adherence to the domestic ideal, 
however, I would argue that Wood purposefully counters this ideal. One clear sign of Wood’s 
turn here lies in her manipulation of the gospel: the verse from Luke on taking up one’s cross 
reads, “If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and 
                                                
11 See Luke 9:23: “If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me.” 
A similar passage appears in Matthew: “If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, 
and follow me” (Matt. 16:24). 
 79 
follow me” (Luke 9:23, emphasis added), but Wood omits the part about self-denial—suggesting 
that Isabel must first recognize her own will before submitting to God’s.  
Wood also depicts Isabel’s lack of will as leading to her adulterous downfall. After her 
father’s death, Isabel follows only men’s wishes. Passed initially to the care of the next Lord 
Mount Severn and then to her husband, Isabel seems destined to live a life like that of Barbara’s 
mother, Mrs. Hare. As the wife of Justice Hare, a man who prefers that everything “be regulated 
by his own will” (184), Mrs. Hare “ha[s] no will”; her husband’s is “all in all” (21). Events 
leading up to Isabel’s departure only confirm this sense of her destiny. When Carlyle proposes 
marriage, Isabel hesitates to accept because she has feelings for Levison. Levison makes her 
decision for her, however: when she informs him that his congratulations on her engagement to 
Carlyle are premature, he reveals he has no plans to propose to her himself (122). Even Isabel’s 
elopement hardly seems her decision. Levison arranges for Isabel to witness Carlyle and 
Barbara’s “tête-à-tête by moonlight” (271). When Levison then encourages her to take revenge 
on her husband by running away, Isabel does not respond but begins sobbing. At this crucial 
moment in her story, we do not see her make any decision at all; she succumbs to Levison’s 
entreaties just as she collapses into his arms.  
Wood thus traces the antecedents of what she calls Isabel’s “kidnapping” to demonstrate 
her heroine’s lack of agency. Her will is circumscribed, as we’ve seen, by that of the men around 
her. But she is also the plaything of chance. On the day Levison arrives at East Lynne Isabel’s 
servant Joyce has injured her ankle; her injury will keep her in bed (and away from Isabel) for 
weeks. When Levison realizes the opportunity this presents, he can hardly contain himself: he 
gleefully scoops up Isabel’s son “and sw[ings] him around” (279). Geraldine Jewsbury, 
publisher’s reader for Bentley and Son, recommended that this plot device be rethought, 
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complaining that “the incident of the fractured ankle is too palpably a predestination. The 
machinery is too visible” (Maunder 698). But Wood refused to change it, suggesting perhaps that 
she meant for the machinery to be visible. 
In order to bear her cross, then, Isabel must discover her will and align it with God’s. But 
distinguishing God’s will from her own proves difficult. After the railway accident, Isabel 
experiences something quite distinct from indifference: a “vain yearning, [an] inward fever, [a] 
restless longing for what might not be. Longing for what? For her children” (389). Isabel’s 
yearnings for her children are answered when the opportunity arises to return to East Lynne to 
work as governess for Carlyle and his new wife, Barbara. But it is not clear that God wants her to 
return. Before she accepts the offer, Isabel deliberates over the moral implications: 
She had a battle with herself that day. Now resolving to go, and risk it; now 
shrinking from the attempt. At one moment it seemed to her that Providence must 
have placed this opportunity in her way that she might see her children, in her 
desperate longing: at another, a voice appeared to whisper that it was a wily, 
dangerous temptation flung across her path, one which it was her duty to resist and 
flee from. (397-98) 
 
Wood more fully outlines the ethical ambiguity of Isabel’s desire a few pages earlier. On the one 
hand, Isabel wants to know her children are safe and not suffering as a result of her departure. 
She worries “that she ha[s] abandoned them to be trained by strangers. Would they be trained to 
goodness, to morality, to religion? Careless as she herself had once been upon these points, she 
had learnt better now.” She especially wants to ensure that her daughter, also named Isabel, will 
not repeat her mistakes: “Would Isabel grow up to indifference, to—perhaps do as she had 
done?” (390). At the same time, this selfless desire to help her children risks becoming a selfish 
need to see them. When a mother is “separated for a while from her little children…the longing 
to see their little faces again…to feel their soft kisses, is kept under; and there may be frequent 
messages, ‘The children’s dear love to mamma:’ but, as the weeks lengthen out, the desire to see 
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them again becomes almost irrepressible” (389-90). Isabel wants to see her children, to give 
them her love, but her desire to give love is also a desire to be loved, “to feel their soft kisses” 
and even to be recognized as “mamma.” Isabel’s desire to return could be driven either by the 
altruistic aim to undo the suffering she has caused or by the vain desire to be loved. 
Wood thus reveals both the possibilities and dangers Isabel’s feelings pose to her moral 
autonomy. Critics, however, have seen Wood’s interest in feeling as indicative of an unreflective 
reliance on the sentimental conventions of melodrama that perpetuates women’s passive, 
oppressed state. Ann Cvetkovich argues that the novel displaces the pain of women’s social 
oppression as wives onto the more manageable problem of women’s repressed emotion. 
According to Cvetkovich, the novel’s sentimental embrace of feminine suffering and release of 
tears through melodrama allow Isabel and the reader to feel they have been temporarily relieved 
from these limitations without addressing the larger socioeconomic limits they face as women. 
But Wood clearly holds a much more complex view of Isabel’s emotions. 
 Indeed, Isabel’s feelings simultaneously lead to moral action and threaten to infuse any 
such action with moral vanity. It becomes unclear whether God wills her to return to East Lynne 
or stay away, since both actions could be driven by selfish motives. At one point, Isabel wonders 
how she will “bear to see Mr. Carlyle the husband of another.” She decides, “It might be difficult 
but she could force and school her heart to endurance: had she not resolved…to take up her cross 
daily, and bear it? No; her own feelings…should not prove the obstacle” (398). Here Isabel’s 
“feelings” create an “obstacle” to God’s will that she return. But in further deliberations they 
prove the obstacle to God’s will that she stay away: her longing for her children “appeared to be 
overmastering all her powers of mind and body. The temptation at length proved too strong: the 
project, having been placed before her covetous eyes, could not be relinquished, and she finally 
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resolved to go.” Returning to East Lynne thus becomes an irresistible “temptation.” In yet further 
deliberation, however, Isabel sees staying away as equally a form of vanity, an avoidance of 
humiliation and of repentance: “‘What is it that should keep me away?... The dread of 
discovery?... Deeper humiliation, than ever, would be my portion when they drive me from East 
Lynne with abhorrence and ignominy.” An embrace of the possibility of humiliation is the only 
guarantee that Isabel follows God’s will, but she is still not safe in her decision, as her 
determination to face humiliation verges on a narcissistic pleasure in imagining her own 
melodramatic, shame-ridden death: “I could bear that, as I must bear the rest, and I can shrink 
under some hedge and lay myself down to die. Humiliation for me! No; I will not put that in 
comparison with seeing and being with my children’” (398). Embracing humiliation risks the 
same vanity as avoiding humiliation. Isabel is in a double bind similar to—if more intense 
than—that of her author. She must find a way to give to her children what she can without 
seeking moral approbation or causing further pain.  
As Isabel’s feelings obstruct her discernment of God’s will, the novel implies that the 
answer lies not in a straightforward question of action—should she return to East Lynne or stay 
away?—but in a more liminal existence that requires ongoing reassessment of her feelings. 
Through her deliberations, Isabel realizes that just because God has not willed her self-
renunciatory retreat does not mean he wills her self-assertive intrusion into the Carlyles’ lives. 
Bearing her cross thus comes to mean choosing a difficult and open stance, one that keeps alive a 
multitude of possibilities of interpretation and action, since God’s will lies in an inarticulable 
place between retreat and intrusion.  
Isabel’s disfigurement is essential to inhabiting this liminality. Such an experience, itself 
resulting from circumstances outside of her control, could of course just encourage further 
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“indifference,” and it does for a little while: “car[ing] little what became of her,” Isabel 
momentarily succumbs to her new existence “as one forgotten,” as one “unknown, obscure, 
unrecognized by all” (327). But then, when her “yearning” for her children becomes too strong, 
Isabel’s disfigurement becomes the means by which she can return to East Lynne and begin her 
atonement, disguised as the governess Madame Vine. The liminality her disfigurement allows, 
while indeed existing apart from a straightforward realm of action, is thus quite different from 
Isabel’s previous “indifference.” It is defined by the sacred uncertainty of the cross, that is, an 
impassioned state of deliberation rather than apathetic inactivity. Once she encounters old 
acquaintances in Germany who do not recognize her, Isabel becomes confident that she will not 
be recognized in East Lynne either. As she later explains, “the consequences and punishment [of 
returning] would be mine alone, so long as I guarded against discovery” (615). And, indeed, 
unrecognized back home, she is able to fulfill her most worthy aim: helping her children. As 
even Barbara, who “in her heart of hearts…ha[s] never liked” Madame Vine (594), admits, “You 
are all we could wish for Lucy: and Mr. Carlyle feels truly grateful for your love and attention to 
his poor boy” (592).  
Back at East Lynne, Isabel may be constantly reminded of the consequences of her past, 
but she is also allowed to believe in the possibility of a new ethical identity. Her liminality, then, 
places her not only between self-assertion and self-renunciation, but also between self-
remembering and self-forgetting. Seeing Barbara again, Isabel painfully remembers the first time 
they met: “She was Barbara Hare, then, but now she was Barbara Carlyle: and she, she, who had 
been Isabel Carlyle, was Isabel Vane again” (404). Witnessing Carlyle kiss his wife, she reminds 
herself that it is “part of the cross she ha[s] undertaken to carry, and she must bear it” (411). At 
one point, however, Isabel remembers her shame too intensely, causing her to retreat from her 
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duties and race up to her room, collapsing “in an agony of tears and despair” as she contemplates 
what her marriage might have been had she loved Carlyle “as she d[oes] now.” Observing Isabel 
wallowing in the knowledge that she is now “worse to him than nothing,” the narrator advises, 
“Softly, my lady! This is not bearing your cross” (474). Significantly, the narrator herself 
“intrudes” here to remind us of the problematic consequences of retreat, as if trying to help 
Isabel return to her place between the two extremes. Wood thus imagines a simultaneous spatial 
and temporal liminality for her heroine: Isabel must temper the humiliation of remembrance with 
a certain amount of forgetting that gives her the courage to care for her children.  
However, Isabel must not forget herself so much that she falls into self-righteousness. 
Isabel temporarily assumes a perspective of moral and social superiority as she admonishes the 
Carlyles for their denigration of Lady Isabel’s memory and their treatment of her children. When 
discussing her son William’s illness with Carlyle, Isabel “almost forg[ets], as they st[and] there 
together, talking of the welfare of the child, their child, that he [i]s no longer her husband” (443). 
Isabel often “almost forgets,” suggesting a desire to be recognized in her previous identity as 
Lady Isabel Carlyle. For example, when Carlyle asks Isabel not to tell Barbara about the severity 
of William’s illness, for fear of “griev[ing] or alarm[ing]” her, Isabel “passionately, fiercely, 
resentfully,” responds, “Why should she be either grieved or alarmed? She is not his mother.” 
Carlyle tells her she “speak[s] hastily,” and she feels his “reproof,” but for different reasons than 
he thinks: it causes her to “remember…who she [i]s; remember…it with shame and humiliation. 
She, the governess!” (521). Bearing her cross requires Isabel to position herself between 
forgetting and remembering, unselfconsciousness and self-consciousness with regard to an 
audience in order to gain some sense that she does right. Isabel’s liminality thus addresses the 
problem of moral vanity and feminine self-consciousness that women in the novel face. As we 
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will see, it also provides Wood’s readers with an independent method of self-reflection and 
allows Wood to imagine a method of authorial moral expression that works around these 
concerns. 
3. 
Isabel must find a way to guarantee her moral sincerity independently. It seems that, 
working in a didactic tradition, Wood wants to teach readers a similar method. Indeed, her 
critique of the novel’s reliance on a narrator figure to provide this guarantee suggests that she 
sought a solution for real women in the real world. In the early scene in which Isabel sings 
hymns unconscious of her admiring audience, the narrator and her father attest to Isabel’s 
unselfconsciousness. It becomes clear, however, that such entirely unselfconscious purity of 
expression is ineffective; indeed, it is really only discernible in narrative form. Isabel sings a 
hymn based on a passage from Luke: “Blessed be the Lord God of Israel: for he hath visited and 
redeemed his people. And hath raised up a mighty salvation for us: in the house of his servant 
David” (Luke 1:68-69 qtd. in Wood 67). As Jay points out in her notes to the novel, “The line 
from the Benedictus that Wood chooses to quote has an ironic relevance to Carlyle’s role in 
‘restoring the house of Vane,’ though sadly he will be unable to save Isabel from ‘her enemies, 
and from the hand of all that hate [her]’” (628, 67n). Once Isabel has left her father’s and her 
husband’s home, she has no one to interpret her moral character for her. The second Lord Mount 
Severn does offer this sort of “narration” when he visits Isabel in Grenoble, claiming that when a 
woman finds herself in such an “inexplicable” position, “it is a father’s duty to look into motives 
and causes and actions…. Your father is gone, but I stand in his place: there is no one else to 
stand in it” (304). Having considered the “motives and causes and actions” of Isabel’s departure, 
the Earl blames Isabel less than Levison, who refused to marry her, and his own wife, Lady 
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Mount Severn, who pushed the penniless and parentless Isabel into marrying Carlyle to get her 
out of her home (308, 310). The Earl might offer the sort of narration women lack in the real 
world, but it remains private, and does not persuade others of Isabel’s goodness. 
Isabel thus finds a way to save herself through bearing her cross, an act that takes her 
prayer into the world and makes it more central to her daily thoughts and actions. As Isabel 
attempts to distinguish God’s will from her own, she can only deliberate for so long before she 
must act on the understanding gained from her deliberations. She chooses to return to East Lynne, 
an act that is distinctly closer to intrusion than retreat, but she has faith that she still follows 
God’s will, continuing to inhabit a place between these two extremes. Wood identifies this 
reliance on faith as simultaneously a problem and a possibility as Isabel attempts to ascertain her 
own sincerity. 
Indeed, the end of the novel seems to test the limits of this virtual intrusion: how publicly 
can Isabel speak her prayers without losing their liminality? As the question of sincerity concerns 
her moral expression in addition to her physical actions, Isabel’s situation more vividly calls out 
to Wood’s experience as a didactic author. Aware of her impending death, Isabel takes an 
irreversible step closer to asking for recognition of her moral expression when she reveals herself 
to Cornelia and Carlyle and asks their forgiveness. Carlyle at first doubts Isabel’s repentant 
speech: “Was she equivocating to him on her death-bed?” (614). Isabel can only go so far to 
convince Carlyle and herself of her earnestness, but Carlyle and Isabel both choose to have faith, 
expressing this with the same simple phrase: “Yes, yes.” Just after Carlyle tells her he forgives 
her, Isabel “murmur[s],” partly to herself, partly to Carlyle, “To His Rest in Heaven…. Yes, yes: 
I know that God has forgiven me. Oh, what a struggle it has been!” In response to Isabel’s 
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request that he “keep a little corner in [his] heart” for her, Carlyle too “whisper[s],” “Yes, yes” 
(617).  
This scene represents a turning from Isabel’s liminal state toward a state of affirmation, 
but affirmation that relies on an acknowledgment of uncertainty. “Yes, yes,” or “yea, yea,” 
appears several places in the New Testament, always with regard to the sincerity of one’s 
speech.12 Its appearance in the Sermon on the Mount provides the most likely context for 
Wood’s use of the phrase, given her reliance in the novel on the Gospels of Matthew and Luke:13 
Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not 
forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: But I say unto you, 
Swear not at all; neither by heaven; for it is God’s throne: Nor by the earth; for it 
is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King. Neither 
shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or 
black. But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more 
of these cometh of evil. (Matt. 5:33-37) 
 
This passage, explicating the Old Testament prohibition against false oaths, points out the 
ambiguity in any oath, the danger in presuming such control over the world, language, and one’s 
motives. Rather than make blindly ostentatious oaths or refrain from making oaths altogether, 
one must “perform unto the Lord [one’s] oaths,” but only with the temperateness of saying 
simply yes, yes or no, no. Such temperateness lies in these words’ acknowledgment of the 
inevitable uncertainty of human motive and language—and the quiet momentary embrace of 
certainty anyway. It is only after recognizing such uncertainty that sincere faith in the possibility 
                                                
12 See Matthew 5:33-37, 2 Corinthians 1:17-20, and James 5:12. 
13 Among Wood’s many Biblical allusions are repeated references to Matthew and Luke, as in Isabel’s talk of taking 
up her cross. Additionally, Carlyle cites a verse from Luke, “Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth 
another, committeth adultery” (Luke 16:18 qtd. in Wood 319), that closely recalls Matthew 5:32, the verse that 
immediately precedes the passage from Matthew above. In Matthew 5:32, Jesus proclaims, “whosoever shall put 
away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her 
that is divorced committeth adultery,” a statement with obvious implications for the novel. Considering its proximity 
to the passage above and Wood’s attention to both Matthew and Luke in particular, it seems likely that Carlyle’s and 
Isabel’s “yes, yes” here draws on Matthew’s “yea, yea.” (The “yea, yea” is frequently translated as “yes, yes,” and 
would, in fact, appear as such shortly after East Lynne was published, in an 1862 translation of the Bible—Young’s 
Literal Translation, by the Scottish publisher Robert Young, a member of the evangelical Free Church of Scotland.) 
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of certainty is possible. Although the novel is ambiguous in the end about whether or not Carlyle 
truly forgives Isabel (he at one point draws away from her, “with a scarlet flush” [616], caused 
either by renewed anger at the thought of Levison or just by a remembrance of his fidelity to his 
current wife), it seems Wood asks readers to consider the yes, yes as approaching the kind of 
virtuous expression she has sought. Compared to the novel’s more extreme images commonly 
associated with Victorian melodrama, the quietness of the yes, yes complicates our sense of 
Wood’s moral aims and puts, as we will see, a much more positive spin on Isabel’s death and the 
novel’s end. 
 The yes, yes is not the blindly static expression of belief associated with typical 
understandings of Victorian didacticism. The word “yes” holds special significance in Christian 
tradition and beyond; as Jacques Derrida has demonstrated, its implicit doubling into yes, yes 
brings the instability of language and the possibility for virtuous expression to the fore.14 Derrida 
considers a line from the seventeenth-century German poet and mystic Angelus Silesius, “Gott 
spricht nur immer Ja / God never says but Yes [or: I am],” in which the phoneme Ja signifies 
both “yes” and “I am” (as in Jahveh) (qtd. in Derrida 121).15 It thus brings together the 
“limitless” Christian “yes” (the apostle Paul said about Christ, “In him there is only yes”) and the 
“separations and distinctions utilized by all of Hebraic epistemology” (Derrida 122)—in a 
similar way, I would argue, to the Sermon on the Mount’s reinterpretation of the Old Testament 
prohibition against false oaths. The line “reminds us of ‘the identity between the Christly ‘yes’ 
and the ‘I am (the Other)’ of the burning bush,” suggesting that the Christian yes holds within it 
                                                
14 It might strike some as incongruous to compare the thought of Ellen Wood to that of Derrida, but given Wood’s 
attention to the double bind women faced with the interpretation of their moral character—the way women’s attempt 
at “modesty” often becomes interpreted as its opposite—a deconstructive ethics seems the most plausible direction 
for her thoughts toward a solution. For another study that recognizes Wood’s ethical investment in a 
deconstructionist style of thought, see Marlene Tromp, who examines Wood’s vexing of conventional Victorian 
understandings of “justice” by employing Derrida’s notion of justice as located in “the undecidable.” 
15 Derrida’s comments here are also an interpretation of Michel de Certeau’s reading of the same line. 
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an acknowledgement (“neither Judaic nor Christian”) of what Derrida calls “the fable inscribed 
in the yes as the origin of every word” (124). The yes, he explains, is a word, 
And yet, implied by all the other words whose source it figures, it also remains 
silent…. It exceeds and incises language, to which it remains nonetheless 
immanent: like language’s first dweller, the first to step out of its home. It brings 
to being and lets be everything which can be said. But its intrinsic double nature is 
already discernable, or more precisely, it is already confirmed. It is and is not of 
language…. For if it is ‘before’ language, it marks the essential exigency, the 
promise, the engagement to come to language. (Derrida 125-26)  
 
The yes thus affirms the power of language and simultaneously reminds us of the instability on 
which language is founded.  
The repetition of yes in Matthew and in East Lynne seems to acknowledge this special 
relationship that the yes holds to the simultaneous certainty and uncertainty through which 
language operates. Derrida argues that at the origins of the yes (and thus the origins of language) 
lies “the fatality of repetition, and of repetition as an incisive opening” that implicitly doubles 
and/or splits the yes into yes, yes:  
Let us suppose a first yes, the arche-originary yes which engages, promises and 
acquiesces before all else. On the one hand it is originarily, in its very structure, a 
response. It is firstly second, coming after a demand, a question or another yes. On 
the other hand, as an engagement or a promise, it must at least bind itself 
beforehand to a confirmation in a next yes…. Since the second yes resides in the 
first, the repetition augments and divides, distributing in advance the arche-
originary yes. This repetition, which figures the condition of an opening of the 
yes, menaces it as well. (130-31) 
 
Expressing one’s faith by saying yes, yes returns one to a place of original affirmation, on which 
language is founded, but also serves as a reminder that, even in its originary state, that 
affirmation responds to something that requires affirmation (and thereby is not affirmation). The 
affirmation implied by the yes, yes is thus by no means final; the structure of the phrase holds 
within it an openness to future uncertainty. 
 90 
Memory and forgetting become important to this acknowledgment, since the first yes 
requires future confirmation and remembrance with the second yes, but at the same time, the 
second yes “must come as an absolute renewal, again absolutely, once again absolutely inaugural 
and ‘free,’ failing which it could only be a natural, psychological or logical consequence”—in 
Isabel’s and Wood’s case, an overly self-conscious need to convince others of one’s sincerity. 
The second yes “must act as if the ‘first’ were forgotten, far enough past to require a new, initial 
yes. This ‘forgetting’ is not psychological or accidental, it is structural, the very condition of 
fidelity, of both the possibility and impossibility of a signature” (Derrida 131). The 
simultaneousness of this remembering and forgetting calls to mind Isabel’s attempt to bear her 
cross. Isabel’s liminality seems one possible response to the inevitable question of what it might 
look like not to “forswear thyself” but to “perform unto the Lord thine oaths.” At the end of the 
novel, Isabel finally reaches a point at which she can say yes, yes to herself, recognizing or 
“remembering” that she has indeed already “said” it through her actions at East Lynne to God. 
Carlyle, on the other hand, never makes it clear that he fully understands the instability of 
moral language that the yes, yes acknowledges, and in fact, at the end of the novel, Wood has 
him espouse the kind of moralizing message for which she herself was criticized. The novel ends 
with Carlyle telling Barbara, “Every good thing will come with time that we earnestly seek…. 
Oh, Barbara, never forget—never forget that the only way to ensure peace in the end, is, to strive 
always to be doing right, unselfishly, under God” (624). Wood might agree with Carlyle’s claim, 
but she also implies that earnestness, doing right, and unselfishness require continuous 
reassessment and even some “forgetting”; they are not the static, easily interpreted virtues 
Carlyle straightforwardly promotes here. Wood makes a radical suggestion with Carlyle’s 
comparative obliviousness, that the gendered restrictions women face with the interpretation of 
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their moral characters force them to think about these issues in much more innovative ways than 
men. Carlyle sums up the novel with his earnest statement, but the fact that it took an entire 
novel to get to these few sentences of “truth” suggests the underlying instability of these terms. 
In contrast, Isabel acknowledges “the struggle it has been” to reach a place where she can finally 
say yes, yes.  
There is, of course, a negative side to such uncertainty, the idea that one can never be 
successful in one’s repentance, a belief common to nineteenth-century evangelicalism that the 
narrator voices near the novel’s end: “The very best man that attains to the greatest holiness on 
earth has need constantly to strive and pray, if he would keep away evil from his thoughts, 
passions from his nature. His life must be spent in self-watchfulness; he must ‘pray always,’ at 
morning, at evening, at mid-day: and he cannot do it then” (590). Wood’s skepticism about the 
possibility of knowing one’s will from moment to moment risks taking on a negativity that often 
leads Isabel’s constant self-questioning to be read as an oppressive masochism rather than a path 
toward moral autonomy, her death the novel’s final word on her behavior, a punishment for her 
transgressions.  
As we have seen, however, Isabel’s time at East Lynne, while often painful, offers a 
second lease on life—something rare within Victorian representations of fallenness. As Ellen 
Bayuk Rosenman points out, “Whereas her father’s fall led to a double stasis in both death and 
the grotesque arrest of his corpse for non-payment of debts, Isabel rises from both shame and the 
grave for a second, unauthorized life…her body may be condemned and maimed, but it will not 
be arrested” (27). Isabel’s fate differs from the many Victorian narratives in which a fallen 
woman’s fate lies only in unabated shame and then death. The positive bent of Isabel’s self-
questioning and moral transformation only increases as the novel approaches its end, establishing 
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value in having faith in oneself and others despite intense skepticism. Even Isabel’s death is 
more accurately viewed in a positive light: interpreting the deaths of several Wood heroines, 
Anne-Marie Beller identifies a “tension…between a Christian eschatology and the 
representational codes of contemporary visual art and literature, which repeatedly encoded the 
dead or dying woman within a rhetoric of fallenness.” Taking Wood’s expression of religious 
belief into account, Beller concludes that Isabel’s death is more “heavenly reward” than 
“punishment” (220). Wood, like many religious Victorians, would have viewed the death of a 
properly repentant individual as much more satisfying than we might today. 
Isabel’s final rest in God serves as a literal rendering of the affirmative value Wood sees 
in fiction that encourages readers toward self-reflection and moral questioning. A few years after 
the publication of East Lynne, the book review section of Wood’s Argosy Magazine (believed to 
be written by Wood herself) would declare, “The end of art is not so much to satisfy as to create 
a noble unrest, in which lies the root of a deeper repose” (316).16 This line revises in more 
directly aesthetic, secular terms the famous claim from the Gospel of Matthew, alluded to by 
Mrs. Hare in East Lynne, that “there will be a blessed rest for the weary” who find faith in Jesus 
as the path to “knowing” God (428).17 Isabel may only reach this rest in the most traditional, 
literal form, through death, announcing, “To his Rest in Heaven” just before claiming, “Yes, yes: 
                                                
16 This is the first line of the Argosy’s September 1868 “Log-Book,” a monthly review forum. Wood purchased the 
Argosy, a literary magazine in which she would publish many of her own stories, in 1867 and served as editor until 
her death in 1887. Charles W. Wood, Malcolm Elwin, and, more recently, Maunder all “suggest that Wood wrote at 
least half of the Argosy’s contents herself, with only the help of a small staff of writers” (Phegley 188). Phegley 
argues, “it is likely that she wrote the magazine’s most prominent book review section herself, taking cover under 
the guise of anonymity.” If Wood did not write this line, she “certainly seems to have used her editorial control to 
guide the critical showcase of the magazine toward redefining the terms that influenced the reception of her own 
fiction” (Phegley 188).  
17 “All things are delivered unto me of my Father: and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any 
man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him. Come unto me, all ye that labour and 
are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in 
heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls” (Matt. 11:27-29). 
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I know that God has forgiven me.” But her story grants readers this possibility more figuratively, 
cultivating “a noble unrest” that continuously allows for “deeper repose” through life.18 
In the end, the novel reassures those readers who have faith in the earnestness of Isabel’s 
moral expressions and actions, demonstrating that her decision to reveal herself brings more 
good than bad to East Lynne. It results, for one, in Cornelia’s atonement for the wrongs she has 
committed with her religious moralizing and criticism of Isabel. Dying, Isabel asks Cornelia to 
forgive her, crying, “Jesus did not come, you know, to save the good, like you: he came for the 
sake of us poor sinners.” The narrator, giving us a glimpse of Cornelia’s thoughts, makes 
Wood’s interest in the instability of moral language explicit: “The good, like you!… the words 
grated…fiercely on her conscience.” Cornelia realizes at that moment “that the harsh religion she 
had, through life, professed, was not the religion that would best bring peace to her dying bed.” 
In a tone more heartfelt and intimate than any we have heard her use previously, Cornelia asks if 
she drove Isabel from East Lynne. Isabel responds that she did not and instead asks her for 
forgiveness. Cornelia “inwardly breath[s],” “Thank God!” but immediately reveals her newly 
acquired responsiveness, replying, “ ‘Forgive me,’…aloud and in agitation, touching her hand. ‘I 
could have made your home happier, and I wish I had done it. I have wished it ever since you left 
it’” (612). Cornelia’s exchange with Isabel appears the first step toward a self-reflectiveness that 
might temper her moralizing stance toward others.  
                                                
18 The affirmative nature of this “noble unrest” resembles that found more recently in Derrida’s work, which has 
previously been seen as nihilistic or at least as promoting a negative ethical vigilance. Derrida himself claimed in 
1989 that he had been “read less and less well over almost twenty years, like my religion about which nobody 
understands anything” (qtd. in Caputo, Prayers and Tears xvii). Caputo fleshes out what Derrida means here by 
looking in particular at his work on negative or apophatic theology. “Deconstruction is never merely negative,” 
Caputo argues; rather it “is thoroughly mistrustful of discourses that prohibit this and prohibit that, that weigh us 
down with debts and ‘don’ts.’ Deconstruction is so deeply and abidingly affirmative—of something new, of 
something coming—that it finally breaks out in a vast and sweeping amen, a great oui, oui—à l’impossible, in a 
great burst of passion for the impossible” (Prayers and Tears 3). 
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The novel’s final scene also reveals that the most morally worthy aim leading Isabel to 
return to East Lynne, her desire to save her children from suffering from her actions, will be 
fulfilled beyond her death because of her final irreversible intrusion into the Carlyles’ lives. 
Informed of Madame Vine’s real identity upon return from the seaside, Barbara immediately 
questions Carlyle’s loyalty. He embraces her, promising that she has no reason to doubt him 
(623). This open exchange leads Barbara to admit and ask forgiveness for her own failing. She 
confesses, “‘there has been a feeling in my heart against your children, a sort of jealous feeling… 
because they were hers; because she had once been your wife. I knew how wrong it was, and I 
have tried earnestly to subdue it…. I think it is nearly gone. I’—her voice sunk lower—
‘constantly pray to be helped to do it; to love them and care for them as if they were my own’” 
(624). On the novel’s final page, we see the positive motive for Isabel’s return fulfilled beyond 
her death, as a direct result of her having returned to East Lynne and revealed herself. Taking her 
“prayers” more directly into the world encourages Barbara to do the same.  
 With Carlyle’s comment about “earnestly…doing right, unselfishly, under God,” the 
novel ends on a note of moral confidence that, when juxtaposed with the patterns of questioning 
and ambiguity throughout, suggests that the question remains whether or not readers can find the 
same faith in Wood’s motives as they may have with Isabel. Struggling against stereotypes of 
moral vanity, Wood, like Isabel returning to her children, seems to try to access the part of 
herself that can give love rather than the part that just wants to be loved. Wood grasps at this 
relation to the reader through the sense of audience she constructs through Isabel’s liminality, 
putting herself among others, in a position that allows her moral agency, but in doing so, walking 
a fine line between truly acting morally and acting for recognition. As Madame Vine, Isabel 
works to understand herself through her interactions with others, but strives against the 
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possibility that shaping others’ views of her would become her primary motive. The complexity 
of Isabel’s actions at East Lynne—which are self-reflective and morally efficacious but also 
rhetorically empowering—is never advertised overtly; her ability to maneuver around 
stereotypical interpretations of women’s moral character is never obvious enough to imply that 
Wood has something to prove about herself. Perhaps for this reason the parallel between Isabel’s 
actions in returning to East Lynne and Wood’s expressions of moral belief as author can only 
remain speculative. But the search for a similar voice, with its unique sense of the relation 
between self and audience, drives novelists like George Eliot’s and Sarah Grand’s 
experimentation with narrative technique and the role of the implied author later in the century. 
Despite their more secular worldview and method of self-reflection, these authors similarly see 
something in the form of Judeo-Christian prayer, with its private appeals outward and the need 
for faith that it conjures, that allows them to believe in the possibility of this voice.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“Something quite new in the form of womanhood”:  
Reimagining “Lady Novelists” and the Realist Novel in Daniel Deronda 
 
 Early on in her career, the writer who would be known as George Eliot championed a 
realist aesthetic that lay in direct opposition to moralistic didacticism. Repeatedly in essays such 
as “The Morality of Wilhelm Meister” (1855) and “Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming” (1855), 
Marian Evans noted that a tendency to moralize hindered one’s access to life’s truths. In “The 
Natural History of German Life” (1856), generally understood as an early argument for Eliot’s 
brand of realism, she claimed that “a picture of human life such as a great artist can give, 
surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that attention to what is apart from themselves.” 
Such a picture can do “more…toward obliterating the vulgarity of exclusiveness, 
than…hundreds of sermons and philosophical dissertations” (Evans 54). For Evans, sermonizing 
obstructed artists’ depiction of life “apart from themselves.”1 
 In “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists” (1856), Evans examined the moralizing tendency of 
women novelists in particular. She expressed concern that the woman writer “has a feverish 
consciousness of her attainments; she keeps a sort of mental pocket-mirror, and is continually 
looking in it at her own ‘intellectuality’” (454-55). Such vanity emerges in her didacticism. 
Again expressing a belief that didacticism lay in direct opposition to realism, Evans claims, “the 
ability of a lady novelist to describe actual life and her fellow-men is in inverse proportion to her 
                                                
1 Eliot subscribed to a notion of realism that believed “one can only be objective by virtue of the moral strength of 
self-restraint” (Levine 149). This idea “is visible,” George Levine writes, “from George Eliot’s intervention in 
chapter 17 of Adam Bede, to Thackeray’s self-conscious representation of his own artifices and their distance from 
truth in Vanity Fair, to Trollope’s determination never to trick the reader with surprises, to Charlotte Brontë’s 
earnest insistence on making the narrative of Shirley as ordinary as Monday morning” (149). 
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confident eloquence about God and the other world” (450). Evans singles out “oracular” works, 
those “intended to expound the writer’s religious, philosophical or moral theories” as “[t]he most 
pitiable of all silly novels by lady novelists” (449). Interestingly for our concerns, Evans ties 
such oracular works to “High Church” authors (455), but she also criticizes Evangelical novels 
“in which the vicissitudes of the tender passion are sanctified by saving views of Regeneration 
and the Atonement” (456). If essays like “The Natural History of German Life” helped Eliot 
define her novelistic realism, “Silly Novels” helped her define her identity as a writer. By 
labeling work by such “ladies” as “silly” and choosing a masculine pseudonym, Eliot identified 
herself as a different kind of novelist.  
 Nevertheless, as this chapter argues, Eliot was not finished thinking about women 
novelists’ vexed relationship with the expression of moral belief. Having been accused of 
moralizing about the plight of women in Middlemarch (1871-72), Eliot worked to neutralize 
criticisms of women’s oppression in the second edition. But just two years later, in Daniel 
Deronda (1876), she would consider how such an avoidance of moralizing could signal its own 
kind of moralizing self-consciousness. As we’ve seen with Sewell and Wood, women’s attempts 
at unselfconsciousness were often viewed as a form of moral vanity. In her final novel, Eliot 
recognizes the difficulties of this interpretive dynamic. Inevitably failing to live up to 
expectations of self-renunciation, characters like Mirah Lapidoth and Gwendolen Harleth seem 
fated to vacillate between the extremes of “embarrassment and boldness” (Eliot, Daniel Deronda 
192). “Boldness” in the novel is aligned with unreflective moral vanity, “embarrassment” with 
the self-berating realization that, thanks to the nature of self-consciousness, such vanity can be 
impossible to avoid. In this way, Eliot’s “embarrassment and boldness” recall the dynamic we 
saw with Wood, in which women who avoid association with feminine vanity, shame, and 
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fallenness become subject to moral vanity. But Eliot shows that this dynamic works in the 
opposite direction as well: those who avoid association with feminine moralizing become subject 
to apologetic “embarrassment” that can carry the stigma of moralizing and fallen shame at the 
same time. The novel describes this as “fall[ing] into the apologetic philosophy which explains 
the world into containing nothing better than one’s own conduct” (177). Fallenness was not only 
associated with the public self-promotion of the prostitute. As Amanda Anderson has shown, it 
was also associated with the self-laceration implicit in an attempt at accurate moral self-
reflection.2 Eliot thus suggests that part of women’s interpretive difficulties stemmed from the 
fact that they confronted fallenness no matter which way they turned.  
 The novel anticipates a dynamic that would shape Eliot criticism for years to come. 
While promoting sympathy for Jewish struggle, Eliot did not stray from her ongoing goal of 
“amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of our 
personal lot” (Evans, “Natural History” 54). Nevertheless, critics accused her of an aggressively 
didactic aim, sparking a reputation for moralizing that grew throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century. Contemporary readings have countered this idea, tracing Eliot’s complex self-
questioning and continual undermining of the moral values her work puts forth. Such readings, 
however, associate her with the apologetic skepticism that she viewed as equally problematic.  
 Eliot thus considers the idea in her final novel that the divide between realism and 
didacticism might not be so clear-cut. If didactic authors like Sewell and Wood demonstrate that 
didacticism’s moral lessons were more realistic in their broad-minded acknowledgment of 
moralism’s challenges, Eliot approaches this issue from the other direction, acknowledging that 
realism always has a bit of the didactic in it. Denying this fact (as Eliot often felt forced to do) 
risks its own moral vanity. 
                                                
2 See Tainted Souls and Painted Faces: The Rhetoric of Fallenness in Victorian Culture (1993). 
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 This chapter traces Eliot’s reconceptualization of the relationship between realism and 
didacticism. Although Eliot had earlier derided lady novelists of the High Church and 
Evangelical schools, her comparison of novelistic narrative to prayer in Daniel Deronda recalls 
similar comparisons in Sewell’s and Wood’s novels. Eliot’s narrative achieves subtle rhetorical 
power by approximating a secular understanding of prayer as a “form” of “self-oblivious” 
expression that “seeks for nothing special” (310). This self-obliviousness is not a selfless 
renunciation in relation to others but a simultaneous obliviousness of others too. In this mode, 
the obsessive consciousness of audience and the urgent intent of communication associated with 
both moralizing boldness and self-conscious embarrassment fall away, while the author’s moral 
message still emerges. Even as Eliot adds to her stance on Jewish struggle a more personally 
charged stance on women’s (and women authors’) rights, the novel exudes a quiet, balanced 
confidence in its devotion to sympathetic realism and a didactic aim. 
 Critics condemned the political stances in Eliot’s fiction for the same reasons they 
condemned Sewell and Wood: they saw these stances as reflective of Eliot’s desire to 
demonstrate her own moral rectitude. I will thus refer to this alleged crime as “moralizing,” even 
when the message Eliot espouses is political. But such messages are usually moral and political, 
just as Sewell’s and Wood’s were moral and religious. Indeed, the novel comments on the 
oppression of women and Jews in society, but it imagines a moral solution to these problems in 
the form of sympathy. 
1. 
The novel examines the constraints on women’s moral character through the two female 
interests of Daniel Deronda, Gwendolen Harleth and Mirah Lapidoth. Both search for their place 
in the world. Gwendolen, a young woman of the gentry class who has recently experienced 
 100 
financial ruin after the death of her stepfather, marries Henleigh Grandcourt for his financial 
stability but ultimately looks to Deronda for moral guidance and affection. Mirah, a young, 
homeless Jewish woman who has escaped a career as an actress, a betrothal to a man she doesn’t 
love, and the father who forced her into both, seeks Deronda’s help finding the mother and 
brother she lost when her father kidnapped her from England years before. In their search for a 
proper place, Gwendolen and Mirah also search for a proper moral character. They struggle with 
the expectation of feminine unselfconsciousness we’ve seen critiqued by Sewell and Wood, the 
idea that women are “delicate vessels” bearing “the treasure of human affections,” that “girls and 
their blind visions…are the Yea or Nay of that good for which men are enduring and fighting” 
(103).3 Of course, with the term “blind visions,” Eliot’s narrator reveals some ambivalence in 
this view that women embody goodness by their very nature, that they do not have to “endur[e] 
and fight” for it, nor, with their “blind visions,” use active reflection to gauge it.  
In Gwendolen, this lack of self-reflection has encouraged vanity and selfishness. With 
Deronda’s help, she becomes receptive to self-criticism, but the kind that shades into “a strong 
self-love without any self-satisfaction, rather with a self-discontent” (13). Gwendolen’s situation 
recalls the problem of “paralyzing self-consciousness” that recurred in narratives of moral 
development in the nineteenth century (Anderson, Tainted Souls 18). Anderson has demonstrated 
that the figure of the fallen woman served to displace the problem of self-consciousness in moral 
discourse. John Stuart Mill, for example, laments in his Autobiography (1873) that the self-
reflection essential to moral character often undermined his moral autonomy. Mill imagines 
himself in an implicitly sexual and feminized subject position, describing the problem as 
                                                
3 The narrator’s use of the term “girls” rather than “women” here is meant to signal the difference between the “girls” 
in England who are expected to remain innocently unconscious of the more serious dramas of the world, and the 
“women” in America who have faced a civil war and courageously refuse to “mourn for the husbands and sons who 
died bravely in a common cause” (102). 
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“weigh[ing] on [his] existence like an incubus” (108). Since fallenness was associated with a 
lack of control over the development of one’s character, “the ideal of feminine virtue, insofar as 
it neglect[ed] ‘the internal culture of the individual,’ c[ould] actually promote rather than prevent 
fallenness” (Anderson, Tainted Souls 37). Fittingly, Gwendolen’s own belated self-
consciousness leads her at its extreme to imagine herself in a position of fallenness, the diamond 
necklace from Grandcourt (previously owned by the “fallen” Lydia Glasher) representing this 
idea in her mind. 
Mirah tries to avoid a similarly debilitating state of mind through a self-renouncing focus 
on others. Upon entering England after escaping her father’s grasp, the once self-assured Mirah 
suddenly worries that she “look[s] like a miserable beggar-girl” (188): “I looked like a street-
beggar…. All who saw me would think ill of me…. I dreaded lest any stranger should notice me 
and speak to me” (188-89). Mirah’s image of herself as a “street-beggar” approaches the figure 
that epitomized fallenness for Victorians—the streetwalker or prostitute. Unable to bear her 
morbid self-consciousness, Mirah tries to drown herself. After she is rescued by Deronda, 
however, Mirah’s attentions swing the opposite direction, as, in an act of ongoing self-
renunciation, she devotes herself to others like Deronda and, eventually, her brother Mordecai. 
But, ironically, as she loses sight of herself in one sense, Mirah develops a sense of superiority 
based on an illusory belief in her selflessness. In this case, the negative connotation of the 
narrator’s claim that “girls” have “blind visions” about morality emerges more strongly. 
Displaying an extreme version of the dynamic we’ve seen epitomized in earlier discourse by the 
“prude” and the “coquette,” Mirah’s narrative intimates that women are pushed toward moral 
egotism in order to distance themselves from associations with fallenness.  
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 Indeed, Mirah’s unreflective sense of moral superiority leads her to imagine herself in 
direct opposition to Gwendolen, whom she compares to an actress self-consciously dependent on 
the gaze of an audience. When asked her impression of Gwendolen, Mirah compares her, “with a 
quick intensity,” to “the Princess of Eboli in Don Carlos,” a figure associated “in 
her…mind…with a certain actress as well as the part she represented” (562). The association is 
clearly negative, considering the deceitful character of the Princess of Eboli and Mirah’s own 
rejection of the life of an actress. Mirah’s “repugnance” for Gwendolen causes her to 
“conceive…more evil than she kn[ows]” (628), her self-renunciation thus leading to the 
inaccurate representation of others and a blindness toward herself.  
Mirah eventually realizes this problem, rejecting Mordecai’s admiration of her feminine 
ability for “love that loses self in the object of love.” Mordecai illustrates his claim with a 
Midrashic story of a woman in love with a king who loves a different woman in prison awaiting 
execution. The first woman’s love for the king leads her to exchange clothes with the second 
woman and “d[ie] in her stead.” Mirah protests that the first woman “wanted the king when she 
was dead to know what she had done, and feel that she was better than the other. It was her 
strong self, wanting to conquer, that made her die” (629). Having experienced the moral vanity 
of self-renunciation, Mirah rejects her brother’s admiration of this quality. But, as Eliot 
experienced, rejecting such associations for yourself does not guarantee that others interpreting 
you will do the same. 
As we’ve seen, Eliot worked to avoid the associations with moral vanity that emerged 
from expectations of feminine selflessness. But she was not always successful. In his 1872 
review of Middlemarch, Richard Holt Hutton accused Eliot of “attempt[ing]…to represent the 
book as an elaborate contribution to the ‘Woman’s’ question” and “meting out unjust measure to 
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the entirely untrammeled imaginative power which the book displays” (1555). Hutton referred to 
the final chapter’s lamentation of heroine Dorothea’s existence in a society that “smiled on 
propositions of marriage from a sickly man to a girl less than half his own age” and that 
encouraged “modes of education which make a woman’s knowledge another name for motley 
ignorance” (810, 784n). Hutton framed Eliot’s appeal on behalf of women as symptomatic of her 
excessive dependence on an audience, noting her need to “represent” her work “as an elaborate 
contribution” to moral and political understanding.  
 The review illustrates a widespread expectation, embraced in the past by Eliot herself, 
that authors should leave themselves out of their novels and that the only moral message 
conveyed by their realism should be an implicit one concerning its selfless objectivity. Eliot 
would subject this idea to scrutiny, however, through the protagonist of her next novel. Recalling 
the main quality Eliot sought with her own realism, Deronda is defined by his “activity of 
imagination on behalf of others” (151). In a way, Deronda authors Mirah’s new life in England, 
providing her shelter and a means of subsistence by advertising her abilities as a music teacher, 
narrating her good character to others. Deronda even refers to his actions in literary terms: 
planning Mirah and Mordecai’s reunion, he “beg[s]” Mrs Meyrick “to make the revelation 
instead of waiting for him” because he dreads “going again through a narrative in which he 
seem[s] to be making himself important, and giving himself a character of general beneficence” 
(496). He thus positions himself selflessly outside the narrative his perspective has made happen, 
as a realist author who wants to avoid moralizing might. 
 Eliot expresses discomfort that this avoidance can exude its own kind of moral vanity. 
After all, Eliot’s response to Hutton’s criticisms would have suggested a similar concern for 
audience. In the 1874 edition of Middlemarch, Eliot erased the feminist undertones, lamenting 
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only the “determined” existence of “creatures” in general (784-85). Nevertheless, as we’ve seen, 
a public accusation of self-consciousness, if not accurate at first, always becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Eliot’s revision intimates a desire to demonstrate her “untrammeled” authorial 
selflessness, a selflessness that is doomed to fail because it is driven by others’ expectations.  
 As Eliot will show, the attempt to avoid moralizing can not only seem moralizing in its 
own way; it can also take on the traits of a self-conscious fallenness—the other quality women 
authors had to avoid. Eliot explores this circular bind through Deronda. She gives him a 
distinctly feminine air, associating him with the angelic nature that, as we’ve seen with Mirah, 
always verges on moral vanity.4 Deronda is defined by an “affectionateness such as we are apt to 
call feminine” (271) and often calls to mind the angel in the house, the wife who serves as the 
ideal by which her husband gauges his moral character. Deronda “becom[es] a part of 
[Gwendolen’s] conscience, as one woman whose nature is an object of reverential belief may 
become a new conscience to a man” (356). 
 Like Mirah, Deronda realizes the risks inherent in being an icon of selflessness. But he 
struggles in his attempt to prove that he is not moralizing in this role. Although Deronda is quick 
to distance his care for Mirah from any self-aggrandizing motives, the more self-negating he 
does, the more he prides himself on his selflessness. He feels threatened by others, like “the 
marplot Hans” or Mirah’s mother and brother, who might take away from his singularly 
benevolent role in Mirah’s life (319-20). Realizing this problem to some extent, Deronda turns to 
Gwendolen to avoid it (192, 319). Unlike Mirah, Gwendolen has no one else to provide this care, 
allowing Deronda to believe himself selfless while “giving himself [that] character of general 
                                                
4 Deronda is repeatedly viewed as an angel by those he helps. Upon rescue, Mirah gives him a “look…full of 
wondering timidity, such as the forsaken one in the desert might have lifted to the angelic vision” (164). To Hans, 
Deronda is “as much out of the question as the angel Gabriel” when it comes to having romantic feelings for Mirah 
(398). And to Gwendolen, Deronda seems “a terrible-browed angel from whom she could not think of concealing 
any deed so as to win an ignorant regard from him” (577). 
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beneficence” he has come to avoid with Mirah. The narrator, feeling perhaps similarly 
compromised, anxiously denies that Deronda’s “sympathy” for Gwendolen could be driven by 
self-regard, thus recognizing this to be one possible interpretation: “It was not vanity—it was 
ready sympathy that had made him alive to a certain appealingness in her behaviour towards 
him” (354). And again, “Not his vanity, but his keen sympathy made him susceptible to the 
danger that another’s heart might feel larger demands on him than he would be able to fulfil” 
(655). The repeated need to distinguish between vanity and Deronda’s self-renouncing version of 
sympathy exemplifies what Marc Redfield identifies as the novel’s tendency to “worr[y] the 
status of its ethical categories even as it enforces them” (145). But this tendency, as Deronda 
himself admits, constitutes a “fall[ing] into the apologetic philosophy which explains the world 
into containing nothing better than one’s own conduct” (177). The more Deronda avoids moral 
action motivated by the desire to appear moral, the more he falls right into it. Thus Deronda’s 
supposedly unselfconscious focus on others increasingly becomes a focus on himself: “in his 
letters…he had avoided writing about himself, but he was really getting into that state of mind to 
which all subjects become personal” (534). Eliot faced a similar conundrum in defending herself 
against Hutton’s charges. 
 Realizing the impossibility of authorial selflessness and the difficulty such expectations 
create for women, Eliot, as we will see, ended up embracing certain didactic strains in her 
realism. Explaining her aims with Daniel Deronda, she told Harriet Beecher Stowe, 
There is nothing I should care more to do, if it were possible, than to rouse the 
imagination of men and women to a vision of human claims in those races of their 
fellow-men who most differ from them in customs and beliefs…. Can anything be 
more disgusting than to hear people called ‘educated’ making small jokes about 
eating ham, and showing themselves empty of any real knowledge as to the 
relation of their own social and religious life to the history of the people they 
think themselves witty in insulting? (Eliot, Letters, Volume 6 301-02) 
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In aiming to reeducate the public, Eliot seemed unconcerned about possible charges of moralism. 
She further explained to Stowe, “I was happily independent in material things and felt no 
temptation to accommodate my writing to any standard except that of trying to do my best in 
what seemed to me most needful to be done” (Eliot, Letters, Volume 6 302). But such a “frank 
avowal of didacticism” confounded even twentieth-century biographer Gordon S. Haight, who 
argued that it “contradict[ed] George Eliot’s basic tenet that fiction should represent real life” 
and signaled “her failure to achieve creative realization” (487).  
 Eliot faced similar criticism after the novel’s publication. Tellingly, both her 
representation of a selflessly sympathetic perspective through the figure of Deronda and her 
more overt stance were deemed morally superficial. The Spectator, for example, found the 
character of Deronda “run[ning] the risk of appearing to the end as little more than a wreath of 
moral mist” (Lerner and Holmstrom 161), while the Academy accused Eliot of “a proneness to 
rank certain debateable positions and one-sided points of view among the truths to which it is 
safe to demand universal assent” (Lerner and Homstrom 138). Such criticisms signaled the 
beginning of a reputation for moralizing that continued well into the twentieth century. In The 
Great Tradition (1948), F. R. Leavis held Henry James’s review of Daniel Deronda primarily 
responsible for Eliot’s moralizing reputation, which he described as “still the established notion 
of George Eliot” (46). Lamenting the “want of tact” in the “importunity of the [novel’s] moral 
reflections,” the review expressed a preference for Eliot’s more “natural” lack of self-
consciousness and the “sympathy” and “spontane[ity]” it allowed (James 288). 
 James’s review reveals the tendency to associate women with physical and moral vanity 
that Eliot saw as lending to women authors’ interpretive conundrum. Although criticisms of 
moralizing were beginning to plague Victorian realists in general as a proto-modernist aesthetics 
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took shape, the review suggests that such moralizing was still associated with women in 
particular. The review takes the form of a conversation between a man, Constantius, and two 
women, Theodora and Pulcheria. While Constantius, a literary critic, is granted a voice of reason 
and experience, Theodora, as her name suggests, voices a less sophisticated preference for art 
that expresses conservative moral ideals. Pulcheria appears to represent the other end of the 
feminine spectrum, enjoying reading only when she can do so aloud in front of others, displaying 
a primary concern with physical appearance, and admiring the “impur[ity],” as Theodora terms it, 
of French novels and Aestheticism (James 277). Theodora defends Eliot against the others’ 
accusations that Deronda is “priggish” and “didactic” (James 283, 286). Constantius concludes, 
however, that there are “two very distinct elements in George Eliot—a spontaneous one and an 
artificial one. There is what she is by inspiration and what she is because it is expected of her” 
(James 287). The review ends with both women distracted by the delivery of their muslins, 
suggesting that their inability to match Constantius’s level of critical insight results from their 
feminine vanity—something they apparently share with Eliot as an author concerned with what 
is “expected of her.” 
 More recent critics have helpfully redeemed Eliot from her moralizing reputation by 
focusing on her complex modes of self-questioning and moral skepticism. Neil Hertz identifies 
characters in her fiction who serve as authorial “surrogates” “whose fate it is to be stigmatized 
within the moral economy of the novels and, in effect, to be cast out of their depicted societies.” 
These characters’ “fates ask to be read allegorically, as clues to Eliot’s understanding of—or 
apprehensions about—that form of agency called authorship” (2). Hertz argues that an 
“alternation between exuberance and apology…govern[ed] Eliot’s literary production throughout 
her life.” This “exuberance,” characterized by “moments of expansive utterance, where neither 
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the distance between the self and its signs nor the difference between selves is felt as a problem,” 
is “commonly followed…by moments of anxious ‘shrinking’ and remorse” (Hertz 26). 
Rosemarie Bodenheimer similarly traces “two related patterns of consciousness which 
consistently emerge” in Eliot’s life and work: “The first is a moral and emotional pattern in 
which acts of assertion, satire, or rebellion are followed by remorse or retreat. The second is 
George Eliot’s peculiarly intense consciousness of audience, which caught her between scorn 
and defiance of public opinion and a strong dependence on it” (xiv-xv).  
 Such readings of Eliot’s consciousness of the problem of authorial agency helpfully 
debunk earlier accusations of unreflective moral vanity. But they overlook the fact that she saw 
this kind of skepticism as equally problematic and morally vain. Eliot worked to develop a 
novelistic mode that would free a woman author from accusations of vanity whether she 
embraced didacticism or tried to renounce it in favor of realism. With her final novel, Eliot 
sought a way around both moralizing and the “apologetic philosophy which explains the world 
into containing nothing better than one’s own conduct” (177).  
2. 
Eliot’s first step in this endeavor was to reshape understandings of women’s moral self-
consciousness through her depictions of her female characters. Mirah may struggle between an 
“exuberance and remorse” similar to Eliot’s, but Deronda at one point notes that she is “free at 
once from embarrassment and boldness,” thus representing “something quite new…in the form 
of womanhood” (192). Mirah’s moral self-consciousness at this moment draws on Eliot’s notion 
of sympathy that acknowledges the difference between self and other rather than attempting to 
erase the self in the face of the other.5 By acknowledging the self-consciousness this difference 
                                                
5 See Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, “George Eliot’s Conception of Sympathy” and Realism and Consensus in the 
English Novel. In her theorization of sympathetic realism in chapter 17 of Adam Bede, Eliot refers to her mirror as 
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creates and thus the impossibility of feminine selflessness, Mirah frees herself from the more 
intense modes of self-consciousness that plague women in the novel. 
For Eliot, sympathy both engenders and tempers self-consciousness. Studies of Eliot’s 
conception of the sympathetic relation usually cite Ludwig Feuerbach as her primary influence. 
For Feuerbach, there is no self without the other and no other without the self:  
The other is my thou,--the relation being reciprocal,--my alter ego, man objective 
to me, the revelation of my own nature, the eye seeing itself. In another I first 
have the consciousness of humanity; through him I first learn, I first feel, that I 
am a man: in my love for him it is first clear to me that…we two cannot be 
without each other, that only community constitutes humanity. (158) 
 
The balanced self-consciousness that sympathy offers depends on an awareness of the difference 
between self and other. Stanley Cavell’s concept of acknowledgment, based in a similar 
awareness, allows us to see how in Eliot’s schema sympathy can not only encourage self-
consciousness but also temper its potential burden. In acknowledging the separateness I share 
with the other, my impulse to gain full knowledge of the other or myself wanes, along with the 
self-consciousness that is necessary to—but that also interferes with—moral knowledge. We 
cannot always “save our lives by knowing them” (Cavell 323); a “willingness to forgo knowing” 
can offer a more accurate sense of ourselves (Cavell 324). Acknowledgment occurs when “I 
reveal…what I share with everyone else present with me at what is happening: …that there is a 
point at which I am helpless before the acting and the suffering of others. But I know the true 
point of my helplessness only if I have acknowledged totally the fact and the true cause of their 
suffering. Otherwise I am not emptied of help, but withholding of it” (Cavell 338). I recognize 
something about myself by acknowledging my separateness from the other, the separateness I 
                                                                                                                                                       
“defective”; as Rae Greiner notes, “if her portrayals were sometimes ‘faint or confused,’ their outlines ‘disturbed,’ 
this was because the novel was the product of a double reflection: ‘a faithful account of men and things as they have 
mirrored themselves in [the] mind’” (qtd. in Greiner 122-23).  
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share with the other, and the self-consciousness that shared separateness creates. Such 
acknowledgment eases the potential burden of self-consciousness. 
Before Mirah escapes to England, her sympathetic perspective allows such self-
understanding. Mirah interprets the moral complexity of her father’s treatment of her, 
recognizing his “fond[ness]” for her but also his misunderstanding of “what would please [her] 
and give [her] happiness.” Mirah realizes that the greed driving his desire for her to sing 
professionally “hemmed in my gratitude for his affectionateness, and the tenderest feeling I had 
towards him was pity. Yes, I did sometimes pity him” (184). Mirah’s sympathy gives her insight 
not only into her father, but also into herself. She is assured that her father’s view of her—as fit 
for the stage—is inaccurate and rejects his and others’ attempts to understand her according to 
certain feminine types. Mirah finds it “insulting” when the Count (to whom her father has 
promised her as “payment” for getting him out of prison) calls her “petit ange” (186), and she 
discounts others’ connection of her Jewishness to physical beauty, acting, and singing that serve 
as signs of fallenness. Through sympathy, Mirah gains an autonomous sense of herself.  
Upon arriving in England, Mirah must relearn this balanced sense of herself and others, 
suggesting that Victorian society’s limited interpretations of women’s moral character cause 
Mirah’s struggles with self-consciousness. When first at the Meyricks, however, she displays 
what the novel suggests is a more appropriate relation to other people. There Mirah recognizes 
others, assuring Deronda and the Meyricks of their goodness, but she also allows herself to be 
recognized. As she self-confidently relates her life story, Mirah intersperses her narrative with 
pauses that allow Mrs Meyrick to respond. Deronda thinks it “impossible to see a creature freer 
at once from embarrassment and boldness” (192), suggesting that Mirah has successfully set 
aside morbid self-consciousness and unreflective egotism simultaneously. 
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And this realization on Deronda’s part proves just as essential to formulating an effective 
mode of moral agency for women. Because women’s vacillations between embarrassment and 
boldness respond to expectations that they serve as moral ideals of innocent unselfconsciousness, 
their moral growth also requires a change in the methods of interpreting women’s moral 
character in general. For Deronda, Mirah represents “something quite new…in the form of 
womanhood. For Mirah was not childlike from ignorance: her experience of evil and trouble was 
deeper and stranger than his own” (192). Mirah thus offers a new model of feminine moral 
character, one that begins by acknowledging the impossibility of innocent selflessness and the 
necessity of self-consciousness to moral development.  
This balance finds a place in Eliot’s realism too. We first see signs of this at the character 
level. Deronda, representative as we’ve seen of both the feminine and the authorial impulses 
toward renunciation with which Eliot struggled, achieves a balanced self-consciousness similar 
to Mirah’s. Mordecai’s unwavering expectation that Deronda is a Jew and Deronda’s own desire 
to help Mordecai and Mirah eventually make him more willing to acknowledge his distinct 
selfhood. As he explains to his mother, “for months events have been preparing me to be glad 
that I am a Jew” (344). As Deronda gradually stops avoiding recognition, it holds particular 
implications for Eliot as author that this recognition is a form of reading: “His mother had her 
eyes fixed on him…, examining his face as if she thought that by close attention she could read a 
difficult language there” (567). Deronda next “b[ears] the scrutinizing look of Kalonymos with a 
delighted awe.” This friend of his grandfather asks him if he will embrace his Jewish heritage. 
“[B]ecoming slightly paler under the piercing eyes of his questioner,” Deronda responds, “‘I 
shall call myself a Jew…. But I will not say that I shall profess to believe exactly as my fathers 
have believed…. I hold that my first duty is to my own people, and if there is anything to be 
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done towards restoring or perfecting their common life, I shall make that my vocation’” (620). 
Despite at first appearing “slightly” too self-conscious “under the piercing eyes” of Kalonymos, 
Deronda achieves balanced moral self-consciousness by the end of this speech: “His respect for 
the questioner would not let him decline to answer, and by the necessity to answer he found out 
the truth for himself” (620). Deronda responds somewhat unconsciously, not exactly knowing 
what he will say as he focuses on Kalonymos, but his response signals a self-reflection that 
differs slightly from the other’s view of him.6 Deronda’s self-acknowledgment alleviates the 
self-consciousness that was beginning to develop, ironically, from his avoidance of himself.  
 Deronda’s struggles have been read as Eliot’s late exploration of the impossibility of full 
selflessness in her third-person narrators. I would argue, however, that these struggles more 
likely speak to the impossible selflessness of the implied author, given that Eliot never attempted 
such selflessness with her narrators. According to Hertz, Deronda allows Eliot to explore the 
possibility of the narrator’s “innocent” “neutrality” (or selflessness) at the character level, where 
the moral implications of self-consciousness formed by the gaze of others are more explicit. 
With Deronda, Eliot can 
reflect back on…the problem of what her critics have come to call her powers of 
‘sympathetic imagination.’ These powers had been most impressively displayed 
in Middlemarch, and most convincingly embodied—or rather dis-embodied—in 
the shrewd and melancholy presiding consciousness and narrative voice of that 
novel…. What would happen, she seems to be asking herself, if the Middlemarch 
narrator had to engage with the characters he had been merely observing? (130) 
 
But Eliot never saw narrators as completely unselfconscious. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth has 
shown that Eliot’s realist narration is based in the same understanding of sympathy as her 
                                                
6 Anderson similarly argues that Deronda’s relationship to Jewish identity and nationalism here reflects Eliot’s 
promotion of “a form of cultural self-understanding that might best be called reflective dialogism:…one must be 
capable of disengagement from cultural norms and givens. But such achieved distance should in turn promote not a 
sustained or absolute disengagement—for Eliot a destructive delusion—but rather a cultivated partiality, a reflective 
return to the cultural origins that one can no longer inhabit in any unthinking manner” (Powers of Distance 120-21). 
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ethics—sympathy that is not self-renunciation but a recognition of difference between self and 
other. Eliot’s narrators thus reveal a distinctly individual consciousness that nevertheless moves 
between self-orientation and other-orientation. Ermarth explains, “As an intermittently 
personalized voice…the narrator inches toward personification; this presence, one who has a 
scientific friend, a limited range, and selective attention, demonstrates the incarnate nature of 
consciousness” (237).7  
Deronda thus seems more likely to question the still-present expectation of authorial 
renunciation. In other words, Eliot’s third-person narrative voice might be self-conscious, but 
realist convention requires that it never be identifiable in its self-consciousness as Eliot 
specifically. Ermarth herself seems to hold this expectation, despite comparing Eliot’s novelistic 
realism to Diego Velásquez’s Las Meninas, in which Velásquez portrayed himself painting the 
Spanish monarchs.8 While the image of Velásquez is recognizably Velásquez and thus serves as 
political commentary on his relationship as an artist to the Spanish crown, Eliot’s narrative voice 
might be “personalized” at times, but Ermarth never considers that the narrative perspective 
might specifically acknowledge itself for political or ethical reasons as a version of George Eliot. 
Eliot suggests in Daniel Deronda that the same model of sympathetic perspective based in 
difference that she celebrates in her characters and requires of her narrators applies to the implied 
author as well.  
3. 
By acknowledging the difference between self and other implicit in the sympathetic 
relation, Eliot envisions a mode of moral agency and authorship for women that recognizes the 
                                                
7 The narrator also inches away from a singular personification to a plural one, becoming what Ermarth calls 
“Nobody”: a “generalized historical awareness hardly distinguishable from our own, a power of transition between 
minds and moments, an implied awareness that makes the realistic series possible” (237). 
8 Ermarth describes Eliot’s narrative voice as “now like Velasquez’s second self, getting into his own picture; now 
generalized, a power of abstraction and of connection that belongs to a consensus of individual perceivers” (237). 
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importance as well as risks of self-consciousness without allowing self-consciousness to become 
a burden. As we will see, Eliot’s embrace of this authorial mindset plays out beyond her 
characterization of Deronda in the formal maneuverings of the novel as a whole, but it does so to 
some extent apart from the sympathetic relation. Eliot prized sympathy for its ethical and 
aesthetic implications. But she also expresses concern in her final novel that even her more 
balanced understanding of the sympathetic relation may be misinterpreted, as it indeed has, as an 
attempt at authorial selflessness.  
We see evidence of this concern in similar misinterpretations of Mirah. Presenting 
Mirah’s balanced self-consciousness as something that is cultivated through her relation to other 
people—and especially her future husband—can appear as just another simplistic embrace of the 
angel in the house ideal. Indeed, specifically at moments when Mirah has achieved this balance, 
the Count calls her “petit ange,” and Gwendolen reads her as the type of “wom[a]n who [is] 
always doing right” (376), who is “blameless” and “perfect” (377). Deronda first misperceives 
Mirah’s balanced self-consciousness as “ignorant innocence” (176) (although he soon realizes 
that she is “not childlike from ignorance: her experience of evil and trouble [i]s deeper and 
stranger than his own” [192]). Even contemporary critics tend to understand Mirah this way. 
Anderson, for example, despite reading Deronda as achieving that “delicate dialectic of 
detachment and engagement” (Powers 132) that in many ways resembles Mirah’s 
“free[dom]…from embarrassment and boldness,” interprets Mirah as “[u]nable to achieve the 
higher-order, mediated cultural affirmation associated with Deronda”; she is instead only capable 
of representing “the importance of a deeply felt connection to family and culture” (Powers 139).9 
                                                
9 See Nancy L. Paxton, George Eliot and Herbert Spencer (1991), and Alison Booth, Greatness Engendered: 
George Eliot and Virginia Woolf (1992). For other readings that similarly assume Mirah fulfills a more conventional 
notion of femininity, see Bodenheimer, The Real Life of Mary Ann Evans (1994); Sarah Gates, “‘A Difference of 
Native Language’: Gender, Genre, and Realism in ‘Daniel Deronda’”; Susan Meyer, “‘Safely to Their Own 
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Anderson’s reading of Mirah draws on studies that ultimately assume Eliot’s “unwillingness to 
abandon conventional ideals of femininity” (Powers 138-39). 
Eliot thus develops an alternative method of achieving this balanced self-consciousness 
through her own maneuvering as implied author and her characterization of Gwendolen. This 
method is most directly presented through the novel’s conception of prayer and draws on a 
“willingness to forgo knowing” similar to sympathy’s acknowledgment of the difference 
between self and other. But it is cultivated to some extent apart from the self-other relation. Its 
purpose as a mode of moral agency is, of course, to improve that very relation; however, because 
the feminine ideal of the selfless angel so strongly epitomized the self-other relation for the 
Victorians, its cultivation apart from this relation distinguishes it from such stereotypes.  
Much earlier in her career, Eliot imagined a similarly balanced self-consciousness that 
resulted not from acknowledgment of self and other, but from a momentary obliviousness of 
both. Significantly, during a period of particular exhaustion after translating Feuerbach’s The 
Essence of Christianity in 1854, she wrote to her friend Cara Bray,  
When I spoke of myself as an island, I did not mean that I was so exceptionally. 
We are all islands…and this seclusion is sometimes the most intensely felt at the 
very moment your friend is caressing you or consoling you. But this gradually 
becomes a source of satisfaction instead of repining. When we are young we think 
our troubles a mighty business—that the world is spread out expressly as a stage 
for the particular drama of our lives and that we have a right to rant and foam at 
the mouth if we are crossed. I have done enough of that in my time. But we begin 
at last to understand that these things are important only to one’s own 
consciousness, which is but a globule of dew on a rose-leaf that at mid-day there 
will be no trace of. This is no high-flown sentimentality, but a simple reflection 
which I find useful to me every day. (Eliot, Letters, Volume 2 156) 
 
Eliot finds “satisfaction” in imagining the evaporative nature of consciousness, not as an act of 
self-renunciation in the face of the other—“[t]his is no high-flown sentimentality”—but in an 
                                                                                                                                                       
Borders’: Proto-Zionism, Feminism, and Nationalism in Daniel Deronda”; and Eileen Sypher, “Resisting 
Gwendolen’s ‘Subjection’: Daniel Deronda’s Proto-Feminism.” 
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implicit imagining of the evaporation of the other’s consciousness too. This “simple reflection” 
proves “useful…every day”—in the very realities of the reciprocal relation it momentarily 
erases. Imagining consciousness as “a globule of dew on a rose-leaf,” Eliot formulated a unique 
mode of moral agency that would find its fullest expression in her final novel. 
Although this mode takes shape at the level of the implied author, it is more directly 
illustrated through the novel’s conceptualization of the self in prayer. Prayer in the novel allows 
one to set aside (without denying or avoiding) dependence on the recognition of others. It is the 
expression of a multiplicity of perspectives, but it originates in the single voice of “the Chazan,” 
or cantor:  
The most powerful movement of feeling with a liturgy is the prayer which seeks 
for nothing special, but is a yearning to escape from the limitations of our own 
weakness and an invocation of all Good to enter and abide with us; or else a self-
oblivious lifting up of gladness, a Gloria in excelsis that such Good exists; both 
the yearning and the exultation gathering their utmost force from the sense of 
communion in a form which has expressed them both, for long generations of 
struggling fellow-men. (310)  
 
Acknowledging “the limitations of our own weakness,” Eliot’s conception of prayer does not 
deny the self praying but continues to reach outward for the “Good” that will make the self 
better. The “Good” that lies outside the self is, in part, made up of “fellow-men,” similarly 
“struggling” selves, but is also larger than the self-other relation. The person praying accesses 
this “Good” through a mode of expression that is “self-oblivious,” “seek[ing] for nothing 
special,” approximating a state of mind similar to the one Eliot imagined early on, in which 
consciousness (both one’s own and others’) becomes like “a globule of dew on a rose-leaf that at 
mid-day there will be no trace of.” Here “yearning and…exultation” blend together in a voice 
that revels in its presence even as it acknowledges its absence and revels in its absence even as it 
acknowledges its presence. Prayer is a “form” that has allowed “long generations of struggling 
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fellow-men” to express the “sense of communion” that emerges from such a mutual 
acknowledgment and release of self-consciousness. It seems Eliot might hold out hope for her 
novel to do the same. 
 Eliot’s understanding of self-consciousness in prayer holds subtle but significant 
differences from the Feuerbachian relation between the I and the Thou that critics usually 
associate with her ethics and realism. Prayer for Feuerbach is an act by which 
man addresses God with the word of intimate affection—Thou; he thus declares 
articulately that God is his alter ego; he confesses to God, as the being nearest to 
him, his most secret thoughts, his deepest wishes, which otherwise he shrinks 
from uttering. But he expresses these wishes in the confidence, in the certainty 
that they will be fulfilled. How could he apply to a being that had no ear for his 
complaints?... What else is the being that fulfills these wishes but human 
affection, the human soul, giving ear to itself, approving itself, unhesitatingly 
affirming itself? (122-23) 
 
Unlike Eliot’s conceptualization of prayer as a “self-oblivio[us]” seeking for “nothing special,” 
prayer for Feuerbach further confirms the self in the gaze of the other. Significantly absent from 
Eliot’s mode of prayer is this more intense sense in Feuerbach of being watched—as well as the 
secrecy, shrinking, confession, and need for affirmation that accompany it. Thus, while Eliot 
embraces Feuerbach’s model as one way to achieve balanced moral self-consciousness (Mirah at 
the end of the novel embodies sympathy’s success), she also suggests the need for something 
else, a simultaneous letting go of self and other only to return to a balanced self-consciousness 
better prepared for the realities of the reciprocal relation central to moral life.  
 This particular model of agency holds moral and aesthetic significance for the implied 
author in realist narrative. Ann Banfield has identified narrative’s ability to capture a perspective 
similar to Eliot’s secular prayer. Narrative, according to Banfield, does not address an audience. 
She demonstrates the impossibility that sentences of third-person narrative could hold 
communicative intent on the part of an “I,” the author, toward a “you,” the reader. One example 
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of narrative’s linguistic uniqueness is the use of past tense with present and future time deictics: 
“Where was he this morning, for instance?” (Virginia Woolf, Mrs Dalloway, qtd. in Banfield 98, 
emphasis added). Another example is “the use of the ‘shifted’ modals could, should, would and 
might where discourse would have can, shall, will and may”: “he could see it now in the pedlar’s 
box” (Eliot, Silas Marner, qtd. in Banfield 201, Banfield’s emphasis). Neither of these sentences 
is “speakable”: they would never be uttered by a self attempting conscious communication with 
an other. With prayer, Eliot captures a similar voice, a reaching outward that is not directed 
specifically toward an audience. But, importantly, it does not deny that audience either. Indeed, 
Eliot’s narrative voice, like prayer, neither intends to communicate nor avoids communication. 
To understand narrative in this way means imagining an author who neither assumes nor denies 
her presence in the language, and who neither clings to nor avoids the other who might recognize 
this fact.  
 But, especially for Victorian women novelists, such authorial inconspicuousness can be 
mistaken for an attempt at renunciation that inevitably fails. Eliot thus demonstrates the 
difference between her balanced self-consciousness and authorial self-renunciation by quietly 
reenacting the thought process that brought her here. This process moves, as we will see, from 
repeated early instances of self-renunciation meant to compensate for any sense of moralizing to 
a moment of self-reflection that questions the need for movement between these extremes. From 
this point on, acknowledging that the movement between self and other, presence and absence is 
inevitable to individual and therefore authorial perspective, Eliot eases up from her movement 
between “embarrassment and boldness.” Her own freedom from these two extremes allows a 
balanced confidence in her stance on Judaism and even allows a stance on women’s rights. 
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Because this stance does not reach levels of “exuberance,” it does not necessitate apologetic 
retreat. 
Eliot accurately predicted that her novel’s focus on Jewish identity and nationalism 
would require this sort of authorial maneuvering. She had retained (for the most part) an 
imagined sense of authorial selflessness throughout her previous novels focusing on provincial 
English life. But when she turned in Daniel Deronda to Jewish experience, a topic usually 
imagined by the Victorians as separate from provincial Englishness, it became more obvious that 
Eliot’s attention had been drawn in a particular direction for particular reasons, that a human 
perspective mediated what had previously seemed a presentation of one arbitrary slice of the 
world. Summing up reactions to the novel five years later in 1881, the American critic and poet 
Sydney Lanier expressed surprise that “people who had enthusiastically accepted and extolled 
‘Adam Bede,’ with all its explicitly moralizing passages and its professedly preaching characters, 
suddenly found that ‘Daniel Deronda’ was intolerably priggish and didactic” (131). Years later 
even, Leavis would find the novel “quintessentially English” (Fleishman 275, 1n). He famously 
labeled the Gwendolen plot the “good half” and the Deronda plot the “bad half,” which “led to 
the suggestion, apparently seriously intended, that the English half might be rescued from the 
Jewish and printed separately” (Fleishman 274-75, 1n). Leavis claimed that “the nobility, 
generosity, and moral idealism” of the “bad half” were “at the same time modes of self-
indulgence” (94, 96). Thus in directing her sympathetic perspective toward the topic of Jewish 
struggle, Eliot automatically called attention to herself as the organizing perspective behind her 
novel’s focus. 
 The novel begins by erasing a sense of her agency in shaping this focus. The dual plot 
structure in particular serves this purpose. By beginning with Gwendolen rather than 
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chronologically with Deronda rescuing Mirah, Eliot can suggest that she just passively presents 
her very “English” world before moving on to Deronda, Mirah, and Mordecai. But such 
renunciation immediately shows signs of obsessive self-reflection in the opening epigraph as the 
novel simultaneously legitimates and questions the choice to begin with Gwendolen: 
Men can do nothing without the make-believe of a beginning. Even Science, the 
strict measurer, is obliged to start with a make-believe unit, and must fix on a 
point in the stars’ unceasing journey when his sidereal clock shall pretend that 
time is at Nought. His less accurate grandmother Poetry has always been 
understood to start in the middle; but on reflection it appears that her proceeding 
is not very different from his; since Science, too, reckons backwards as well as 
forwards, divides his unit into billions, and with his clock-finger at Nought really 
sets off in media res. No retrospect will take us to the true beginning. (3)  
 
The comparison of poetics to science emphasizes the objectivity of the realist depictions to 
come, while the comparison of science to poetics’ acts of “make-believe” simultaneously 
questions the possibility of a selflessly objective perspective. The epigraph’s allusion to the 
science of chronology also suggests that although there may not be any “true beginning,” a truer 
beginning might have been the moment at which Deronda finds Mirah, since it occurs before his 
trip to Leubronn and his encounter with Gwendolen.  
The sense of forced authorial renunciation continues as the story begins. Although the 
novel’s opening scene takes place abroad and is populated with “very distant varieties of 
European type” (4), the only characters we hear from are English people who interact 
exclusively with other English people. It is in fact striking when reading the scene that everyone 
knows each other from back home. By beginning the novel emphasizing the possibility of 
connection among people even when it seems improbable, Eliot justifies the connection she has 
designed to occur between Deronda and Gwendolen while maintaining a sense that it is arbitrary 
(that is, not of authorial design). The narrative focus moves from Gwendolen to Grandcourt, and 
then finally to Deronda, who closes out the first book with his rescue of Mirah. In this way, Eliot 
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incorporates the core of her story, the relationship between Deronda and Mirah, into larger, more 
conventional surroundings that distract from the novel’s ultimate focus on Judaism. Similarly, 
her depiction of Gwendolen as just another English heroine embarking on what appears the 
beginning of a marriage plot with Deronda allows Eliot to avoid a stance on women’s issues. 
Feminist readings of Eliot often note that while her novels call attention to women’s suffering 
within patriarchy, they avoid more active suggestions for change. Eliot thereby continues this 
passivity—something that Hutton’s review of Middlemarch could have only encouraged.  
 Eliot simultaneously conceals her own presence and, like Deronda, “fall[s] into the 
apologetic philosophy which explains the world into containing nothing better than one’s own 
conduct.” Ironically, as her attempt at a selflessness similar to Mirah’s supposed “love that loses 
self in the object of love” intensifies, Eliot takes on the characteristics of Gwendolen’s “fallen” 
self-consciousness. Another instance of Eliot’s “explain[ing] the world into containing nothing 
better than one’s own conduct” adds to the sense of identification with Gwendolen: 
Men, like planets, have both a visible and an invisible history. The astronomer 
threads the darkness with strict deduction, accounting so for every visible arc in 
the wanderer’s orbit; and the narrator of human actions, if he did his work with 
the same completeness, would have to thread the hidden pathways of feeling and 
thought which lead up to every moment of action, and to those moments of 
intense suffering which take the quality of action. (139)  
 
The emphasis on psychological suffering over more traditional “action” works to legitimate 
Eliot’s extended focus on Gwendolen rather than Mirah. Mirah takes part in the novel’s most 
significant moments of action: she is kidnapped, taken to America and Europe, and forced into 
acting to support her father’s gambling; she escapes to find her long-lost mother and brother in 
England; she tries to drown herself; and she is rescued by Deronda, with whom she falls in love 
and lives happily ever after. However, most of the events of Mirah’s life are narrated in only a 
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few pages by Mirah herself, while Gwendolen’s psychological suffering, which directly results 
from a lack of traditional narrative action, is depicted at length. 
The possibility of Gwendolen’s death comes up repeatedly, seeming to offer an end to 
Eliot’s identification with Gwendolen’s obsessive self-consciousness. Certainly, Victorian 
literature holds plenty of instances in which the telos of a woman’s self-destructive shame is 
death. As Anderson notes about the rhetoric of fallenness, the “structure of moral reflection is 
self-obliteration, its telos, suicide” (Tainted Souls 90). Before Grandcourt’s death, Gwendolen’s 
own death, even her drowning instead of Grandcourt, holds distinct possibility.10 For Deronda, 
watching Gwendolen’s shame thwart her moral autonomy is like seeing “her drowning while his 
limbs [a]re bound” (389). Deronda considers that Gwendolen “too needed a rescue, and one 
much more difficult than” Mirah’s (478). Even the “imperious” Gwendolen seems to consider, if 
only momentarily and indirectly, the possibility of death (284): “What possible release could 
there be for her from this hated vantage-ground…but death? Not her own death. Gwendolen was 
not a woman who could easily think of her own death as a near reality…. It seemed more 
possible that Grandcourt should die:--and yet not likely” (518). There is a death, but it is 
Grandcourt who drowns. Until Deronda sees Gwendolen carried in from the sea alive, though, 
the possibility of her drowning instead remains very present in onlookers’ comments: “One said 
it was the milord who had gone out in a sailing boat; another maintained that the prostrate figure 
he discerned was miladi; a Frenchman who had no glass would rather say that it was milord who 
had probably taken his wife out to drown her, according to the national practice” (587).  
                                                
10 Critics usually focus on Gwendolen’s overwhelming sense of guilt with regard to Grandcourt’s death. The 
primary counterfactual implied with this focus—that Gwendolen might have thrown the rope out to Grandcourt in 
time to save him—seems to have led critics to overlook the other counterfactual possibility made very present by the 
text: that Gwendolen might have died herself. 
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But Gwendolen’s death would signal Eliot’s giving in to the debilitating self-
consciousness of the fallen woman, feeling the need to deny and erase it, which can only make it 
worse. Significantly, Gwendolen does not die. Eliot stops avoiding her political stance—the 
problem that created this conundrum—when the setting moves to Genoa, where Grandcourt dies 
just after Deronda meets his mother. The scene between Deronda and his mother echoes what 
afterward seems Eliot’s performance of balanced self-reflection behind the scenes. Deronda at 
first attempts to continue his selfless perspective, focusing on his mother rather than himself: “I 
beseech you to tell me what moved you…to take the course you did…. I enter into the 
painfulness of your struggle. I can imagine the hardship of an enforced renunciation.” (Just 
speaking this sentence, Deronda seems to force himself into an illusory self-renunciation.) 
Deronda’s mother immediately refuses this attempt to “enter into” her experience, responding, 
“No…. You are not a woman. You may try—but you can never imagine what it is…to suffer the 
slavery of being a girl” (541). It is in this scene that Deronda is finally forced to acknowledge his 
distinct identity, something that prevents him from ever fully knowing his mother’s experience 
as a woman.  
When Grandcourt’s death shortly follows, it appears that Eliot has engaged in self-
reflection similar to Deronda’s. After she presents Deronda with the opportunity to recognize and 
stand up for himself, Eliot seems to find similar confidence in her own such worthiness as a 
woman author. Deronda’s failure to “enter into” his mother’s experience seems to signal a 
change in Eliot’s understanding of the realist author’s supposed selflessness. Just as Deronda 
realizes that he cannot “enter into the painfulness of” his mother’s experience as a woman, Eliot 
is forced to acknowledge her difference from Deronda. Her inability to “enter into” Jewish 
experience has significant implications for the realist depictions of her characters. But Eliot’s 
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difference from Deronda is also significant for the fact that she can, like the Princess, “enter 
into” the experience of being a woman in her own way. As we will see, this self-reflection 
affirms the novel’s aim of encouraging sympathy with the Jewish cause but condemns the 
employment of authorial renunciation to achieve this sympathy. Eliot’s attempt at 
unselfconscious selflessness has encouraged denial that her own distinct identity as a woman 
would emerge to shape the trajectory of her narrative and cause her at times to identify with 
certain characters’ experiences over others’. 
Critics have read the Princess as a representation of Eliot—but in the context of an 
“eruption” of authorial narcissism that the narrative then attempts to suppress.11 Hertz argues that 
the scene between Deronda and his mother anchors authorial agency in the novel, the Princess 
serving as a “scapegoat” that must be “cast out.”12 This interpretation demonstrates Eliot’s 
consciousness of the possibility that her supposedly unselfconscious realism could slide into 
authorial narcissism, but it also then assumes that Eliot would be discomfited by the way her 
own needs were shaping the novel. Feminist readings similarly characterize the Princess as 
representative of the repressed feminist “impulse of the novel” that “erupt[s]” in this scene only 
to be “suppressed” (Meyer 742). But it seems that Eliot decides to take a stance on women’s 
rights as well. Eliot does indeed absent herself almost as soon as she presents herself in the figure 
of the Princess, but she leaves this passive displacement of herself behind only to make her own 
similar role authoring her characters’ lives as (for better or for worse) the Princess authored 
Deronda’s more explicit and to embrace more openly her role of implied author shaping the 
trajectory of the narrative.  
                                                
11 See Bodenheimer, Hertz, Meyer, and Redfield, among others. 
12 Reading the scene under the psychoanalytic lens of Kristeva’s abject to suggest Eliot’s ultimate discomfort with 
the fact that she is implicated by the text, Hertz argues, “the casting out of the Princess, her abjection, is intended not 
to collapse the distance between author and surrogate, but to stabilize it as a chosen separation and thus to ground 
the multiple gestures of mimesis that make up the novel” (120-21). 
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With the recurring image of Gwendolen “drowning” in her marriage, the narrative 
encourages us to see Grandcourt’s death as allowing Gwendolen to live. And the novel continues 
to emphasize this connection through Gwendolen’s repeated claim “I shall live” throughout the 
final pages. Such connective logic is not based in a literal sense of cause and effect; it is 
explicitly figurative and even political. Redfield reads Grandcourt’s death as the last in a series 
of deaths in Eliot’s final two novels that “question…what the act of fiction (as sympathy) is.” He 
argues that the deaths of Casaubon, Madame Laure’s husband, and Grandcourt signal  
the convenience of a fiction, and leave…a residue that Eliot’s texts represent in 
the figure of ambiguous murder. Murder is a crime of omission in George Eliot 
novels: if killing may be taken as action in its purest manifestation of violence, 
Eliot’s texts worry the status of the act as a play of conflicting motives and 
circumstances…. Casaubon’s and Grandcourt’s deaths provoke the supplemental 
and less stable question of what it means for an ‘author’ to ‘act’—that is, in this 
idiom, to kill a fictional character, or identify with one, thereby seeing her wish 
outside her. (Redfield 154) 
 
Grandcourt’s death, however, is significantly different, since, with the first two deaths, there is 
no parallel possibility that the woman might die instead of the man. Redfield argues that Eliot’s 
texts are anxiously aware that “bad art…is a figure that does not know whether it is figurative or 
literal and cannot control the difference.”13 In Daniel Deronda, the added emphasis that 
Grandcourt’s death has allowed Gwendolen to live seems an open acceptance of the fact that 
fiction will always hold the possibility of being figurative and literal and that obtaining full 
control over the difference is not the goal. Eliot embraces the simultaneous absence and presence 
of authorial agency here, acknowledging identification with her woman character rather than 
                                                
13 In Middlemarch, the figurative acts of melodrama become “contagious” as the actress Madame Laure actually 
kills her husband at the same time that her character commits the act on stage in a play. Lydgate, the physician, and 
Laure’s admirer, “is at the center of this epidemic, aggravating it by trying to isolate and cure it” (Redfield 155). 
“Eliot’s text,” according to Redfield, does the same, “quarantining this rhetorical plague within the ethical and 
aesthetic categories of melodrama and narcissism only at the cost of exposing organic history to disease, and raising 
the suspicion that a certain illegible, literary contagion infects and enables sympathy” (Redfield 155-56). Redfield 
sees Grandcourt’s death as a continuation of this suspicious activity, but the set-up in Daniel Deronda is 
significantly different. 
 126 
unsuccessfully avoiding it. The signs of this open acceptance of her role in the narrative only 
continue as the novel comes to a close. 
Having Grandcourt die rather than Gwendolen makes Eliot’s political position with 
Deronda that much stronger, and it allows her a similar stance with Gwendolen. In Deronda’s 
case, the narrative shift further emphasizes his decision to embrace Judaism since it requires him 
to reject Gwendolen and more actively choose his love for Mirah and his devotion to the Jewish 
people. After learning that Grandcourt is dead, Sir Hugo voices a desire (common with Eliot’s 
readers at the time) for Gwendolen to be the heroine in Deronda’s life story: “To him it was as 
pretty as a story need be that this fine creature and his favourite Dan should have turned out to be 
formed for each other” (654). Interestingly, Sir Hugo’s thought implies that the conventional 
marriage plot, although “as pretty as a story,” has become so invisible as a construct in the novel 
(influencing even Sir Hugo’s understanding of how things happen in “real life”) that marriage 
between the two protagonists would somehow be more acceptable in readers’ minds as a 
“probable” (less political) outcome. Defying such expectations by having Deronda marry Mirah 
rather than Gwendolen, Eliot returns to the marriage plot the authorial intention from which it 
had illusorily freed itself. 
 Eliot also furthers her development of a valid mode of moral agency for women. Rather 
than forcing Gwendolen to exit Deronda’s life and the narrative through self-obliterating shame, 
or its telos, death, Eliot allows her to end this self-destructive obsession on her own. Rather than 
put a definitive stop to his interactions with Gwendolen, Deronda ends up proposing, “I will 
write you always when I can, and you will answer?” (691). Such ambiguity grants Gwendolen 
the opportunity to let Deronda go instead of the other way around. Rather than comply with 
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Deronda’s proposal that he write to her and that she answer, Gwendolen writes to him first, 
making it fairly clear she does not want an answer:  
Do not think of me sorrowfully on your wedding-day. I have remembered your 
words—that I may live to be one of the best women, who make others glad that 
they were born. I do not yet see how that can be, but you know better than I. If it 
ever comes true, it will be because you helped me. I only thought of myself, and I 
made you grieve. It hurts me now to think of your grief. You must not grieve any 
more for me. It is better—it shall be better with me because I have known you. 
(694-95) 
 
Gwendolen works toward freedom from embarrassment and boldness for herself here. She 
finally reciprocates Deronda’s sympathy, but she is not self-renouncing. Instead, she expresses 
the hope “to live to be one of the best women.” She displays regret for her behavior, but not 
embarrassed “remorse or retreat.” Gwendolen’s focus on the distant future lends the 
correspondence finality, but she does not beg Deronda not to respond.  
The note’s final sentence in particular reflects Gwendolen’s work toward a balanced self-
consciousness. She first rehearses versions of the line just after Deronda reveals his marriage 
plans. “[H]indered by struggling sobs,” Gwendolen eventually utters, “I said…I said…it should 
be better…better with me…for having known you” (691). As Deronda leaves, she attempts to 
speak the sentence again: “It shall be the better for me—” (691). This time, Gwendolen cannot 
finish the thought, described as “what her mind ha[s] been laboring with,” because “the intense 
effort with which she sp[eaks] ma[kes] her too tremulous.” Several attempts to speak the 
sentence to her mother follow, and when she finally writes the sentence in her note, it takes yet 
another form: “It is better—it shall be better with me because I have known you” (695). Shifting 
from “better for me” to “better with me,” the final version emphasizes the importance of a 
general good, of which Gwendolen will partake and to which she will contribute, rather than 
goodness that exists solely for her. And the shift from “for having known you” to “because I 
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have known you” positions Gwendolen as stronger and yet more bounded within the “I” of the 
sentence, as she grants herself agency in the development of moral character while preventing 
her self-reflection from devolving into overwhelming self-consciousness.  
Significantly, neither Gwendolen nor the narrator communicates any of this explicitly. 
Instead, the understated shifting of prepositions and clause constructions—a subtle linguistic sign 
of less self-conscious moral deliberation—presents this idea in such a way that the urgent intent 
of communication falls away, even as a meaning becomes available. In this way, Gwendolen’s 
language calls to mind Banfield’s understanding of narrative voice, and the strange use of tenses 
in her repeated revisions of the line seem to consider the ethical significance of this unique voice. 
The first version of the line, “it should be better…better with me…for having known you,” 
haltingly combines the shifted modal “should” of narrative with “having known,” the present 
perfect tense of communicative speech, as if Gwendolen were trying (and failing) to embody the 
balanced self-consciousness of realist narrative. The final version, “It is better—it shall be better 
with me because I have known you,” reverts to the present and future tenses of everyday 
communication. Gwendolen realizes the impossibility of speaking to someone else from a 
perspective that sets aside communicative intent. However, the quick shifting of tense within this 
sentence indicates that she maintains a similarly subtle, balanced self-consciousness: not now, 
while still somewhat conscious of Deronda’s gaze or somewhat unconscious of the fact that she 
is sympathetically reading him, but sometime in the future when she has reflected on her own 
role in this sympathetic relation, “it shall be better.” Gwendolen’s note to Deronda is her only 
presence in the final chapter; the narrative moves on without any explanatory framing, focusing 
on Deronda and Mirah’s marriage and their journey to the East. Gwendolen thus quietly removes 
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herself from the overly self-conscious position of receiving Deronda’s (and the narrative’s) 
attention—without denying or avoiding it. 
Mirah’s story ends in marriage, with her husband’s gaze upon her, but she has learned 
how to achieve a balanced self-consciousness and thus moral autonomy within this reciprocal 
relation. Gwendolen’s very different outcome—separated to some extent from the expectation of 
marriage and sympathy but achieving the same balanced moral self-consciousness—serves as 
both a comparison and contrast by which Eliot can quietly distinguish her moral model for 
women. After the novel ends, Mirah, by existing within Deronda’s gaze, exists within ours; her 
marriage plot ending encourages us to imagine a certain story for her beyond the end of the 
narrative. Gwendolen, on the other hand, necessarily diminishes the intensity of the gaze of the 
other that has caused her debilitating self-consciousness: without a marriage plot ending (or an 
existence within Deronda’s gaze), there is no narrative convention to carry her beyond the end of 
the novel in our minds.14 This diminished intensity is not a denial of the other; it makes only a 
subtle difference comparable to the difference between Eliot’s and Feuerbach’s understandings 
of self-consciousness in prayer. With her unconventional ending, Gwendolen approximates what 
it might be like to be “a globule of dew” evaporating at “mid-day.” Importantly, Gwendolen does 
not attempt self-renunciation; the ending to her story is “no high-flown sentimentality.” She will 
have to return to more intense versions of self-consciousness inherent to the reciprocal relation—
but perhaps not quite as intense or seemingly irreversible as they have been in the past. The 
novel opens with Deronda asking about Gwendolen, “Was she beautiful or not beautiful?” (3). 
                                                
14 Many contemporary readers complained of the bathos of the novel’s end. The reviewer from the North American 
Review argued, “The chief defect in the story is that it suddenly stops rather than artistically ends” (Colby 232). It 
seems Gwendolen’s nonexistence beyond the novel’s end was so disturbing to some readers that one, inspired by the 
above review, found a way to return Gwendolen to our consciousness by publishing a sequel (aptly titled 
Gwendolen) that frees up Deronda to marry her. The final lines of the sequel reads, “And when, at last, Deronda 
confessed his undying devotion and love, she sank beneath gratitude and joy, into the expanded arms of her adored 
lover,--Reclaimed” (qtd. in Colby 234). 
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Mirah, for one, embodies “her own definite mould of beauty” only when she is “free at once 
from embarrassment and boldness” (192). Gwendolen seems on her way to a similar beauty by 
the novel’s end. We can hope that this is true, but it is the very fact that we (and Deronda) are not 
there to witness it that makes it more likely. 
 Linked as the topic of women’s moral character is to realist aesthetics for Eliot, it is 
fitting that Amy Meyrick asks a similar question about the beauty of a story that celebrates self-
sacrifice. Together with the Meyrick women, Mirah tells Deronda about “a wonderful story…of 
Bouddha giving himself to the famished tigress to save her and her little ones from starving,” and 
says that she and the Meyrick women “all imagine” him to be “like Bouddha.” Embarrassed, 
Deronda responds, “Pray don’t imagine that.” As discussion of the ethics of Buddha’s position 
continues, Mab adds, “Perhaps if he was starved he would not mind so much about being eaten,” 
to which Mirah responds, “Please don’t think that, Mab; it takes away the beauty of the action” 
(399). Significantly, Amy asks, “But was it beautiful for Bouddha to let the tiger eat him?” (400). 
Throughout Daniel Deronda, Eliot similarly asks whether or not a story’s beauty is found in its 
authorial selflessness. In a way, Eliot reverses Buddha’s sacrificing of selfhood in order to let the 
tigress live when she sacrifices her attempt at selflessness to let Gwendolen live. If there is 
beauty in Buddha’s act, there is also beauty in Eliot’s. But, significantly, Eliot’s act is not 
celebrated as a “sacrifice” might be—this very subtlety makes it work (but also causes it to be 
overlooked).  
 Nevertheless, Eliot’s “sacrifice” of authorial selflessness signals an important cessation 
of the back and forth between “exuberance and apology” that characterized much of her literary 
career. Here, following a well-known act of retreat from the feminist undertones of her previous 
novel, is a subtle but powerful statement on the possibilities for interpreting women’s moral 
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character and women’s writing. For just a moment at the end of her novel-writing career, Eliot 
took a recognizably personal stance in her fiction, following it up not with apologetic retreat but 
only with further affirmation, in the form of Gwendolen’s note to Deronda at the end of the 
novel. The note expresses regret, but alongside this regret is acknowledgment that the ethical and 
aesthetic model that Eliot imagines for women might be possible—that it is possible. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Feminist “Cant” and Narrative Selflessness in Sarah Grand’s New Woman Trilogy 
 
  A journalist who popularized the term “New Woman,” an activist for such causes as 
women’s suffrage and rational dress, and a public lecturer on women’s issues, Sarah Grand used 
her trilogy of New Woman novels to promote a model of feminine moral agency based in active 
self-consciousness gained through the public expression of belief.1 Grand may have seen her 
fiction as one more avenue for her political activism, but throughout Ideala (1888), The 
Heavenly Twins (1893), and The Beth Book (1897), she was careful to identify the ethical and 
aesthetic risks this posed. Grand expected charges of moralism to be directed at her work; she 
addresses this issue through the trilogy’s repeated preoccupation with “cant.” But she also asks 
whether “art for art’s sake” can become a kind of moralizing itself. Grand thus joins Eliot in 
staging a surprising return to didacticism at a time when a protomodernist aesthetics was turning 
against this allegedly staid, outmoded form. 
Of course, like the other authors studied here, Grand’s didacticism is far from staid. In 
fact, her trilogy can be considered a sustained experiment in revision and renewal—of both her 
narrative voice and her self-understanding.2 Grand’s narrators trace a complex moral self-
consciousness in their heroines similar to that which we’ve seen in previous chapters. As the 
trilogy progresses, Grand uses shifts in narrative perspective to question her motives in depicting 
                                                
1 For other studies that focus, in part, on Grand’s investment in the ethical motives behind her more public feminist 
politics, see Marilyn Bonnell, “Sarah Grand and the Critical Establishment: Art for [Wo]man’s Sake” (1995); John, 
Kucich, The Power of Lies: Transgression in Victorian Fiction (1994); and Jil Larson, Ethics and Narrative in the 
English Novel 1880-1914 (2001). 
2 Many critics refer to Grand’s New Woman novels as a trilogy for the way they share characters and settings. My 
use of the term follows this tendency but also reflects my understanding of the novels’ linear progression, not in 
conventional terms of plot, but rather in their development of a model of moral agency for women and an 
appropriate narrative perspective for Grand’s politics. 
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this state of mind. These experimental shifts, previously considered isolated instances, prove an 
integrated project exploring the ethical consequences of narrative knowledge.3 Moving from the 
first-person narration of Lord Dawne in Ideala to the anonymous third-person narration in the 
first five of six books in The Heavenly Twins, Grand suggests she can achieve the same 
unselfconscious, selfless objectivity her narrators do. But then, abruptly moving to the first-
person narrator Dr. Galbraith in the final book of the The Heavenly Twins, Grand reveals how an 
author figure might use a supposedly disembodied, unselfconscious third-person perspective to 
shape her moral appearance for her own ends.  
Grand’s experimentation culminates in the eponymous heroine of the semi-
autobiographical Beth Book, through whom Grand more overtly examines her own self-serving 
use of narrative perspective. Grand finally acknowledges her presence as implied author and 
reveals the self-examination that pervades the entire trilogy—even those portions that do not 
employ characters as authorial stand-ins. The previous novels we’ve studied signal their own 
autobiographical interests through such stand-ins, but, as we will see, Grand’s experiments with 
narrative perspective more directly suggest that all novels are to some extent autobiographical. 
This inevitability leads Grand to embrace her personal, didactic aims as an author, knowing that 
they result from renewing self-examination rather than moral blindness. Revealing the recurring 
                                                
3 A surprising lack of attention has been paid to the implications of narrative knowledge in Grand, especially as they 
emerge across the trilogy. In considering the ethics of truth-telling for late-Victorian feminism, Kucich briefly 
identifies its connection to formal narrative choices, noting, for example, Grand’s novels’ “unconcealed narrative 
manipulation,” in which the narrative withholds information or gives a misrepresentative sense of what is to occur 
by the novel’s end (262-63). Studies that examine Grand’s interest in narrative knowledge at greater length 
nevertheless tend to limit their scope to the last book of The Heavenly Twins, in which the limited first-person male 
clinical perspective of the narrator Dr. Galbraith replaces the earlier omniscient third-person narrator. See Ann 
Heilmann, New Woman Fiction: Women Writing First-Wave Feminism (2000); Adam Seth Lowenstein, “ ‘Not a 
Novel, nor even a Well-Ordered Story’: Formal Experimentation and Psychological Innovation in Sarah Grand’s 
The Heavenly Twins,” Studies in the Novel (2007); and Teresa Mangum, Married, Middlebrow, and Militant: Sarah 
Grand and the New Woman Novel (1998). Mangum’s study extends beyond Galbraith to Lord Dawne, the first-
person narrator of Ideala, identifying both figures as representative of patriarchal perspectives founded in medical 
and class authority. 
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connection between narrative and prayer in women’s novels, Grand, like Sewell and Eliot, 
imagines herself to engage in prayer as a way to guarantee the sincerity of her self-examination. 
Like the authors before her, Grand sees prayer as a means of achieving a distinct self-
consciousness through a sense of audience that lies somewhere between self and other. Having 
been guided by Grand’s narrators to identify a similarly complex self-consciousness in her 
heroines, readers have the tools to identify it in Grand, should they so choose. 
Grand notes narrative’s unique ability to capture the complexity of women’s self-
consciousness and laments the lack of such knowledge in real life. Our previous novelists leave it 
to women to interpret this self-consciousness in themselves while holding out distant hope that 
their novels’ tracing of such complexities may begin to change stereotypical understandings of 
women’s moral character. Grand on the other hand more actively envisions a solution in the form 
of a community of women willing to provide this interpretation for each other. Narrative’s 
particular representational ability—in conjunction with its limitations—has the potential to 
propel Grand’s feminist vision. A model of feminine moral character that began with fairly 
conservative, isolated roots in Sewell and Wood thus becomes the source of an ever-expanding 
feminist community in Grand. 
1. 
 All three novels of Grand’s trilogy promote women’s active, self-reflective shaping of 
their moral character through the public articulation of belief. In Ideala, a public reading of the 
eponymous heroine’s poem awakens her to its self-absorption, “show[ing] Ideala at about her 
worst”; her resulting desire for change “mark[s] a period in her career, a turning-point for the 
better” (47). In The Heavenly Twins, Evadne’s recording of her thoughts in her journal leads her 
to know she is right in refusing to consummate her marriage; although her tragic plotline carries 
 135 
her far from feminist liberation, her protestations against coerced marriage further the novel’s 
critique of the Contagious Diseases Acts. And in The Beth Book, Beth’s voicing of her views to 
Dr. Galbraith and the women in her community allows her to see where she stands on women’s 
issues and to find social and professional independence in public speaking.  
 The importance Grand places on women’s public expressions of their beliefs, however, 
has led to complaints of moralizing. But Grand addressed the possibility of such criticism in her 
novels. When Ideala rewrites her poem for an audience of friends, giving it a more overt moral, 
one member of the audience, Ralph, “patronisingly” gives his critique: “Well done, Ideala!... you 
certainly have a memory, and are quite as good at patchwork as the author of ‘Delysle.’ I could 
criticize on another count, but taking into consideration time, place, circumstances, and the 
female intellect, I refrain.” Ralph admits to preferring the first version because, unlike the 
revision, it avoids “wholesome[ness]” (62). His criticism both echoes a tendency to condemn the 
naïve articulation of moral belief in art and anticipates criticism, early and late, of Grand for this 
failing. Grand, like other New Woman writers, was accused of engaging in “moralizing as 
aggressive as that of a Sunday-school story book” (Noble 493) and filling her novels with 
“sermonic tedium” (Bradfield 541). This view has endured among more recent critics, 
characterizing even those who set out to recover New Woman literature. As John Kucich 
remarks, “The conventional view, formulated by, among others, Elaine Showalter, is that New 
Woman novelists were too activist and polemical to be interested in aesthetics and that they 
grounded themselves instead in an antiquated didactic realism” (243, 6n).4 
                                                
4 Showalter has received special attention from critics aiming to shift the grounds of our assessment of New Woman 
fiction. Thus Heilmann’s complaint that Grand’s work and New Woman fiction in general have been relegated to 
“the Woolfian category of moralistic, stuffy, sensually repressive and intellectually regressive Victorianism which 
continues to haunt modern criticism, a spectre resurfacing in Elaine Showalter’s recent verdict that it is 
‘[i]mpossible’ to conceive of ‘humorless’ first-generation New Women like Olive Schreiner ‘writing about women 
and play, or imagining pleasures, let alone joys, outside of the twin spheres of principle and duty’” (New Woman 
Strategies 2-3). 
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 Other recent critics have, in different fashions, worked to save Grand from such charges. 
Ann Heilmann identifies Grand’s exploration of gender performance and female libidinal desire 
as countering the potential rigidity of her moralizing.5 Teresa Mangum points out that throughout 
The Beth Book, Grand attempts to answer the still active question of whether “feminist politics 
[can] cohabit with aesthetics” (145). Mangum traces Grand’s redefinition of “art” as dependent 
on “purpose”: “By insisting that Beth is a woman of genius driven by irresistible impulse, Grand 
circumvents this facile dichotomy between art and politics with an alternative aesthetic that can 
encompass both. ‘Purpose’ motivates art; language ceases to be art unless driven by purpose” 
(151). Thus, while Heilmann demonstrates that Grand’s work does more than just advance a 
rigid moral purpose, Mangum argues that Grand’s moral purpose is still central to her work, but 
that it holds a more complex relationship to her aesthetics than previously acknowledged.  
 Grand’s vexed views on moralizing seem to have encouraged such interpretive 
differences. Her preoccupation with this issue is made evident by the frequency with which 
characters on all sides of the women’s rights debate accuse each other of “cant.” In The Heavenly 
Twins, Evadne calls Mrs. Frayling’s talk of young wives reforming husbands with immoral pasts 
“cant” (89), Ideala criticizes the clergy’s “cant of obedience” for women (266), and Angelica 
complains of “men’s cant about protecting the ‘weaker’ sex” (451). At the same time, male 
characters complain of women who “put themselves forward,” expressing their beliefs publicly 
as members of a “shrieking sisterhood” made up of “old harridans” (The Heavenly Twins 194).6 
This “shrieking sisterhood” resembles Dan’s characterization in The Beth Book of the “canting 
sentimentalists” who protest the Contagious Diseases Acts (399). Although canting would appear 
                                                
5 Heilmann’s demonstration of Grand’s investment in her heroines’ sexual desire works in particular to complicate 
what has been seen as an overly moralistic, conservative stance on social purity in her novels. 
6 The phrase “shrieking sisterhood” comes from mid-Victorian antifeminist Eliza Lynn Linton, who used it as the 
title of an 1870 article denouncing women’s rights activists. 
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the special vice of moralizers and not artists, Galbraith warns Beth not to be “misled by the cant 
of art,” explaining that writers “must learn that right thinking, right feeling, and knowledge are 
more important” (The Beth Book 375). Galbraith suggests that the proclamations of “art for art’s 
sake” equally risk falling into cant and thus leaves open the possibility that careful articulation of 
moral belief might have a place in art. Grand challenges the idea that art should never advance a 
clear ethical agenda, but she is also careful to ask at what point the articulation of moral belief 
loses its efficacy, becoming “cant” resulting from the same self-centeredness she sees in art 
created solely for art’s sake. 
 Kucich is one of the few critics to recognize the exploratory nature of Grand’s 
investigation of these questions. “Conflicts between literature and activism,” he notes, “filtered 
through ethical quandaries, are…left very much in abeyance by The Beth Book. It is, indeed, 
striking how much less settled these conflicts are than the conventional New Woman diatribes 
against ‘art for art’s sake’ have led many critics to believe” (277). The unsettled nature of the 
conflict derives, on Kucich’s view, from Grand’s novels’ situation between two conflicted 
feminist impulses: one, an impulse to develop a powerful public voice (that also acknowledged 
the possibility of moralizing) and the other, an inclination toward a more subtly performative 
subversion of gender stereotypes (that itself acknowledged the possibility of reinscription into 
“Victorian clichés about ingrained female mendacity” [245]). This double bind, according to 
Kucich, kept Grand from “develop[ing] a unified image of feminist moral authority appropriate 
to the publicly performed sexual and social activism [New Woman novelists] so urgently 
desired” (278-79).  
 However, in helpfully making evident the constraints of Grand’s position, Kucich’s 
reading misses what is new and constructive in her writing. Grand, like the other novelists we’ve 
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studied, sees the possibility for novelistic expressions of belief to result from an ethical self-
consciousness that acknowledges the importance of understanding oneself from the perspective 
of others and, at the same time, recognizes that such a focus can lead to moral self-regard. 
Teaching Beth what he calls “the best code of morality in the world,” Beth’s father tells her, “be 
as good as your friends think you, and better if you can. Tell the truth, live openly, and stick to 
your friends” (The Beth Book 70). Captain Caldwell encourages Beth to develop an active 
consciousness of herself in relation to her peers through honest, open speech and living. But this 
awareness alone is not enough; his addendum “and better if you can” suggests the moral risks of 
an intense focus on what others are thinking of you: while it may allow a way out of the self, it 
may also lead to moral actions done solely to appear moral to others. Grand’s heroines’ self-
understanding depends on others’ views of them, and they must publicly articulate their moral 
beliefs to influence those views and improve themselves. At the same time, they balance their 
attention to what others think with an ethical unselfconsciousness in order to guarantee the 
sincerity of their speech and actions. 
 In The Beth Book, Grand envisions the extreme version of this state of mind at life’s 
edges, imagining an ideal of sublime unselfconsciousness grounded in a Romantic sense of 
childhood innocence. Early in the novel, Beth escapes her mother’s harshness at home and visits 
the nearby mountain streams “to lie her length upon the turf beside them,” losing herself in “the 
incessant, delicate, delicious murmur of the water, a sound which conveyed to her much more 
than can be expressed in articulate speech” (61). Similar to Eliot’s “globule of dew on a rose 
leaf,” such unselfconsciousness seems somehow not fully part of human subjectivity: two pages 
later, Beth observes the carcass of a horse and “wonder[s] how a creature once so full of life 
could become a silent, senseless thing, not feeling, not caring, not knowing, no more to itself 
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than a stone—strange mystery; and some day she would be like that, just white bones. She held 
her breath and suspended all sensation and thought…to see what it felt like” (63, emphasis 
original). Although any suspension of “sensation and thought” is increasingly impossible as Beth 
grows up, and the notion of “not caring [and] not knowing” alone is antithetical to the novel’s 
insights into moral development, the memory of such sublime states endures as a model for the 
moments of fleeting unselfconsciousness essential to Grand’s ethical feminism. 
 Indeed, the feasible version of this unselfconsciousness is achieved in conversation with a 
more conscious state. Characters achieve this delicate balance in all three novels, beginning with 
Ideala. At a social gathering, one of Ideala’s friends reads a new poem called “The Passion of 
Delysle”—a self-enamored piece that tells the story of a woman who relishes the idea of her 
forbidden love for a priest, reveling in her self-absorbed melancholy; the poem ends with the 
woman and the priest melodramatically surrendering themselves to the sea, hoping to be united 
in death. Afterward, Ideala loudly criticizes the immorality of the lovers, the hackneyed 
storyline, and the self-absorption of the author, before proposing that she try to “produce the 
same story, with the same conclusion, but a different moral, in an hour” (56-57). Neither Ideala’s 
audience nor Grand’s first-time readers know that Ideala—having felt “shame and mortification” 
while listening to the reading (69)—is revising her own poem. 
 Ideala rewrites “The Passion of Delysle” as “The Choice,” a poem that emphasizes a 
moral awareness of the self in its relation to others. The new version displays Ideala’s newfound 
self-awareness, depicting a heroine who resembles (the now “old”) Ideala, with her lack of self-
reflection; like Ideala, the heroine’s broken marriage results from having chosen a nobleman 
over the man she loves. When she again meets her true love, now a monk, by the sea, she 
considers suicide, but in this version of the poem they decide it their duty to return to their lives 
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to “do the good [they] can; not seeking death / Nor shunning it, but living pure and true” (62). 
Unable to relinquish melodrama entirely, Ideala has the tide rise and overtake them before they 
can depart. Although both poems end with the couple’s death, the difference in intention 
articulated in the second version makes a marked moral difference.7 
 While Grand does not suggest that the second poem is great art, she does present it as 
evidence of moral development. Ideala’s revision, and, importantly, Grand’s representation of it, 
hover between conscious moral reflection and a less self-conscious state of mind. In “The 
Choice,” the couple’s decision to live even though they still die answers to the imperative of 
doing good in ways unrecognizable to others and oneself. No one else can realize the moral 
significance of their decision to live and be good to others, since their illicit love has remained 
unknown. Nor can the couple themselves fully know the significance of their decision, at least to 
the extent their audience does, since they cannot know the alternate reality of the first poem’s 
ending. Beyond this even, the audience and the reader are unaware of the significance the 
revision holds for Ideala’s own moral character. Not knowing that the first poem is Ideala’s, they 
see the revision as merely another example of inferior writing, demonstrated through a hasty, 
equally mediocre rewriting. However, in its later revelation that Ideala wrote both poems, the 
narrative retrospectively reframes the significance of the revision, suggesting that Ideala was 
secretly concerned with the first poem’s revelation of her own self-absorption. Her revision thus 
seems an act of moral self-reflection, a rewriting not only of the poem but also of herself. Such 
                                                
7 Providing the only other reading of this scene I’ve found, Heilmann briefly identifies in it a simultaneous moral 
and feminist awakening for Ideala: “Ideala reveals the protagonist as the author of both a decadent and a moralistic 
poem about forbidden love…. Significantly, though, Ideala conceals her authorship of the aesthetic piece, charging 
decadent writers, and women writers in particular, with merely ‘stimulat[ing]’ the senses but failing to ‘nourish’ the 
mind or heart. Her move into feminism and social reformism is accompanied by her rejection of aestheticism on the 
grounds of political incorrectness” (New Woman Strategies 107-08). 
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an ethical motive is never explicitly stated, however. That is to say, Ideala too seems to some 
extent unconscious of the ethical implications of her revision. 
 Nevetheless, Ideala’s revision exceeds unselfconsciousness when it grants her the 
confidence to speak out afterward on a variety of social issues to her audience, assured that her 
motives are sincere. This assurance, however, does not extend to her audience; they consider her 
expressions of moral belief to be ignorant and judgmental. Unfortunately, there is no one in the 
room with Ideala to interpret her speech for her audience. As a character in Grand’s novel, 
however, she has a narrator doing this for her. As we’ve seen with previous authors, Grand’s 
narrators are crucial to revealing the complex self-consciousness underlying women’s public 
expressions of belief: they defend characters from misinterpretation without them having to ask 
for that defense, or even to be aware of it. 
 Indeed, the narrator of The Heavenly Twins carefully traces the way the 
unselfconsciousness of Evadne’s moral development leads to a quite conscious, but similarly 
misinterpreted, publicizing of her feminist beliefs. The earnest attention Evadne pays to her 
father’s misogynist comments leads to her eventual feminism, “set[ting] her mind off on a long 
and patient inquiry into the condition and capacity of women” (13). But the narrator repeatedly 
emphasizes that Evadne is not fully conscious in this endeavor: “she did not begin her inquiry of 
set purpose; she was not even conscious of the particular attention she paid to the subject. She 
had…no wish to find evidence in favour of the woman which would prove the man wrong. Only, 
coming across so many sneers at the incapacity of women, she fell insensibly into the subject of 
asking why” (13). This less self-conscious “asking why” eventually leads Evadne to refuse to 
consummate her marriage, having discovered her husband’s depraved past and possible syphilis. 
“Marrying a man like that,” she says, “allowing him an assured position in society, is 
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countenancing vice, and…helping to spread it” (79, emphasis original). Evadne’s parents 
interpret her decision as “outrageously” impulsive—morally unreflective. In letters to her 
mother, Evadne laments that her parents cannot see the complex state of mind, the “conscience, 
and not caprice” (93) that has led to her decision: “You say that no girl in your young days 
would have behaved so outrageously as I am doing. I wish you had said ‘so decidedly,’ instead 
of ‘outrageously’” (92). Evadne’s emphatic desire to be accurately interpreted, and the 
frustration of that desire within the novel, make evident for readers the decisive role of the 
omniscient narrator, who can reveal the earnest motives behind Evadne’s actions. 
 Grand’s narrators demonstrate the complex self-consciousness prompting Evadne’s and 
Ideala’s sincere articulations of moral belief, but they do so without revealing their own 
purposes. Why doesn’t Lord Dawne immediately tell us that Ideala wrote “The Passion of 
Delysle,” or at least explain why he has delayed in giving us this information? Why doesn’t the 
narrator of The Heavenly Twins explain why it’s so important that Evadne’s feminism originates 
somewhat unconsciously? It is as if the narrators themselves were equally unconscious of their 
own ethical role in making their heroines’ complex states of mind apparent for readers. The 
move from Lord Dawne’s first-person narration in Ideala to the anonymous third-person 
narration in The Heavenly Twins helps establish this sense, the latter’s disembodied voice 
suggesting the selfless objectivity of both novels’ representations of their heroines. At the same 
time, the introduction of first-person narrative at the end of The Heavenly Twins undermines this 
sense of pure unselfconsciousness, making it seem more like the third-person narrator and Lord 
Dawne might be avoiding self-consciousness. As we will see, Dr. Galbraith’s narration in the 
final book of The Heavenly Twins retrospectively projects such a sense of agency and 
consciousness onto the anonymous third-person narrative that preceded it. 
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Grand does not rest comfortably with the idea that third-person narrative could ever 
achieve pure unselfconsciousness or perfectly selfless objectivity. Like the other authors we’ve 
seen, she seems eager to distinguish her heroines’ moral self-consciousness and her novels’ 
narrative perspectives from more traditional notions of feminine selflessness that keep women 
powerless both in their relation to other people and in their ability for moral self-improvement. 
Several of Grand’s characters echo the common belief that “enshrined within her home, a 
Victorian angel-woman should become her husband’s holy refuge from the blood and sweat that 
inevitably accompanies a ‘life of significant action,’ as well as, in her ‘contemplative purity,’ a 
living memento of the otherness of the divine” (qtd. in Gilbert and Gubar 24). According to this 
model women’s virtue is ontological rather than epistemological or practical; women are moral, 
while men think and act morally. As Ideala claims (a statement she later retracts), “My function 
is not to do, but to be” (Ideala 14). Marriage is the quintessential act for women, requiring they 
“do” nothing more than consent. Hence the wry comment in The Beth Book about Beth’s 
mother’s belief “that absolute ignorance of human nature is the best qualification for a wife and 
mother” (44). Innocence, as Mrs. Frayling remarks in The Heavenly Twins, makes her daughter 
Evadne “eminently qualified” to become a wife (39). Lady Adeline challenges Mrs. Frayling, 
however, calling it instead “dangerous ignorance” (41). Grand’s clearest example of the dangers 
of feminine virtue appears in The Heavenly Twins with Edith Beale, who is “fitted by education 
to move in the society of saints and angels only, and so rendered as unsuited as she [i]s 
unprepared to cope with” the realities of marriage (159). Unknowingly marrying a man with a 
promiscuous past, Edith gives birth to a syphilitic child, leading to a mental and physical decline 
that ends melodramatically in her death. 
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 Grand criticizes this ideal for its deleterious effects on the women it aims to improve, 
suggesting that it makes them not just vulnerable but also unreflectively self-absorbed. Her 
critique took vivid practical form in her campaign against corsets.8 Designed to make women 
attractive to men by reducing their bodily selves, corsets represented a moral ideal of selflessness 
as well, suffering for the sake of others. However, Grand suggests that both physical and moral 
selflessness, taken to extremes, have immoral effects: “The waist is an infallible index to the 
moral worth of a woman; very little of the latter survives the pressure of a tightened corset” (The 
Heavenly Twins 562). Grand’s witty remark cinches together the physical and moral 
diminishment demanded by feminine ideals.9 Devoting their attention to the cultivation of 
physical and moral selflessness in the eyes of others, women are blinded, the novels suggest, to 
the inevitable moments at which their attempts at selflessness backfire. Mrs. Caldwell, believing 
women should be ignorant of the ways of the world and silent about their husbands’ infidelities, 
exemplifies the psychological side of this problem in The Beth Book. Beth’s mother might pride 
herself on her ability to stay silent about her husband’s philandering, but she channels her 
discontent into verbal and physical abuse of her daughter. Discouraged as a woman from active 
moral knowledge, Beth’s mother lacks the self-reflection to realize the immorality of her actions 
toward her daughter (or the immorality of her husband’s actions toward her). 
Grand suggests that her own attempts at a similar selflessness will only lead to self-
absorption. Turning in the final book of The Heavenly Twins to the first-person narrator Dr. 
Galbraith, Grand calls attention to the possibility that her narrators not only serve to demonstrate 
                                                
8 Grand was a member of the Rational Dress Society, founded in 1881 “to warn women of the dangers of tight 
lacing and other constrictive clothing.” Grand’s active involvement, writing and speaking on the Society’s behalf, 
also “quickly acquainted her with prominent feminists in London” (Mangum 234, 22n). 
9 Heilmann notes that, for feminists, corsets represented both physical and mental confinement for women: “Sarah 
Grand was at the forefront of writers who exposed the corset as a straitjacket of the mind” (New Woman Fiction 
122). 
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Evadne’s and Ideala’s complex self-consciousness; they also serve to demonstrate her own 
selflessness. The sudden, unorthodox shift from a heterodiegetic narrator to a homodiegetic one 
in the novel’s final book lends to this sense of metalepsis.10 Having appointed himself as 
Evadne’s psychologist, Galbraith’s gathering of narrative details as part of his psychological and 
moral assessment points back to the construction of the novel itself, reminding the reader that the 
implied author’s perspective organizes what seems an immediate presentation of a world. 
Galbraith’s purpose is not entirely selfless; he aims to demonstrate something about himself. He 
explains that doctors should be able to understand the “character” of anyone they meet; any 
“medical man who has not insight enough to do so at will has small chance of success in his 
profession” (555). Here in the final book emerges a clear (albeit fictional) author figure selecting 
and organizing the details of the narrative to serve his own professional needs. This shift 
unsettles the narratorial stability of the previous books and intimates that Grand herself might be 
revealing the private details of her heroines’ lives only to demonstrate the complexity of her own 
moral thought, to gain recognition of her moral character.11 
 From this angle, the novels’ objective representation of their heroines becomes suspect 
knowledge, their narrators prying opportunists. The other novelists studied here express concern 
that their attempts at a disinterested objectivity may on the contrary reveal something about their 
own interests; in Grand, this disguised self-interest takes the specific forms of spying and even 
vivisection. The minor character Lady Fulda comments that one might “keep the ten 
                                                
10 Gérard Genette explains of metalepsis, “The transition from one narrative level to another can in principle be 
achieved only by the narrating, the act that consists precisely of introducing into one situation, by means of a 
discourse, the knowledge of another situation. Any other form of transit is, if not always impossible, at any rate 
always transgressive” (234). 
11 Many critics read the shift in perspective to Galbraith’s first-person narration as a critique of the objectifying male 
clinical gaze. Lowenstein sees the shift as “undermin[ing] the very notion of omniscience itself” and representative 
of the epistemological crisis surrounding late-century understandings of hysteria (438). Galbraith cannot adequately 
interpret Evadne—as her doctor or her narrator—and diagnoses her as hysterical. It seems to me that the narrative 
shift provides Grand a prime opportunity to demonstrate her simultaneous commitment to the feminist critique of 
patriarchy and the active self-questioning essential to her model of moral agency for women. 
 146 
commandments strictly, and yet be a most objectionable person…, listen[ing] at doors, 
repeat[ing] private conversations, open[ing] other people’s letters, [and] pry[ing] amongst their 
papers” (The Heavenly Twins 537). In Ideala Lord Dawne mysteriously admits to piecing 
together part of the narrative “with the help of papers that have lately come into [his] possession” 
(90); and the anonymous narration that begins The Heavenly Twins includes copies of Evadne’s 
and her mother’s letters, as well as entries from Evadne’s journal. As Candace Vogler argues, 
anyone who wants to know a human being (“Jane,” in her example) as well as one knows a 
fictional character like Maggie Verver of Henry James’s The Golden Bowl “will need…to stalk, 
eavesdrop upon, and interview Jane repeatedly…to study Jane’s personal correspondence, 
wardrobe choices, diaries, and photo albums—all in order to approximate the kind of access to 
Jane that James gives us to Maggie” (15, emphasis original). More starkly yet, such an intruder, 
“having finally acquired and archived all available evidence on Jane,…will have to see to it that 
her life ends in order to ensure that the thing he has come to know is finished” (Vogler 15).  
Grand anticipates and even extends the criticism implicit in Vogler’s comments by 
recurring to the figure of the prying vivisectionist.12 In The Beth Book, Dan, a vivisectionist, 
listens at Beth’s door, opens her letters, and barges into her room, demanding to know what she 
has been doing. And Beth herself, a fictional stand-in for Grand, is accused of “vivisecting” 
Alfred Cayley Pounce: “She watches the workings of his mind quite dispassionately…and then 
adjusts him under the microscope. It interests her to dissect the creature. When she has studied 
him thoroughly, she will cast him out, as a worthless specimen” (461-62). In The Heavenly 
Twins, vivisection is directly connected with the act of narration, as rumors circulate early on 
                                                
12 The anti-vivisection movement, which gained momentum in the 1870s, was well underway by the time Grand 
published her novels. Anti-vivisection was closely linked with the women’s movement: feminist Frances Power 
Cobbe founded the Society for the Protection of Animals Liable to Vivisection in 1875 and the British Union for the 
Abolition of Vivisection in 1898, and other feminists like Grand and Mona Caird spoke out for animal rights. 
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that Galbraith practices vivisection (133). When Galbraith becomes narrator, his aggressive 
attempts to determine Evadne’s motives for visiting a seedy neighborhood late at night are cast 
in a negative light. Unable to determine her motive, he begins to believe Evadne’s actions 
stemmed from “[a]n unholy curiosity” (621). He bluntly asks her what she was doing, but she 
refuses to tell him. Galbraith’s frustration reflects back upon the self-aggrandizing nature of his 
constant judgment of her moral character, suggesting a connection between his roles as 
vivisectionist and narrator. 
In drawing parallels between narration and the prying vivisectionist, Grand reverses a 
trope that had earlier been associated with the objectivity of realist narrative. Indeed, as Richard 
Menke has shown, G. H. Lewes, Eliot’s longtime romantic partner and a vivisectionist himself, 
compared what he saw as Dickens’s failures in characterization to “the deficiencies of an 
incompetent vivisector” (627). Menke argues that Eliot had a more ambivalent view on the ethics 
of vivisection but nevertheless “use[d] language and techniques translated from Lewes’s 
physiological psychology” to capture the complexity of her characters’ subjective experience in 
“The Lifted Veil,” Middlemarch, and Daniel Deronda. As Menke explains, Daniel Deronda’s 
“unusually complex psycho-narration, free indirect discourse, and treatment of 
psychology…render the subjective aspect of consciousness in an apparently objective form, as 
Lewes imagined a non-reductive, experimental physiology of mind might do” (646).13 As we’ve 
seen, Eliot may have striven toward objectivity in her realism, but she also had reservations 
about embracing it wholeheartedly. Grand similarly challenges such a straightforward faith in 
                                                
13 For other studies of the relationship between fiction and vivisection in the nineteenth century, see Lucy Bending, 
The Representation of Bodily Pain in Late Nineteenth-Century English Culture (2000); Ivan Kreilkamp, “Petted 
Things: Wuthering Heights and the Animal” (2005); Christine Ferguson, Language, Science, and Popular Fiction in 
the Victorian Fin-de-Siècle: The Brutal Tongue (2006); and Jessica Straley, “Love and Vivisection: Wilkie Collins’s 
Experiment in Heart and Science” (2010). 
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objectivity, presenting her scientifically minded narrator Dr. Galbraith as markedly limited by his 
professional egotism. 
 Ultimately, then, Grand reminds readers of a key similarity between fallible first-person 
narrators and objective third-person narrators: objectivity is a mask worn by the limited implied 
author. The final book of The Heavenly Twins sheds new light on Grand’s moral project: she has 
shrewdly used the ambiguity in our understanding of narrators—as both self-conscious, 
embodied communicators of their own knowledge and an unselfconscious, disembodied means 
of presenting an objective reality—for her own moral ends. Grand’s third-person narrative 
pushes her ideal of ethical unselfconsciousness to an extreme and intimates that she as the 
implied author is capable of it. Thus, while the novels express her beliefs about the complexity of 
women’s moral character, Grand can assure her audience that this expression comes from a 
selfless desire to improve the world rather than an overly self-conscious desire to prove her own 
merits. But in introducing Galbraith as narrator at the end of The Heavenly Twins, Grand 
questions her narrators’ and her own supposedly selfless objectivity: in her attempt to bring to 
light the reasons and experiences that lead her heroines to think, act, and speak the way they do, 
is she merely vivisecting them for her own purposes, as a woman worried about her own ethical 
identity in the eyes of her audience? By assuming that her third-person narrator allows her a 
position of perfect selflessness, Grand risks undermining the intricate balance of ethical self-
consciousness informing her novels’ feminist message. She thus demonstrates that even fiction 
that avoids overt didacticism can still convey a certain moral self-regard. The key to overcoming 
cant in one’s art is, as we will see, openly acknowledging that fiction will always, at some level, 
have something moral or political to say to its readers thanks to the inevitable presence of the 
author. 
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2. 
 Grand’s self-questioning at the end of The Heavenly Twins thus suggests that the more 
her novels “selflessly” focus on the moral probity of her characters, the more they point back to 
her own moral probity as implied author. Grand continues to explore this problem in The Beth 
Book, but she also searches for a solution. Grand’s attempts at selflessly objective narration in 
the previous two novels began to suggest an ironic desire for recognition as implied author. With 
such avoidance of recognition only suggesting a further desire for recognition, it begins to seem 
that the only possibility for breaking out of this vertiginous circle would involve open 
acknowledgment of her own purposes in organizing the narrative and morally interpreting 
characters. Open self-acknowledgment is exactly what Grand demonstrates in the 
semiautobiographical Beth Book,14 where she more overtly examines herself by projecting her 
authorial persona into the character Beth. The focus on the author is more explicit this time, but 
Grand maintains the anonymous third-person narrator, thereby coming as close to autobiography 
as possible while continuing the investigations of novelistic narrative begun in the trilogy’s 
previous volumes. 
 Grand’s concern thus far has been with her own narrative perspective as author, and her 
projection of her authorial persona into Beth indeed focuses on the formation of a strangely 
narratorial perspective in her character stand-in.15 In this way, The Beth Book bends 
                                                
14 Grand was ambiguous about the novel’s autobiographical status: “I see the papers are announcing that The Beth 
Book is an autobiography,” she commented. “As they have said the same of every book I have written yet, and as the 
heroine of each is entirely distinct and different, I should think the announcement must begin to fail of its effect.” 
Nevertheless, Grand eventually “contradicted this claim, acknowledging that she had adapted scenes from her 
girlhood, and, indeed, the similarities between her life and her fiction are striking” (Mangum 144). 
15 Lyn Pykett briefly notes that the early characterization of Beth highlights a kind of writerly sensitivity, providing 
“the minute details of the myriad sense impressions that constitute the history of Beth’s coming to self-
consciousness…. Many of the passages which involve this process function as both representations of the 
character’s consciousness, and celebrations of the writer’s self-consciousness. The language of these passages is 
frequently in excess of the demands of the mere portrayal of character; writing itself is foregrounded” (The 
‘Improper’ Feminine 178). 
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Künstlerroman conventions, documenting the development not just of an author, but of a 
narrative perspective. With an uncanny ability for observing the world around her, remembering 
the earliest moments of her existence, and knowing future events, Beth holds the first-person 
narrative perspective of an autobiography (Grand’s autobiography) stuck in the third-person 
narrative of a novel. We are repeatedly assured that Beth remembers everything narrated early on 
in her life, even the first moment she came “into conscious existence” as an infant; the 
experience “recur[s] to her at odd times ever afterwards” (10). Such an emphasis on observation 
and memory is usually found in first-person narrative: unlike a disembodied third-person 
narrator, a first-person narrator must convince readers of “the plausibility of his cognition, 
particularly when it involves the most inchoate moments of his past” (Cohn 144). In addition to 
observing and remembering like a narrator, Beth at times finds herself knowing her future as if 
she has already lived it. First-person narration allows for this knowledge on the part of the 
narrating “I,” knowledge that is typically impossible in third-person narration. The protagonist of 
a typical third-person narrative, as Dorrit Cohn explains, “cannot know his future self…. The 
experiencing self in first-person narration, by contrast, is always viewed by a narrator who 
knows what happened to him next, and who is free to slide up and down the time axis that 
connects his two selves” (145). Beth holds first-person retrospective narrative knowledge as a 
character in a third-person narrative. For one, she senses that her aunt Victoria is going to die in 
the pages before her sudden death. Attempting to explain this knowledge, she says, “I sometimes 
feel as if I were listening, but not with my ears, and waiting for things to happen that I know 
about, but not with my head…. I have to…suspend something in myself, stop something, push 
something aside—I can’t get it into words; I can’t always do it; but when I can, then I know” 
(212-13). Beth experiences this sensation again when she is trapped on the beach with Alfred 
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Cayley Pounce, the tide rising. Beth afterward tells Alfred that although she was frightened, she 
somehow knew that they would be safe: “The things that have come to me like that on a sudden 
positively have always been true, however much I might doubt and question beforehand. I did 
know at that moment that we should not be drowned” (241). At this and other moments, when 
Beth can “suspend” herself, taking on the more ample perspective of a narrator, she accesses 
knowledge of her own future. If The Beth Book were a traditional first-person autobiography, 
Grand would be able to talk about events like these with knowledge of their outcome because she 
would have already lived them, but in Beth this knowledge comes across as precognition. 
By inserting herself more explicitly into the story in the character of Beth, Grand 
acknowledges the human fallibility of her authorial persona. As an embodied character, Beth 
interacts more directly with other characters than a heterodiegetic narrator or implied author 
would, and therefore holds a more explicit potential to act for overly self-conscious, self-
aggrandizing reasons. Through this acknowledgment, as we will see, Grand creates space to 
maneuver around her fallibility and let go of her need for moral recognition—not asking for 
recognition but not avoiding it either. Before she fully acknowledges her fallibility, however, 
Grand seems only willing to acknowledge her potential for fallibility. Beth might hold the 
potential to act for overly self-conscious reasons, but, significantly, she does not. Instead, she 
holds a perspective as selflessly expansive as that of a third-person narrator, suggesting that 
Grand has fallen back into her desire to be recognized for her supposed selfless objectivity as 
author. Beth’s selfless perspective allows her to shift in and out of free indirect representations of 
other characters’ consciousness. Beth takes turns “being” other characters (19), speaking in their 
voices and sensing their thoughts. “[G]enerally somebody else in these days, seldom herself” 
(131), Beth “make[s] herself passive,…reflecting the people with whom she converse[s] 
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involuntarily” (208), thus approximating Grand’s narrators’ “selfless” presentation of an 
unmediated, objective reality. Her capacity for selfless observation is in fact often depicted 
through her bodilessness, as she “seem[s] to be seeing and hearing and feeling without eyes, or 
ears, or a body” (35). At other times, however, Beth’s perceptiveness extends to the very self of 
which she is often unaware: “The next day was Sunday. Beth knew it by the big black bonnet…. 
She had a kind of sensation of having seen herself in it, bobbing along to church, a sort of Kate 
Greenaway child, with a head out of all proportion to the rest of her body” (21). Here, Beth 
narrates herself as though a character out of one of her children’s books. Grand thus suggests that 
she can selflessly observe and narrate the world around her, even when that world includes 
herself.  
 As the novel continues and Beth grows up, however, Grand gives up the attempt to prove 
her selflessness to readers. In the most remarkable step in her exploration of narrative ethics, 
Grand quietly undermines her role as the supposedly objective interpreter of her heroine and 
allows Beth to stand on her own without need for the narrator’s constant recognition of her 
selflessness. Early on, the narrator claims of Beth, “In those first few years, had there been any 
there with intelligence to interpret, they probably would have found foreshadowings of all she 
might be.” The narrator aims “to throw light on the mysterious growth of [Beth’s] moral and 
intellectual being” (11). Here Grand implies that she is the one “with intelligence to interpret,” 
and we’ve indeed seen her interpret Beth as having the abilities of a novelist. But near the 
novel’s end, Beth shifts direction and leaves writing for public speaking. Grand demonstrates the 
plausibility and coherence of this development in such a fashion that we discover that her 
interpretation has been decisively limited:  
Angelica had said that all the indications had pointed to literary ability in Beth, 
but there had been other indications hitherto unheeded. There was that day…when 
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Beth invited the country people in to see the house, and…found words flowing 
from her lips eloquently; there were her preachings to Emily and Bernadine in the 
acting-room, of which they never wearied; her first harangue to the girls who had 
caught her bathing…, and the power of her subsequent teaching…indications 
enough…, had there been any one to interpret them. (525) 
 
There had been someone to interpret them, of course—the novel’s narrator, or Grand as the 
implied author. And yet she has said nothing. Grand thus alerts us to a shift in her thinking about 
the aims of narrative.  
 Suddenly changing paths for herself and for Beth without explanation, Grand lets go of 
her desire for the sort of moral interpretation she has provided her heroines. Grand undermines 
her role as the selflessly objective interpreter of Beth at the same moment that Beth herself gives 
up the roles of author and narrator for public speaker. Beth’s change in professional direction 
mirrors the development of her author: becoming a public speaker rather than a novelist, Beth no 
longer has recourse to demonstrating her selflessness through her novelistic narration. 
 Examining herself through Beth, Grand seems to have made the sort of self-discovery 
that we saw Ideala make in the first novel of the trilogy, this time at the level of the narrator 
rather than the character. Whereas Ideala rewrote herself across the two poems, in The Beth 
Book, Grand rewrites herself within the same story. Like Ideala, she does not draw attention to 
her discoveries, nor does she avoid drawing attention to them—and indeed, that balance is an 
essential part of the discovery itself. Grand might remain silent about her revision, but she leaves 
it in the novel, available for interpretation by readers. Neither asking for recognition nor avoiding 
it, Grand finds some autonomy of moral judgment. 
 Grand aims to develop for readers (as for herself) a model of feminist moral agency that 
takes cues from her narrators’ understandings of her heroines’ complex self-consciousness but 
finds ways to operate in the real, narratorless world. Through her rewriting of herself and Beth, 
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Grand performs a model of moral agency that requires the articulation of one’s views and oneself 
publicly in order to acquire a sense of one’s moral character privately and autonomously. Beth 
takes on this practice in her own world, understanding it as a form of prayer. Having struggled 
with her parents’ cold indifference toward religion and her aunt Victoria’s devout Calvinism, 
Beth develops a secular religiousness and a reverence for the idea of prayer as part of her 
personal moral code. She tells her friend Arthur Brock, “Religion is an attitude of mind, the 
attitude of prayer…. I would not lose that for anything” (502).  
Self-questioning is an integral part of moral certainty, and Grand’s late conceptualization 
of the “attitude of prayer” presents this paradox as key to the ethics behind women’s confident 
articulation of moral belief. We’ve been prepared for the final importance of the term by Grand’s 
earlier uses of it. When Beth’s mother forces the servant Kitty to leave—in part because she 
believes she is converting her children to Catholicism—Beth, heartbroken and angry, is locked in 
her room for threatening to pray to the Virgin. Struggling between following her mother’s 
Protestant beliefs and embracing Catholic practices she has learned from Kitty, Beth disobeys 
her mother and prays to the Holy Mother, timidly finding assurance that she has done right 
through the act of prayer itself: “Her pathetic little face was all drawn and haggard and hopeless. 
But presently she began to sing.” As she prays, “comfort c[omes] to her, and the little voice 
swell[s] in volume” (41). Through prayer, the young Beth finds a way to do what Grand 
struggles with throughout her trilogy: obtain fleeting assurance of her own virtue and the 
sincerity of her expressions of moral belief. 
The confident articulation of prayer, as Grand conceives of it, is a response to something 
outside the self that neither denies the self praying on one hand, nor, on the other hand, requires 
the fully active self-consciousness that one might, more intuitively, assume motivates a 
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“confident” expression of moral belief. If we conceive of prayer as Jean-Louis Chrétien 
describes it—“the act by which the man praying stands in the presence of a being in which he 
believes but does not see and manifests himself to it” (149)—then its unique relationship 
between self and other becomes clear: the sense of the listening other in prayer both establishes 
and alters the self, drawing on the self-certainty and -uncertainty of the person praying. The 
secular articulation of moral belief in Grand’s novels shares phenomenological characteristics 
with prayer thus conceived. Grand and her heroines speak not with the intention of specific 
others hearing them and then seeing them in a certain way, but neither with the intention of 
speaking solely for themselves. As in prayer, they speak something other than monologue or 
dialogue: “The word affects and modifies the sender, and not its addressee. We affect ourselves 
before the other and toward him. This in prayer is the first wound of the word: the yawning 
chasm of its addressee has broken its circle, has opened a fault that alters it” (Chrétien 153). 
Speaking not solely for myself, nor solely to affect a listener, “my own speech, altered from the 
very beginning, perhaps from before the beginning, turns back upon me with…singular force” 
(Chrétien 153).  
Prayer’s intended audience is somewhere between self and other. Grand’s understanding 
of herself and her beliefs in The Beth Book seems to result from a similar in-betweenness. 
Publicly expressing herself through her novel’s narrative, Grand does not wait for a response 
before she privately identifies moral problems and adjusts her understanding. Rather, she allows 
her articulations to “turn back upon [her] with…singular force” in her narrative act of secular 
prayer. Near the novel’s end, Beth’s work habits reflect the dual nature, public and private, of 
women’s moral thought and expression. Retreating from the city to live alone but also becoming 
a public speaker, Beth develops “an attitude of deep devotion,” approaching her work “in the 
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spirit of the great musician who dressed himself in his best, and prayed as at a solemn service, 
when he shut himself up to compose” (522). Beth engages in an ongoing process of secular 
“prayer” meant more to gauge and improve her moral character privately than to prove 
something about herself publicly.16 
 But the public side of this “attitude of prayer” remains essential for Grand’s moral and 
political vision. Indeed, one possibility held out by Grand’s secular “attitude of prayer” (and it is, 
as we’ve seen, essential that this never be its primary aim) is that others will sense its sincerity 
and change their impressions of the speaker for the better. We see this potential when Beth blurts 
out her views about the ethics of literary style at a gathering of women. The women disapprove 
of Beth because of her husband’s position as the head of the Lock Hospital; they assume that she 
supports his career, even though Beth is unaware of Dan’s position. As they discuss Ideala’s 
writing, Mrs. Carne tells her, “What I love about your work is the style” (388, emphasis 
original). When the group consensually defines style as “a thing in itself to be adopted or 
acquired,” Beth cannot stay silent: “‘I am sure it is not,’ Beth burst out, forgetting herself and her 
slights all at once in the interest of the subject. ‘I have been reading the lives of authors lately, 
together with their works, and it seems to me, in the case of all who had genius, that their style 
was the outcome of their characters—their principles—the view they took of the subject.’” Beth 
quickly becomes self-conscious, realizing “that everyone…[i]s listening to her.” She reverts at 
first to uncertainty, feeling that “she ha[s] done the wrong thing to speak out like that” (389), but 
then changes her mind, realizing that she has in fact done right: “Then suddenly in herself, as 
before, something seemed to say, or rather to flash forth the exclamation for her comfort: ‘I shall 
succeed! I shall succeed!... She drew herself up and looked round on them all with a look that 
                                                
16 Heilmann describes the cottage to which she retreats as “the site of Beth’s public and private consummation” 
(New Woman Strategies 82). 
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transformed her. Such an assurance in herself was not to be doubted” (389-90). With these 
lines—the only lines of extended narration in the scene—a Grand heroine finally speaks for 
herself, interprets her own speech (and herself) positively, and does so without the interpretive 
guarantee that a narrator would provide. She speaks without considering whether her audience 
will find her sincere, but reflects back on her speech to judge for herself.  
In the event, Beth’s peers also perceive her speech positively—something Ideala and 
Evadne never achieve, but something Ideala helps to bring about here. After Beth abruptly runs 
out, Ideala convinces the others to listen to what Beth has to say, calling her “the genius for 
whom we are waiting…. It is the old story. She came unto her own, and her own received her 
not” (390). Ideala’s work as interpreter is all the more powerful for our recollection that she 
herself lacked one when she recited her poetry in the first book of the trilogy. Here, as the set of 
novels comes to its close, the narrator receding into the background, that earlier failure is 
redeemed: a woman speaks out without any intention of proving herself right or demonstrating 
her moral character, she and her audience independently reflect on what she has said, and they all 
conclude that she was right to speak out. Ideala has thus offered something sorely needed in a 
burgeoning feminist movement in which “[t]here is little union between women workers” and 
“[e]ach leader thinks her own idea the only good one, and disapproves of every other” (392). 
Indeed, such public interpretation appears one of the most ethical things women can do for each 
other: not asking for recognition but providing it for others. 
 The novel, in its own way, offers this opportunity to readers. When Grand undermines 
her role as interpreter of Beth, quietly rewriting the story and herself, the reader, trained by 
Grand, must perform the interpretive work that the narrator performed earlier. Grand has, this is 
to say, transformed readers into narrators. There are, of course, differences: Grand’s heroines 
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neither desire nor know of the recognition that their narrator provides them; indeed they cannot, 
within the conventions of realistic narration. The novel form protects them from this desire and 
its self-regarding dangers. Their delicate balance of self-consciousness is thus at once sheltered 
and exposed. This also means, however, that the political potential of this complex self-
consciousness exists apart from the heroines and their worlds. In The Beth Book, Grand considers 
the possibility for an ethical feminism to be recognizable in the real, narratorless world, where 
women still suffer misinterpretation. The novel suggests to readers the importance of acting as 
each other’s narrators, providing moral interpretation for those brave enough to speak out.  
Indeed, Grand’s politics do not have as transformative an effect on Evadne and Beth as 
one might expect; as many have noted, both end up in situations that suggest a woman’s identity 
and ultimate happiness depend on finding a man who loves her. Her heroines may be forced back 
into marriage-plot endings, but Grand devotes the rest of her trilogy to formulating a richer sense 
of ethical selfhood for her heroines, herself, and her readers. Grand suggests that women, who 
face constant misinterpretation as either outspoken, moralizing “old harridans” or silent, helpless 
angels, be their own moral interpreters; public articulation allows them the distance for private 
self-reflection. But Grand’s feminist aims also lead her to make the private motives of her 
heroines public through narrative fiction—to found a rhetoric of women’s rights in a complex 
ethical self-consciousness. Although publicizing this state of mind still risks accusations of 
moralizing, an “attitude of prayer” requires that the project be ongoing, characterized by 
confident but self-reflective acts of writing and repeated rewriting (exemplified by Grand’s 
trilogy). Exploring the possibilities offered by novelistic narrative’s ambiguous sense of self and 
audience, Grand encourages women to cultivate a similar perspective, to develop the ability for a 
more nuanced moral self-consciousness and for active interpretation of that state of mind in 
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themselves and others. The novel form can isolate such intricate self-consciousness and make it 
apparent; Grand’s readers have the more challenging but politically rewarding task of identifying 
it in each other. 
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